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Abstract 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE TREATMENT OF INCAPACITATED RAPE 
COMPLAINANTS: THE POTENTIAL OF VULNERABILITY AS A 
NEW FOUNDATION FOR LEGAL REFORM 
 
 
This thesis critically analyses the legal treatment of incapacitated rape complainants in 
England and Wales suggesting the need for reform. Recent statistics have identified a 
substantial drop in the rate of convictions for rape and sexual assault, indicating the need 
for substantial change to the criminal justice system. With a particular focus on 
incapacitated complainants, this thesis seeks to critically evaluate the failures of the current 
law. It will use a theory of vulnerability to suggest that the current conceptual 
underpinning of the law-autonomy, is at the core of the problematic response to sexual 
assault. In particular, it will argue that an autonomy-based approach has led to 
responsibilise complainants and develop a hierarchy of protections for incapacities. These 
issues, together with the inadequacy of a consent model, place undue focus on 
complainant’s behaviour thereby distracting from the defendant’s actions. After identifying 
the problems with an autonomy-based approach, this thesis will suggest a new legal 
offence drawing from Martha Fineman’s theory of vulnerability. Titled ‘unjustified sexual 
relations’ the offence will expand upon Jonathan Herring and Michelle Madden 
Dempsey’s argument that sexual penetration requires justification. This new offence will 
remove the focus from consent to a more robust requirement of justification. To 
demonstrate justification, a defendant must show that they did not exploit the vulnerability 
of the complainant. This theoretical shift will encourage a move away from the individual 
responsibility to avoid harm that an autonomy approach carries, to a duty placed on 
everyone not to exploit each other’s vulnerability.  This thesis acknowledges the powerful 
but limited role of the law. Therefore, it will be argued that a theory of vulnerability should 
be used to demand a responsive State to transform the societal response to sexual assault 
complainants requiring widespread and systemic change.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. THE JUSTICE GAP 
The criminal justice system is failing sexual assault complainants. Despite legislative 
reforms and procedural changes, rates of reporting and convictions for rape and sexual 
assaults have remained low for many years.1 As Temkin and Krahe have coined, there is 
arguably a significant  ‘justice gap.’2 The ‘justice gap’3 refers to the difference between the 
estimated rapes and sexual assaults perpetrated and the number of cases resulting in 
conviction. According to the 2018 ONS report on victimisation, the majority of victims of 
sexual assault are female.4 The report states that 560,000 victims were female with 140,000 
male victims, noting that women were four times as likely to have experienced sexual 
assault in 2017.5  The most recent report from the Crown Prosecution Service on Violence 
Against Women and Girls has revealed alarming statistics. In particular, the conviction 
rates dropped by 26.9% from 2,635 convictions in 2017-2018 to 1,925 in 2018-2019.6 This 
report, focussing on female victims, also noted that almost all the defendants were male.7 
According to the Home Office and Office for National Statistics (ONS) reports, the police 
recorded an increase of 11%8 in the number of rape claims reported, just 1.7% were of 
 
1 561,000 female and 143,000 male victims of sexual assault were recorded between March 2016 and March 
2018, yet the CPS recorded a 10% decrease in convictions and charges in the last year with just 6% offences 
resulting in a charge or summons see Ministry for Justice, Criminal Justice statistics quarterly. England and 
Wales [2017] 15 
2 Temkin, J., and Krahé, B., Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A question of Attitude (Hart publishing, 
2008) 
3 Ibid. 
4 Home Office, Ministry of Justice & the Office for National Statistics, ‘Sexual offending: victimisation and 
the path through the criminal justice system’ [2018] 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/articles/sexualoffendingvictimisati
onandthepaththroughthecriminaljusticesystem/2018-12-13 
5 Ibid. 
6 Crown Prosecution Service, Violence against Women and Girls Report 2018-2019, available at 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/cps-vawg-report-2019.pdf  According to 
the report, almost all defendants prosecuted were male. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Home Office, Ministry of Justice & the Office for National Statistics, ‘An Overview of Sexual Offending in 
England and Wales’ January 2017 
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claims prosecuted.9  These figures include both male and female victims. Traditionally, 
rape is viewed as a heteronormative issue, where the response tends to focus on female 
victims and male perpetrators. This thesis does not distinguish between male and female 
victim-survivors, and instead takes a gender-neutral approach to sexual assault. Indeed, in 
the concluding chapters, a sex-neutral offence will be suggested as an alternative to the 
current gender-specific approach of the law.10  
Research has also revealed a lack of confidence in the justice system. It was recorded that 
between one half and two thirds of complainants withdraw from the judicial process before 
they are referred to the CPS.11  It appears that this low confidence in authorities has 
remained rife, as the 2018 ONS revealed similar results. The report showed that nearly one 
third of victim-survivors did not tell anyone about their assault, with just 17% reporting to 
the police.12 Some reasons given for not informing the police included embarrassment and 
that they didn’t think they could help.13 A significant 27.7% stated that they did not tell the 
police as they thought they would not be believed. Furthermore, 20% of women who had 
been assaulted suggested their attack was too trivial to report.14 This might also suggest the 
impact rape myths might have on complainants themselves, denying or downplaying their 
own experience as explored in Chapter 2.   
 
The above figures are important for this thesis as they identify a justice gap, suggesting a 
need for reform to policies, practice and the law. Although this thesis acknowledges that 
increasing conviction rates should not be a primary aim for legal reform,15 these figures are 
still noteworthy as they highlight the existence of deep-rooted issues within our legal and 
societal response to sexual assault. The purpose of this thesis is to identify that the reliance 
on autonomy may be one of the issues contributing to this ever-widening justice gap by 
critically analysing the treatment of incapacitated complainants. Moreover, it will be 
 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/crimeinenglandandwales/
yearendingdecember2018 
9 Ibid. 
10 Throughout this thesis victim-survivors and complainants are used interchangeably. The terminology used 
in mostly non-gender specific. However, the pronoun she is used at times, however it should be noted that 
this analysis does encompass and acknowledge male victim-survivors. 
11 Lucy Maddox, Deborah Lee & Chris Barker, ‘Police empathy and victim PTSD as potential factors in rape 
case attrition’ [2011] 26 Journal of Police Criminal Psychology 112-117, 112 
12 ONS (n 4).  
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Wendy Larcombe, ‘Falling Rape Conviction Rates: (Some) Feminist Aims and Measures for Rape Law’ 
[2011] 19 Feminist Legal Studies 27-45, 27 
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argued that repeatedly reforming the law based on the same concept of autonomy will lead 
to similar unsatisfactory results. Therefore, this thesis will use a theory of vulnerability to 
suggest legal reforms.  
 
At the heart of sexual interactions in both law and society lies our understanding of the 
autonomous liberal legal subject.16 ‘He’ pervades our appreciation and vision of sexual 
relationships, of how victims should respond, of who deserves to be protected and of how 
we should protect those deserved. We strive to be autonomous, capable and independent 
individuals. We desire to be free, free from the State and free from any constraints on our 
choices. Yet such an understanding of our ontological existence is too simplistic, it is not 
nuanced, it is merely binary. We are categorised: you are capable, or you are not; you are 
free, or you are controlled; you can, or you cannot, you are normal or you are the ‘others.’ 
Reforming and implementing the law in such a light, however appealing due to its 
simplicity, has arguably led to inadequacies in the treatment of rape complainants. Such an 
approach ignores the reality of the human condition as we and our circumstances and 
environment are ever changing. As ever- fluctuating human beings we are constantly at 
risk of harm, therefore, we are never wholly independent. Rather, by our very nature, we 
are very dependent and reliant on both relationships and institutions.  It is the theory of 
vulnerability that acknowledges this reality of our existence;17 it offers us a unique 
opportunity to scrutinize our current response to victim-survivors of sexual offences 
together with a prospect to harbour future reforms with vulnerability at its core.  
Whilst there is some literature using a theory of vulnerability in relation to sexual 
offences,18 there is yet to be a full exploration of the potential of the theory as a new legal 
foundation. This thesis therefore seeks to fill a significant gap in the literature. It will use 
the theory of vulnerability to challenge our societal and legal norms and posit difficult 
questions regarding state and individual relationships and suggest how we might reimagine 
a legal framework with a conceptual foundation of vulnerability.  
 
16 Martha Albertson Fineman, ‘Cracking the Foundational Myth: Independence, Autonomy and Self 
Sufficiency’ [2000] 13(8) Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law 13- 29, 15 
17 Martha Albertson Fineman, ‘Elderly as Vulnerable: Rethinking the Nature of Individual and Societal 
Responsibility’ [2012] 20 (2) The Elder law Journal 101-141, 101 
18 Vanessa E. Munro, ‘Shifting Sands? Consent, Context and Vulnerability in Contemporary Sexual 
Offences Policy in England and Wales’ [2017] 26(4) Social and Legal Studies 417-440; Stu Marvel, 
‘Response to Tuerkheimer – rape on and off campus the vulnerable subject of rape law: rethinking agency 
and consent’ [2016] 65 Emory Law Journal Online, 2035- 2049; Herring, J., Vulnerable Adults and the law 
(Oxford University Press: 2016) ch 7 
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Martha Fineman has been developing the theory of vulnerability for over a decade since it 
was first proffered in 2008.19 The Vulnerability and Human Condition Initiative was 
developed as an ‘academic space within which scholars can imagine models of State 
responsibility.’20 In recent years the theory has gained much momentum with most 
academic literature exploring the theory in detail,21 other academics have sought to utilise 
the theory within their discipline ranging from for example, bioethics,22 analysing 
vulnerability of children,23 disability law,24 workfare law,25 sex work,26 marriage27 to the 
elderly.28 More recently, in 2018 the UNSW Law Journal published a thematic issue on 
vulnerability and the law. This special issue particularly refers to Martha Fineman’s theory 
of vulnerability. 29 In Jonathan Herring’s forward of the issue, he succinctly summarises 
how the vulnerability theory have been utilised in each of the articles. The issue focusses 
on the pragmatic uses of vulnerability moving on from much of the literature that has 
 
19 Martha Albertson Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition’ 
(2008) 20 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 1-23, 12 
20 http://web.gs.emory.edu/vulnerability/about/index.html Throughout this thesis the term State will be used 
to refer to the government and its institutions. The term Responsive State comes from Martha Fineman’s 
literature. It is used to refer to all state institutions including, but not limited to, the law, CPS, the police, 
institutions of the criminal justice system, educative institutions, health care, social care etc.  
21Martha Fineman, ‘Vulnerability and Inevitable inequality’ [2017] Oslo Law Review 133-149; Martha 
Albertson Fineman, ‘Equality and Difference- the Restrained State’ [2014-2015] 66(3) Alabama Law Review 
609-626; Biggs, H and Jones, C (2014) Legally vulnerable: what is vulnerability and who is 
vulnerable? In Freeman, M, Hawkes, S and Bennett,B (eds), Law and Global Health (Current Legal Issues, 
Vol. 16). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 133–148; Pamela Sue Anderson, ‘Autonomy, Vulnerability 
and Gender’ [2003] 4(2) Feminist Theory 149-164; Martha Fineman, ‘ The vulnerable Subject and the 
Responsive State’ [2010-2011] 60 Emory Law Journal 251- 274; Kohn (n 194), Marie A. Failinger, ‘The 
Paradox in madness: Vulnerability Confronts the Law’ [2012] 1 Mental Health Law & Policy Journal 127-
150, Frank Rudy Cooper, ‘Always already Suspect: Revising Vulnerability Theory’ [2015] 93 North 
Carolina Law Review 1339-1380, Beverley Clough, ‘Vulnerability and capacity to consent to sex – asking 
the right questions?’ [2014]26(4) Child and Family Law Quarterly 371-396, Kate Kaul, ‘Vulnerability for 
example: Disability theory as Extraordinary demand’ [2013] 25(1) Canadian Journal of Women and the law 
81-110, Pamela Sue Anderson, ‘Autonomy, Vulnerability and Gender’ [2003] 4(2) Feminist Theory 149-164, 
Bruenlla Cassalini, (2016). Politics, Justice and the Vulnerable Subject: The Contribution of Feminist 
Thought. Gênero & Direito. 5. 15-29; Fineman (n 19). 
22 Michael Thomson, ‘Bioethics and Vulnerability: Recasting the Objects of Ethical Concern’ [2018] 67 
Emory Law Journal 1207-1233. 
23 Herring, J., Vulnerability, Childhood and the Law (Springer Briefs in Law: 2018) 
24 Beverley Clough, ‘Disability and Vulnerability: Challenging the Capacity/Incapacity Binary’ [2017] 6(3) 
Social Policy and Society, 469-481, 477 
25 Jydbejerg, C.S., ‘Vulnerability, Workfare law and Resilient Social Justice’ 111 in Martha Fineman & 
Jonathan Fineman (eds) Vulnerability and the Legal Organization of Work (Routledge: New York 2018) 
26 Vanessa Munro and Jane Scoular ‘Abusing vulnerability? Contemporary law and policy responses to sex 
work and sex trafficking in the UK’ 20(3) [2012] Feminist Legal Studies 189-206.  
27 Martha Albertson Fineman, ‘Vulnerability and the Institution of Marriage’ [2015] 64 Emory Law Journal 
2089-2091, 2091 
28 Fineman (n 16).  
29 The thematic issue attempted to reveal the potential practical value the vulnerability theory may have, 
exploring many disciplines and issues such as policing and criminal justice, mental health law, workplace 
and disability law, working women undergoing IVF, forced marriage, and refugee law.  
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utilised vulnerability in an ‘abstract way.’30  Indeed, one of the vulnerability theories key 
criticisms is its lack of pragmatic value.31  This thesis seeks to address this criticism by 
using vulnerability in two pragmatic ways. Firstly, this thesis will use the vulnerability 
theory as a tool to critique and challenge the current legal response to sexual assaults. It 
will challenge our accepted norms and ask difficult questions of responsibility allocation 
and the role of the State. It will also be used to develop and mould a new legal response to 
sexual offences that will address the key problems as identified by a critical analysis of our 
current response. Below is a detailed outline of the chapters of this thesis.  
2. CHAPTER OUTLINES 
Chapter 1 of this thesis will critically explore the theoretical underpinnings of the current 
autonomy-based approach to sexual offences. It will analyse the key elements of an 
autonomy-based approach. It will also explore the connections between autonomy and the 
consent model, revealing their problematic ties. This chapter will also outline the coercion 
theory as a potential alternative approach to an autonomy-based model. It will then detail a 
vulnerability theory. It will highlight and examine the key concepts that underpin a 
vulnerability theory. Although Munro sees some benefits of a vulnerability approach, she 
warns of the potential issues that may arise from its use.32 This chapter acknowledges that 
vulnerability is not without its flaws, however after an in-depth exploration and critique of 
the current liberal legal autonomous approach through vulnerability, the reality of 
responsibilisation and State failure that permeates our laws and society will be highlighted. 
Moreover, it will be argued that a vulnerability theory can be used as a tool to challenge 
our traditional understandings of our existence, and to tackle the expectations and 
responsibilisation that comes with an autonomy-based approach. This chapter will provide 
 
30 Jonathan Herring, ‘Vulnerability and the Law: Forward’ [2018] 41(3) UNSW Law Journal 626 
31 Haas argues that the theory has many limitations highlighting the need for recognition of its strengths and 
downturns Nayeli Urquiza Haas, ‘Book review: M. A. Fineman and A. Grear (eds.): Vulnerability: 
Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics Ashgate, 2013,’ [2014] 22 Feminist legal 
studies 335-339, 335; Kohn and Eichner have identified that Fineman’s theory needs refinement and revision. 
Kohn also labelled the theory as relatively abstract see Nina A Kohn, ‘Vulnerability Theory and the Role of 
the Government’ [2014] 26(1) Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 1-27, 8; Maxine Eichner, ‘Dependency 
and the Liberal Polity: on Martha Fineman’s Autonomy myth’ [2005] 93(4) California Law Review 1285-
1321, 1287; whereas Fallinger’s analysis portrays how the theory of vulnerability can be used as both a shield 
and a sword, protecting those who need it and promoting the personal rights of those who at that particular 
time do not need extra protection Marie A. Failinger, ‘The Paradox in madness: Vulnerability Confronts the 
Law’ [2012] 1 Mental Health Law & Policy Journal 127-150, 146.  
32 For an exploration of the critiques of vulnerability and responses see chapter 1 
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us with the tools to move forward and unpick the societal and legal response to sexual 
assault complainants.  
Chapter 2 will develop this argument further by exploring the treatment of sexual assault 
complainants in law and society. Many academics have identified attitudes as the source of 
the justice gap. As Dripps argues there is a problem of attitudes for which he suggests that 
we bypass the jury.33 Temkin and Krahe also identify the problem of attitudes and 
similarly suggest abolishing the jury in sexual assault cases. 34 Moreover, as Anna Cossins 
suggests ‘the only feasible explanation’35 for low conviction rates in sexual assault trials, is 
the misconceptions and myths and that affect jury decisions. 36 Although a potential 
explanation for low convictions, this fails to address the inefficiency of the formation of 
the legal response to sexual assault. Moreover, they do not identify how an autonomy 
approach has shaped these attitudes. Cossins suggests expert evidence should be provided 
that summarises the psychological impact of sexual assault on victims,37  and/ or a judicial 
direction containing the same information.38 Temkin and Krahé also suggest further 
educative measures including screening and selecting jurors,39 assisting jurors with written 
materials,40 giving reasons for verdicts41 and training judges and lawyers.42 However, these 
suggestions focus on attitudes and myths and fail to identify the conceptual underpinnings 
of these problematic expectations that are placed on complainants. Although 
commendable, it will be argued that these reforms alone, are not enough to tackle the deep-
rooted issues. Instead, this chapter will argue that blame and responsibility is attributed to 
many complainants of sexual assault because of the current autonomy approach. It will 
argue that a more nuanced vulnerability analysis will allow us to shift our focus away from 
the complainant’s behaviour, onto the exploitative actions of the defendant.  
Chapter 3 will then critically analyse the current legal response to sexual assault 
complainants with a particular focus on intoxicated complainants. Other academics have 
 
33 Donald Dripps, 'After Rape Law: Will the Turn to Consent Normalize the Prosecution of Sexual Assault' 
[2008] 41 Akron Law Review 957-980, 960. Dripps also suggests, in a US context, to develop a special 
crimes court see pp 979.  
34 Temkin & Krahe, (n 2) 177. 
35 Anna Cossins, ‘Expert witness Evidence in Sexual Assault trials: questions answers and law reforms in 
Australia and England’ [2013] 17 The International Journal of Evidence and Proof 74-113, 77 
36 Ibid. 
37 Cossins (n 35) 111. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Temkin & Krahe (n 2) 180. 
40 Ibid 181. 
41 Ibid 186. 
42 Ibid 188. 
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identified the problems with the current legal response, yet the solutions offered fail to 
tackle the conceptual underpinnings of the legislation.  Sharon Cowan rightly identifies, 
the legal protections for voluntary and involuntary intoxicated complainants as 
hierarchal.43 However, this thesis goes further by including mentally incapacitated 
complainants in this comparison, arguing that all complainants are incapacitated at the time 
of offence and are therefore deserved of equal protection. She also recognises that we need 
to address the issue of responsibility for sexual activity44 calling for ‘social change 
regarding gendered expectations of appropriate sexual activity and beliefs about 
responsibility for sexual assault.’45  She suggests an exploration into the socio-sexual 
behaviour of men and women to attempt to shift prejudices.46  Cowan suggests these 
together with legal reform, including ‘a statutory based test and guidance on capacity, 
more education and training for judges and potentially also juries.’ 47 These suggested 
reforms have potential to address some of the issues that incapacitated complainants face. 
This chapter builds on these arguments. It will explore how the determination of capacity 
and consent came into being by analysing the discussions prior to the introduction of the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003. It will then explore how these concepts, and the legal 
presumptions are interpreted and applied through an analysis of the key case law.  This 
chapter will contribute to the overall thesis by arguing that because of the conceptual 
underpinnings of autonomy, complainants, particularly those who were voluntarily 
intoxicated, are responsibilised and afforded protections in accordance with their apparent 
blameworthiness. This chapter identifies there is undue focus on the complainant’s 
behaviour because of the autonomy approach which in turn contributes to the problematic 
legal and societal response to sexual assault.  
Building on these points, chapter 4 explores the current and historical treatment of sexual 
assault complainants who have a ‘mental disorder’. This chapter will further strengthen the 
argument that an autonomy-based approach is at the heart of the problematic legal 
response. It will argue that because of autonomy, those with a mental disorder have 
typically been othered from society, segregated and treated different on the basis of the 
existence of particular characteristics. Whilst identifying this, this chapter will also 
 
43 Sharon Cowan, ‘The Trouble with Drink: Intoxication, (In)Capacity, and the Evaporation of Consent to 
Sex’ [2008] 41 Akron Law Review 899-922, 921 
44 Ibid 922. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid 921. 
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critically analyse section 30 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which demonstrates a 
genuine attempt at balancing autonomy and protection. It will also look to the civil law 
approach for determining capacity. It will be asked whether there are any lessons to 
learned from this legal response when moving forward to suggesting alternative legal 
reforms based on a theory of vulnerability.  
Through the analysis of the current legal response in England and Wales, the determination 
of capacity and consent will have been identified as problematic. Before suggesting an 
uprooting of the theoretical foundations, chapter 5 will explore alternative reforms that are 
based on autonomy. For this, we look to the Canadian approach, where an affirmative 
consent model and a capacity umbrella approach have been implemented. The affirmative 
consent model will be critically analysed to determine whether a yes means yes model is 
sufficient to alleviate the concerns of an autonomy-based approach. Moreover, it will 
explore whether the removal of the types of incapacity from legislation has amounted to 
equal protection for incapacitated complainants. It will ask whether this approach can 
significantly improve the treatment of incapacitated complainants whilst still informed 
through an autonomy lens.   
The final substantive chapter will explore how a vulnerability theory might shape our legal 
response to sexual offences. Tadros identifies the problems with a consent model which 
focusses on the complainant by putting the victim on trial and subject to manipulation by 
defence counsel.48 Moreover he rightly identifies that defining rape ‘around the will of the 
victim tends to encourage criminal trials to focus problematically on the conduct and 
sexual history of the complainant rather than the conduct of the accused.’49 This chapter 
also seeks to argue that consent is too malleable and inadequate a concept which 
encourages undue focus on the complainant’s behaviour.  This chapter further identifies 
the undue focus on the complainant’s behaviour as part of the problematic legal and 
societal response to sexual assault. However, although Tadros suggests the removal of 
consent as a central concept50 of sexual offences, he instead suggests a differentiated 
offence of rape which can be perpetrated in different ways.51 Unfortunately, as he 
acknowledges, he does not explore the theoretical underpinnings of the legal response,52 
 
48 Victor Tadros, ‘Rape without Consent’ [2006] 26(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 515-543, 517 
49 Ibid 516. 
50 Ibid 518. 
51 Ibid 541. 
52 Ibid 519. 
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and his suggested reforms are therefore limited as they are based on autonomy.53 Instead, 
this chapter will build on Herring and Dempsey’s argument that sexual penetration requires 
justification that is more than just consent.54 It will explore and expand on Herring and 
Dempsey’s concepts through a vulnerability lens. Through a critical analysis and 
expansion of Herring and Dempsey’s arguments a new offence titled ‘unjustified sexual 
activity’ will be suggested. This chapter will argue that this new offence would help to 
alleviate the concerns with the current legal response to sexual assault.  
The concluding chapter will explore how a theory of vulnerability would be used to shape 
the societal response to sexual assault complainants, detailing the need for widespread 
systemic change. This chapter will explore the need for an active and responsive State. 
Academics like Kelly, Lovett and Regan suggest ‘a shift within the CJS from a focus on 
the discreditability of complainants to enhanced evidence gathering and case-building.’55 
These suggestions can be informed through a theory of vulnerability. Indeed, this chapter 
will detail how a vulnerability theory could help inform education policies, judicial 
directions and widespread systemic change to our attitudes and expectations placed on 
complainants. Overall, it will be argued that an autonomy-based approach is inadequate as 
it responsibilises individuals and fails to adequately and equally protect complainants. 
What is required is a complete overhaul of the conceptual and theoretical foundations of 
our legal and societal response to sexual assault complainants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 Ibid 543. 
54 Michelle Madden Dempsey and Jonathan Herring, ‘Why Sexual Penetration Requires Justification’ [2007] 
27 (3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 467-491 
 55 Kelly, Liz, Jo Lovett, and Linda Regan, ‘A gap or a chasm? Attrition in reported rape cases (Home 
Office Research Study 293)’ [2005] London: Home Office Research, Development and Statistics 
Directorate. xii 
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Chapter 1 
 
CHALLENGING AUTONOMY: THE POTENTIAL OF VULNERABILITY 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The area of sexual assault law reform has been dominated by the theory of autonomy. 
Reforms have been repeatedly suggested and implemented based on these overarching 
notions which are underpinned by the idea of the ‘liberal legal subject.’56 As it will be 
analysed throughout this thesis, there are many issues with assuming the existence of a 
liberal legal subject.57 The aim of this chapter is to highlight the inadequacies of the 
concept of the liberal legal subject, exposing the flaws of an autonomy approach, and to 
reveal the shortfalls of the alternative theory of coercion. This will be analysed in section 
1.1 and section 2. To challenge our understanding of the human condition the theory of 
vulnerability will be detailed in section 3. In this section, the key components of the 
vulnerability theory will be critically explored to provide a comprehensive understanding 
of its uniqueness and alternative narratives of the legal subject. In section 3.3 it will be 
argued vulnerability is rooted within a richer understanding of our ontological existence 
that calls for the State to respond to all subjects equally. As explored in section 3.5 it seeks 
to challenge the ‘othering’ of vulnerable groups and demands a shift in our perspective. 
Vulnerability is a novel theory that helps shape our understanding of our ontological and 
societal existence. The theory of vulnerability has a wide and vast scope. This thesis will 
 
56 The liberal legal subject is based on the freedom of choice and autonomy. As Rosemary Hunter described 
‘The legal person envisaged by liberal legalism is rational, autonomous, self-contained, self-possessed, self-
sufficient and formally equal before the law. see ‘Contesting the Dominant Paradigm: Feminist Critiques of 
Liberal Legalism’ In: Davies, Margaret and Munro, Vanessa, eds. The Ashgate Research Companion to 
Feminist Legal Theory. Ashgate, Farnham,13-30, 13 also referencing Ann Scales definition of the liberal 
subject ‘as individuals are rational and self-interested and use their rationality to achieve their needs and 
desires’ Scales, A., Legal Feminism: Activism, Lawyering and Legal Theory (New York: University Press) 
60.   
57 Hunter also notes feminist critique of the liberal legal subject as inherently masculine, referring to how 
privileged white men have populated law and shaped it to their own image ‘and instated their experience and 
view of the world as the legal norm’. She refers to the existence of this masculine norm in many areas of law 
including that of the reasonable man in tort and the responsible person criminal law. She cites Naffine’s 
analysis which states it is difficult to see these legal persons who act autonomously in the public sphere, 
changing nappies, cuddling children or breastfeeding. Naffine, N. ‘Can women be legal persons?’ in S. James 
& S Palmer (eds.) Visible Women: Essays on Feminist Legal Theory and Political Philosophy, (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2002) 81. See also Ibid 13. 
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contribute to the developing literature by uniquely addressing its applicability and 
pragmatic value to sexual assault law reform. It will be used as a tool to challenge the 
current conceptual underpinnings of autonomy and it will be expanded and developed to 
suggest legislative reforms moving forward.  Suggested legal reforms borne out of these 
philosophies provide the opportunity to develop an improved and enriched response to 
incapacitated victim-survivors of sexual assault.  As earlier noted, the theory of 
vulnerability has yet to be fully explored in relation to sexual offence law, a gap which this 
thesis seeks to fill. Firstly, we must explore why the competing theories of autonomy and 
coercion are inadequate both generally, and in relation to addressing sexual offences.  
 
1.1 THE ‘MYTH’ OF AUTONOMY AND THE PITFALLS OF THE ‘LIBERAL 
LEGAL SUBJECT’ 
Martha Fineman labelled autonomy as a myth in 2004,58 stating that autonomy is in fact 
unattainable, and has been used to create a ‘public-private divide.’59 More recently 
Fineman has stated that the autonomous and independent legal subject is a ‘static figment 
of the liberal imagination.’60  Through an analysis of the key values of the liberal legal 
subject, the shortfalls of the autonomous liberal legal framework will be argued.   
The ‘liberal subject’ is the dominant legal subject who seeks from the State the facilities to 
assist in the exercise of autonomy.61 The approach pursues a distinctive line dividing the 
public and private sphere.62 In particular, the liberal legal subject is concerned with the 
State’s interference in the private sphere which risks preventing individuals’ exercise of 
 
58 Fineman, M. The autonomy myth. A theory of dependency (New York/London: The New Press 2004); 
Fineman, M., 'Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject in Law and Politics' in Martha Fineman and 
Anna Grear (eds), Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics (Ashgate, 
2013) 13- 27; Fineman (n 16). 
59 Kerin,H., ‘In the land of choice: Privatized reality and contractual vulnerability’ in Martha Albertson 
Fineman, Titti Mattison & Urika Andersson Privatization, Vulnerability, and Social Responsibility: A 
Comparative Perspective, (Taylor & Francis: 2017) 61 
60 Fineman, M., Mattison, T., & Andersson, U., Privatization, Vulnerability, and Social Responsibility: A 
Comparative Perspective, (Taylor & Francis: 2017) introduction p. 3 
61 Fineman (n 16) 15.  
62  Ibid. There are many issues with this division. As Hunter (n 57) 20 cites ‘Responsibility for individual 
welfare is less and less considered to be a matter of collective, social, or public obligation and is increasingly 
regarded as a private, individual or, at most, a family or charitable matter’ see also Fudge & Crossman, 
‘Introduction: Privatization, law, and the challenge to Feminism’, in Privatization, Law, and the Challenge to 
Feminism, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press) 3–37, 3 
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autonomy. The current autonomy approach rejects State action and labels it as a 
paternalistic interference with rights to freedom. 63 
Generally, the pursuit of this liberal legal subject suggests that autonomous individuals are 
capable, they have capacity to make decisions and live their own lives and as such, they do 
not need ‘help’ from others or the State. With that comes an understanding of the 
autonomous liberal legal subject as independent. As a liberal legal subject, their health and 
capabilities are presupposed where they can live independently of ‘subventions and 
support from others.’64 As Montero rightly states, ‘this insistence on the desirability of 
autonomy (and the undesirability of vulnerability) reinforces the conception of the ideal of 
the human being as a finished, self-sufficient being.’65 Similarly, Witmer-Rich refers to the 
classical liberal legal approach to decision making and self-government; he outlines 
J.S.Mill’s dicta on the value of consent; that we place so much emphasis on consent 
because ‘individuals are the best judge of their own interests.’66 Moreover, he refers to 
Feinberg’s arguments on the value of consent as a ‘right to autonomy based on her intrinsic 
sovereignty of her own life.67 To achieve such independence and self-sufficiency with 
decisions made free from any control or inferences, the liberal legal subject shuns State 
interference. At its core is the notion that individuals should be able to choose how they 
live their life however they so wish.68 As McClusky suggests, the State is legitimate only 
when it acts to enable human autonomy and protect individual freedom.69 Arguably then, 
preventative action by the State is construed as negative.  As Brenkert argues ‘people are 
unfree when they are constrained by others or institutions.’70 Hence, liberal legal subjects 
often treat the State and its resources as a source of scepticism with which motives of 
action are scrutinized and regulations rejected.  
 
63 Gilson, E., ‘Entrepreneurial subjectivity, the privatization of risks and the ethics of vulnerability’ in Martha 
Albertson Fineman, Titti Mattison & Urika Andersson Privatization, Vulnerability, and Social 
Responsibility: A Comparative Perspective, (Taylor & Francis: 2017) 90 
64 Katzin, M., ‘Freedom of Choice over equality as objective for the Swedish welfare state? The latest debate 
on choice in education’ in Martha Albertson Fineman, Titti Mattison & Urika Andersson Privatization, 
Vulnerability, and Social Responsibility: A Comparative Perspective, (Taylor & Francis: 2017) 172 
65 Carolina Montero, ‘Autonomy, Vulnerability, Dichotomy or continuum?’ (A workshop on Vulnerability 
conference, Emory University, February 2018) 
66 Jonathan Witmer-Rich, ‘It’s Good to be Autonomous: Prospective Consent, Retrospective Consent, and the 
Foundation of Consent in the Criminal Law’ [2011] 5 Criminal Law and Philosophy 377-398, 377 
67 Ibid. 
68 Herring, J., ‘Relational Autonomy and Rape’ in Shelley Day Sclater, Fatemeh Ebtehaj, Emily Jackson & 
Martin Richards (eds) Regulating Autonomy: Sex Reproduction and Family (Oxford and Portland, Oregon 
Hart Publishing, 2009) 54 
69 Martha T McCluskey, ‘Responsiveness and Resilience Beyond Neo-Liberal Autonomy’ conference paper 
‘A workshop on Vulnerability’ Emory University February 2018.  
70 George G Brenkert, ‘Self Ownership, Freedom and Autonomy’ [1998] 2 The Journal of Ethics 27-55, 27 
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Although these above-mentioned elements of the autonomy approach could be dealt with 
in detail in turn, they are somewhat overlapping. The core concepts of the liberal legal 
subject can be surmised as a free capable individual who exercises their rights to act in 
their own bests interests free from any paternalistic interventions.71 With regards to sexual 
autonomy the same values are evident, as sexual autonomy rights are seen as a subset of 
autonomy rather than a distinctive category.72 As Schulhofer explains, sexual autonomy 
has three components: ‘an internal capacity to make mature and rational choices…an 
external freedom from impermissible pressures and constraints, and the bodily integrity of 
the individual.’73 The focus remains on the importance of individual choice and of 
informed consent to sexual activities.74  
 
As a result, the foundations of the legislation appear to be based on this desire for freedom, 
this assertion of a right to be free from external pressures and this presumption that 
individuals are capable to make choices. This is problematic for a number of reasons. 
Simply asserting that there is a right to be free from external pressures, does nothing to 
address the presence of such pressures. It does not address the impact that such external 
pressures have on the validity of these choices. It is merely a proclamation, that ignores the 
stark reality that choices, particularly sexual choices, are not made in a vacuum. These 
decisions are not merely an assertion of freedom but are difficult complex choices that 
interrelate to the individual and their position, their situation and their environment. Sexual 
autonomy, and the assertion of its associated rights, fails to acknowledge and address the 
realities in which we live and make sexual decisions. The approach is further complicated 
where an individual is perceived not to have capacity to consent as explored below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
71 Hunter (n 57) 13.   
72 Stephen Knight, ‘Libertarian critiques of consent in sexual offences’ [2012] UCL Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence, 103-165, 140 
73 Schulhofer, S., Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and the Failure of Law (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press 1998)  
74 Knight (n 72) 137.  
22 
 
1.2 AUTONOMY, CAPACITY AND OTHERING 
A key element of the autonomy theory is its links with the presumption of capacity. 
Autonomy, unlike vulnerability, ‘is not an inherent human characteristic.’75 Politically, 
autonomy is based on keeping the State out of the way to allow individuals to make their 
own private decisions.76 Its liberal interpretation focuses on choice and disapproves of 
restrictions of that freedom.77 As the autonomous liberal legal subject puts substantial 
emphasis on independence and capabilities of individuals this then creates a distinctive line 
between those who have capacity and those who do not. Moreover, a foundation that is 
based on autonomy, and therefore presumption of capacity is problematic for sexual 
relations. If we start from a point where we presume everyone is capable, it is unsurprising 
that the burden to prove otherwise rests with that individual. In other words, because of 
this acceptance, and arguably the insistence if capacity, defendants’ wilful blindness as to 
their incapacity, may well be accepted. Moreover, a foundation based on capacity 
contributes to the creation of a norm. It presumes individuals are capable and independent, 
unless they have a particular characteristic to suggest otherwise.  If you do not meet this 
expected standard of capable, you are othered. This in essence fuels the grouping of the so-
called others who fail to fulfil the capable characteristics of the autonomous liberal legal 
subject. Such ‘othering’ then leads to distinctive treatment of these individuals. They are 
separated into groups with like characteristics and afforded certain protections because of 
their apparent dependency. In other words, the liberal subject fails to consider the frailty of 
the human condition holistically. Considering that a liberal subject is based on a fully 
autonomous individual, arguably those who do not fall into that category are characterised 
as ‘incapable’ individuals. This can result in differential treatment; in particular their rights 
to decision making can be restricted and protections may be unequally distributed. 
This creates, as Clough refers to, binaries between capacity/incapacity and 
vulnerable/invulnerable78 and with this follows the stereotypical attitudes and myths that 
relate to those who do not fulfil this ‘ideal type’ subject criteria. This is of particular 
concern when we explore how this approach affects the treatment of incapacitated rape 
complainants.79 This is similarly echoed in the approach to State interventions. There are 
 
75 Martha Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State’ [2010] The Emory Law Journal 251–
275, 260.  
76 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/autonomy  
77 Herring (n 68) 59.  
78 Clough (n 21) 470. 
79 As we will be discussing in the below section this othering of groups in something which the vulnerability 
theory seeks to avoid and eradicate. 
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many critiques to the rejection of the State. In particular, as Brenkert rightly recognises, 
individuals start with different levels of ‘abilities, talents, energy and resources.’80 Such a 
libertarian approach to freedom and state interferences may mean that people will 
accumulate different levels of resources where ‘any coercive redistributive efforts would 
reduce their freedom…’81 Moreover, what appears not to be recognised through this 
approach is that the State is ever present and is constantly acting. Rejecting State action to 
protect autonomy fails to acknowledge the State as a constant cog which regulates our 
everyday lives. The roles and responsibilities which it chooses to accept and adopt vary 
because of the way in which we have accepted our individual responsibility. The more the 
State is rejected, the more autonomy we perceive to have. As Kozel states ‘autonomy is a 
striking and powerful word,’82 which carries with it many connotations. With autonomy, 
comes responsibilisation- by welcoming self-regulation and shunning state action, we 
become responsible for any failures or indeed harm that may result.  
This section has begun to argue that there are inherent issues within the autonomous liberal 
legal subject. Throughout this thesis, Martha Fineman’s claim that autonomy is a myth83 
will become more apparent when we examine our societal attitudes towards rape 
complainants and the current legislative approach to incapacities. Many scholars will be 
reluctant to accept this rejection. Indeed, Satz in particular, disagrees with Fineman’s 
rejection of the liberal subject.84  She states that she does not see the need for legal 
structures to be shaped exclusively around one or the other.85 Moreover, some academics 
have accepted the problems with this approach and have instead attempted to 
reconceptualise autonomy86 through a feminist lens with the term ‘relational autonomy.’87 
 
80 Brenkert (n 70) 27. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Randy J. Kozel,’ Institutional Autonomy and Constitutional Structure’ [2014] Michigan Law Review, 957-
978, 963. 
83 Fineman (n 16) 24. 
84 Ani B. Satz, ‘Disability, vulnerability, and the limits of antidiscrimination’ [2008] 83 Washington Law 
Review 513-567, 551 
85 Ibid. 
86 Stoljar, Natalie, ‘Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/feminism-autonomy/>. 
87 See Catriona MacKenzie, ‘The importance of Relational Autonomy and Capabilities for an Ethics of 
Vulnerability’ in Catriona Mackenzie, Wendy Rogers & Susan Dodds (eds) Vulnerability, New Essays in 
Ethics and Feminist Philosophy, (New York: Oxford University Press 2014); Herring (n 64) ; Susan Dodds, 
‘Depending on care: Recognition of vulnerability and the social constructs of care provision’ [2007] 21(9) 
Bioethics 500-510; Elizabeth Ben-Ishai, ‘The Autonomy-Fostering State: ‘Coordinated Fragmentation’ and 
Domestic Violence Services’ [2008] 17 Journal of Political Philosophy 307-331; Braudo-Bahat, Yael, 
‘Towards a Relational Conceptualization of the Right to Personal Autonomy’ [2017] 25(2) American 
University Journal of Gender, Social Policy the Law, 111-154  
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A relational autonomy approach attempts to move away from the individualistic traditional 
understanding of autonomy, towards an understanding of the individual identities are 
formed in the context of their social relationships.88 It acknowledges the vulnerability of 
individuals, where decisions are made in context as embedded beings.89 Relational 
autonomy accepts our dependency and acknowledges that ‘social institutions and structures 
protect us against some vulnerabilities, while others expose us to risk.’90 As Delgado states 
human beings are always involved in relationships and sit within a network of social 
relations.91 Indeed she explores the connection and overlap between Fineman’s 
vulnerability theory and relational autonomy, arguing the promotion of relational 
autonomy through a vulnerability lens.92 Although not within the scope of this thesis to 
fully explore, it is argued that a relational autonomy approach would not address the 
problematic response to sexual assault complainants. As will be argued throughout, the 
autonomy focus is still structured on the individual. The concept of relational autonomy is 
merely derivative of autonomy and cannot address the issues that will be identified in this 
thesis. As Westlund suggest ‘it is not always clear whether relational theorists are offering 
a fundamentally different approach to autonomy.’93 Although we need to recognise our 
position in society and how we live our lives in a web of relationships,94 we need to move 
away from an individualistic response towards a more holistic theory of vulnerability. 
Moreover, with the foundations of sexual offences based on autonomy, the violation of a 
same is proceeding to have sex without her consent.95 This inextricable link with the 
complex and vague concept of consent creates further issues for sexual offences.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 Mackenzie, C & Stoljar, N, ‘Autonomy refigured’ In Ed Mackenzie & Stoljar (eds) Relational Autonomy 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) 4 
89 Dodds (n 87) 506. 
90 Ibid 507. 
91 Janet Delgado, ‘Re-thinking relational autonomy: Challenging the triumph of autonomy through 
vulnerability’ [2019] 5 Bioethics 50-65, 52 
92 Ibid. 
93 Andrea C Westlund, ‘Rethinking Relational Autonomy’ [2009] 24(4) Hypatia 26-49, 26. 
94 Herring (n 68) ch.4. 
95 Schulhofer (n 73) 268-272. 
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1.3 THE PROBLEMS WITH CONSENT.  
MacKinnon in particular notes that that consent misdiagnoses the problem.96 Estrich too 
recognises that the ‘definition makes all too plain that the purpose of the consent rule is not 
to protect female autonomy and freedom of choice, but to assure men the broadest sexual 
access to women.’97 Indeed this thesis will argue that consent is problematic,98 in that 
through the guise of promoting and respecting autonomy we responsibilise complainants 
and excessively focus on how her actions contributed to the assault. Consent, as an 
inherently subjective concept, fails to address the contextual and situational factors in 
which decision are made. Using a complex, subjective concept such as consent to 
differentiate between permissible and criminal acts is likely to lead to inadequate 
responses. Moreover, as detailed in chapter 6, consent lacks normative force. As Herring 
and Dempsey refer discuss, consent merely provides a defendant with exclusionary 
permission to not consider reasons against penetration.99 Although autonomy underpins 
consent, consent is also inextricably linked to autonomy. To give valid consent you must 
be autonomous, which, as this thesis will argue, is in fact unachievable. 
From a vulnerability perspective, consent is problematic because it promotes autonomy, it 
hides responsibilisation with a guise of freedom and fails to adequately address the 
situational and particular vulnerabilities of the complainant. Therefore, it is the 
underpinning theory of autonomy that appears to cause of the many issues with the 
treatment of sexual assault complainants.  
 
As will be explored below, the coercive model through MacKinnon’s perception of gender 
inequality, assumes that such inequality pervades every sexual relationship. Vulnerability, 
however, does acknowledge that we are all vulnerable, both because of our embodiment 
but also because of our embedded nature- how we interact with the State and others. 
Vulnerability posits a more nuanced understanding of our relationships and does not 
assume the mere differing in gender automatically equates to unequal sex. Instead we can 
use the lens of vulnerability to critically analyse the particular and situational factors whilst 
 
96 MacKinnon, C., ‘Rape: on Coercion and consent’ in Lori Gruen & George E. Panichas (eds.) Sex Morality 
and the law (New York and London, Routledge, 1997) 436 
97 Susan Estrich, ‘Rape’ [1986] 95 Yale Law Journal 1087-1184, 1087 
98 When analysing the legislation in chapter 3. 
99 Herring J., & Dempsey M., ‘Rethinking the criminal law’s response to sexual penetration’ in Clare Mc 
Glynn & Vanessa E. Munro Rethinking Rape law, International and Comparative Perspectives (Oxon, 
Routledge, 2016) 33 
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also shifting our perspective from the individual onto the State. Moreover, the vulnerability 
focus allows us to challenge autonomy, something which coercion continues to support 
despite, as will be further detailed below, the hidden implications. Before we explore the 
potential of vulnerability, the merits of the theory of coercion must be explored to 
determine whether there is potential in the alternative approach. 
 
 
2. THE APPROACH OF MACKINNON’S COERCION 
The above section has started to reveal some of the many issues within the autonomy and 
consent paradigm for sexual offences. Indeed, it is because of the difficulties in 
conceptualising and regulating consent that many feminists have favoured an approach 
based on coercion. Coercion from Mackinnon’s perspective is understood to be some form 
of pressure, duress or fear that results in so called consent to sex.100 Many feminists have 
different views on how coercion is or should be framed, below is a brief exploration of 
some the key literature. Coercion is a popular approach to sexual offences by many 
feminists, we must therefore consider its merits before suggesting an alternative approach 
through a vulnerability theory.  
 
2.1 RAPE AS VIOLENCE  
 
One such understanding of coercion is based on the historical view that rape was not an 
offence against a woman, rather women were seen as property belonging to a man. In 
Susan Brownmiller’s Against our Will, the history and development of rape was fully 
explored.101 She details a historical account of rape as a weapon of war used against 
 
100 There appears not to be a single accepted definition of coercion. Pugh and Becker explore the definitions 
in their recent article and note the following. ‘Many scholars use the terms sexual coercion and sexual assault 
interchangeably or that sexual coercion encompasses all types of perpetration tactics that lead to sexual 
assault…’ and ‘Feminist scholars argue that verbal sexual coercion is fuelled by invisible power dynamics 
that justify men’s use of coercive tactics, prohibit women from making free and autonomous decisions on 
when, how, and where to engage in sexual activity, or utterly obscure the process by considering it to be a 
normal part of heterosexual relations’. Citing physical force, a continuum of rape and unwanted sexual 
activity consented through compliance or acquiescence as some understandings of coercion. See Pugh, B., & 
Becker, P.  ‘Exploring Definitions and Prevalence of Verbal Sexual Coercion and Its Relationship to Consent 
to Unwanted Sex: Implications for Affirmative Consent Standards on College Campuses’ [2018] 
8(8) Behavioral sciences 69, (2.1) 
101 Brownmiller, S., Against our Will: Men, Women and Rape (Pelican Books, 1986) 
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enemies.102 In essence, Brownmiller recounts rape throughout the years and concludes that, 
rape is an act of power and dominance used by men to instil fear in their victims.103 She 
uses the theory of coercion to argue that rape is not sexual desire or uncontrollable passion 
but instead an act of violence used by men to control women.104 She suggests that threat of 
rape benefits all men.105   
 
Arguably, Brownmiller’s failing is her excessive reliance on examples of rape during times 
of hostility. She explores rape by men during war, in prison and riots but rarely ‘by men as 
men.’106 However, there may be some merit in the coercive model in the international 
criminal law context;107 particularly when rape is perceived as violence.108 Although this 
too has been the subject to much criticism and debate, of which this thesis does not have 
the capacity to engage with,109 considering rape in an international criminal law setting is 
often perpetrated by men at a time of war and hostility, this model might serve as an 
accurate reflection of the coercive nature of sexual offences committed. However, as 
aforementioned, equating rape at war time to acts of genocide has been subject to much 
debate.110 Therefore, there may be some strength in her proposal that victims submit to 
coerced sex at times of war/hostility because of this threat of violence; but it is difficult to 
envisage how such a theory could accurately reflect the wide-range of sexual relations in 
normal day-to-day life. As Conaghan argues, by placing rape as an act of violence, it fails 
to acknowledge the particular wrong of rape and fails to identify why it ‘should be 
distinctly wrongful.’111 Comparing rape to other acts of violence, as Conaghan suggest, 
makes rape ‘indistinguishable’ whilst failing to identify why it deserves our special 
 
102 Ibid 31. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid 153. 
105 Ibid 15. 
106 MacKinnon (n 96) 
107 Munro, V.E., ‘From Consent to Coercion’, in Mc Glynn, C., & Munro, V.E., (eds.) Rethinking Rape Law, 
International and Comparative Perspectives (Oxon, Routledge, 2016) 18 
108 Catherine A MacKinnon, ‘Towards a Feminist Theory of the State’ (London Harvard University Press 
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attention.112  For instance, the rape of an intoxicated victim for the perpetrator’s sexual 
gain would more accurately be described as the exploitation of a vulnerable subject’s 
inability to refuse sexual advances rather than an act of violence. Undoubtedly, some rapes 
will have (and will continue to) be fuelled by violent motivations; yet it is not a true and 
all-encompassing reflection to posit that all rapes are just an act of violence. Although 
violence can be defined and conceived through different lenses, if we take the term in its 
ordinary meaning, we can challenge this idea. As Cahill observes, ‘few women would 
agree that being raped is essentially equivalent to being hit in the face.’113 Similarly, as 
Conaghan states ‘conceived narrowly and traditionally in terms of physical force, coercion 
yields an understanding of rape that excludes many non-consensual sexual encounters… a 
consent-based model is obviously more expansive than a force- or coercion-based one.’114 
Therefore, this understanding of rape arguably reflects one particular type of rape and fails 
to reflect different experiences of sexual assault. However, there are other interpretations 
of the theory of coercion that in fact reject Brownmiller’s understanding of rape as 
violence and instead rely on coercion to posit that rape is about power. In particular, 
MacKinnon’s view is a dominant interpretation of the coercion theory which suggests that 
gender inequality is at the heart of sexual assault.115 
 
 
2.2 RAPE AS POWER IMBALANCE 
It is acknowledged that some instances of rape may well reflect Brownmiller’s 
interpretation of rape as violence, however this account cannot accurately reflect the 
realities and particularities of rape. Instead, we can look to MacKinnon’s interpretation of 
the coercion approach which places power imbalances and gender inequality at the heart of 
sexual offences. As MacKinnon suggests, the consent model fails to acknowledge coercion 
and the coercive circumstances that permeate our lives and society.116 MacKinnon’s 
interpretation of coercion centres on notions of gender-inequality.117 She argues that 
consent can never be sufficient or meaningful when both parties have unequal starting 
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points.118 In particular she argues consent is inadequate considering its definition and 
understanding is based on men’s perceptions.119 With some arguing that her position 
suggests  ‘all sex is rape’;120 more accurately MacKinnon believes there is great difficulty 
in distinguishing between sex and rape.121 She suggests that dominating power over the 
powerless is characteristically sexual in society122 and to suggest it is merely violence acts 
only to validate ‘heterosexual sex.’123 She suggests that the demonising and humiliation of 
women is perceived as inherently sexual;124 women fulfil their gender roles by submitting 
to the coercive male’s sexual desires.  
 
Arguably, this approach seems to suggest that no woman freely engages in sex and that 
they only do so to please men and fulfil their gender roles.125 When MacKinnon refers to 
consenting women, she claims such consent is linked to the societal eroticisation of male 
supremacy.126 Moreover she suggests that no such decision to engage in sex is free as these 
decisions are shaped in the context of gender inequality. However, this approach can be 
challenged. It fails to identify the particular wrongness of rape or distinguish sex from 
rape.  Similarly, the assertion that implies all men eroticise submission to their 
dominance127 unjustly labels all men as sexually coercive and inaccurately reflects a 
society where male dominance is not always necessarily seen as desirable. As Hoffman 
articulates in her review of Grauerholz & Korelewski on Sexual Coercion, ‘eager to 
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explain its relevance- no author asks the opposite question- how do we account for the 
facts that the majority of men do not engage in sexually coercive behaviour.’128 
Moreover, arguably this theory of coercion is heteronormative. It is based on the normative 
presumption that men are sexual aggressors and women are passive and submissive. 
Arguably, it is linked with the presumption of heterosexuality whilst adhering to a strict 
gender binary and reinforcing stereotypical gender roles. This approach fails to encapsulate 
the wide and varying range of sexual relationships, and ways and means by which sexual 
exploitation can be manifested. The theory fails to appropriately and adequately reflect the 
reality of the varying range of possible sexual encounters; as ‘the insight of MacKinnon's 
question is that women experience commonalities between what is legally defined as rape 
and what is considered normal sex.’129 This leads us on to consider what is actually the 
essence of rape? Once we begin to properly understand what rape is, we can mould and 
adopt our approach to reflect this. 
   
2.3 THE (IN)ADEQUACY OF COERCION 
In order to determine the most appropriate legal and societal response to sexual offences 
the essence of rape must be considered. We must explore whether a coercion approach can 
fully address the different contexts in which rape arise. Moreover, we must determine 
whether the aims and potential remedies of a coercion approach are productive.  
 
2.4 THE ESSENCE OF RAPE: IS COERCION TOO NARROW A CONCEPT? 
What is the essence of rape? It is a very difficult question to answer. In Conaghan’s most 
recent article, she grapples with this difficult conceptualisation.130 She acknowledges that 
rape is a vile and heinous crime but posits why it is positioned as such ‘now that the older 
feminine-purity premises are no longer available.’131 She cites differing positions on the 
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essence of rape, referring to penetration, intent and the violation of autonomy as some of 
the main perceptions.132 
 
She explores whether the essence of rape is as simple as what the law states it is;133 this is 
quickly disregarded as juries are too influenced outside and beyond formal doctrines to 
make such a suggestion. If the law then is so entangled with society that they both reflect 
one another, how might we frame the essence of rape? Perhaps it is therefore consent, or 
lack thereof, that could be the essence of rape. She concludes that it is not often the 
presence or absence of consent that is at the heart, but rather how the defendant perceives 
its existence.134  
 
Conaghan concludes that there is no core ‘essence’ of rape, beyond stranger rape, despite 
analysing many academic suggestions.135 We can gain insight from Fitzgerald’s suggestion 
of taking sexual liberties136 as a potential aspect of rape. As explained by Conaghan, 
Fitzgerald removes the violence and sexual nature from rape to and relabels it as an issue 
of morality.137 Fitzgerald seems to suggest that the sexual nature of rape is almost 
incidental,138 which differs greatly from some coercion theorists. Instead he suggests the 
wrongness of rape is in its violation of moral order and its apprehension and perception of 
rape depends on the cultural understandings of rape.139 However, arguably, the essence of 
rape lies much deeper than a violation of moral and social order. Indeed, as Conaghan 
recognises, rape is a ‘remarkedly fluid concept’,140 which arguably therefore demands a 
flexible and fluid response. It is a very difficult task to pinpoint the exact harm of rape, as 
rape can occur in so many different circumstances resulting in many different harms. As 
rape is such a fluid concept, we cannot suggest that the essence of rape is harm to 
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autonomy. Coercion, like autonomy, is similarly based on a liberal framework. The 
coercion approach magnifies the issues of coercive relationships and issues with power 
imbalances. Yet this is framed as an offence against someone’s autonomy. The remedies 
suggested through a coercion approach are framed through a focus of reenabling an 
individual’s autonomy. The coercive framework fails to consider the broader structural and 
legal change because of its liberal individualistic foundations. It can therefore be argued 
that the coercive approach is linked with an autonomy lens which is arguably inadequate. 
Instead, we require a fluid and mouldable response that accurately reflects the different 
situational circumstances of rape. 
 
If we agree there is perhaps no essence to rape, perhaps the theory of vulnerability might 
instead reflect the reality of rape. We could articulate rape as not the denial or harm to 
autonomy as coercion does, but instead as exploitation of vulnerability.141   If we accept 
that the essence of rape is not the denial of autonomy then a coercion approach is unlikely 
to be sufficient.  
 
Therefore, the coercive model must be rejected; the regulation of sexual offending ought 
not to focus merely on particular instances of rape, i.e. rape as power/violence. 142 It is 
therefore suggested that coercion alone is not sufficient. However, the theory of 
vulnerability offers us a more extensive approach under one theoretical umbrella; it 
encapsulates a more nuanced understanding of sexual encounters that considers our 
positions in society, our shared characteristics, our abilities to choose and refuse, power 
imbalances and the need for State response. Arguably, coercion can be interpreted as too 
restrictive, creating an essentially force-based framework.143 Although coercion can be 
argued in many circumstances, those relating to intoxicated complainants do not fit so 
neatly. As Munro posits, such wrongdoing ‘is [the offender’s] disregard of [the 
complainant’s] entitlement (as a moral and legal agent) to make a choice;’ and coercive 
factors lay merely in the background.144 Although such circumstances could be moulded to 
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fit within the coercion model, the theory of vulnerability offers a more expansive approach 
that has the potential to cover a vast range of encounters, particularly where complainants 
are intoxicated.  
 
Moreover, there are conflicting views on what coercion means, whether it be framed as 
violence, sexual desire, power or whether issues of deception should be covered. If we 
were to implement a coercive model, this could arguably create further issues with scripts 
and how rape encounters are perceived, making them in some instances over and under 
inclusive. For example, if we perceive sex between an employer and employee inherently 
coercive, the approach may be overly inclusive. Coercive relationships that do not fall into 
particularly scripts may be overlooked and thereby under-inclusive. As Conaghan argues, 
for coercion it is often from as sex-versus-violence perspective or presented ‘as an 
‘either/or’ situation; despite Mackinnon’s attempt to combine sexual and violence for 
coercion, one generally trumps the other.145  
 
Moreover, where the vulnerability theory and coercion disagree is with regards to the role 
of autonomy. As Roberts cited in her introduction, Estrich suggests that the object of 
modern rape law be a ‘celebration of our autonomy.’146 These suggestions are still based 
on framing consent through autonomy or indeed promoting autonomy in any other way. As 
she states, ‘[w]e could prohibit the use of force and threats and coercion in sex, regardless 
of ‘consent.’ We could define consent in a way that respected the autonomy of women.’147 
Basing a new legislative response, on the same foundations of autonomy, will unlikely 
achieve any substantive change. Indeed, similar foundations may create similar 
underpinning issues such as a hierarchy of protections and issues of responsibilisation of 
victim-survivors. The coercive approach is therefore inadequate because of its links to 
autonomy and its shortfalls earlier explored.  
 
Coercion is therefore not the most appropriate or indeed robust response to addressing the 
issues revealed within the current legal framework. This is not least because of its 
similarities with autonomy, which, as is detailed below, vulnerability seeks to challenge. 
Jed Rubenfeld supports this argument suggesting that coercion and consent are quite 
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closely linked considering they are both designed protect sexual autonomy. 148 As above 
mentioned, and as will be discussed in further detail in chapter 3 and 6, the legal 
framework concerning consent is problematic. The coercion theory and the vulnerability 
theory acknowledge consent as a key issue to addressing sexual assault, but for differing 
reasons.149 We must therefore seek to reimagine our approach; this requires not only a 
reform to the law but to look to a different theoretical understanding of our existence to 
begin to reinvent our response to sexual assault. It is the theory of vulnerability as will be 
explored below, that offers us that opportunity. 
 
 
 3. FROM AUTONOMY TO VULNERABILITY 
This section provides a general overview of the key components of the theory of 
vulnerability, whilst touching on the potential in relation to sexual offences. This is not 
meant to be a complete analysis. The vulnerability theory will be applied throughout the 
remaining chapters, and the last chapter will discuss how vulnerability can be used a 
potential for legal reform in depth. This section aims to explore the key components of the 
theory of vulnerability. The universality and particularity of vulnerability will first be 
explored. Then we will detail how the vulnerability theory demands an active and 
responsive State. Considering this, the demands for resilience and a shift away from 
individual responsibility rejecting the ‘othering’ approach will follow. These sections will 
highlight the potential use of vulnerability as a tool to challenge our understandings based 
on an autonomy approach before briefly exploring how we might reframe our response to 
sexual offences.  
We have identified the inadequacies of a coercion approach, and the responsibilisation and 
othering effect of an autonomy approach. Therefore, this section looks towards 
vulnerability as both a potential replacement but also as a tool to further unmask the 
realities of an autonomy-based approach. Our focus is on a theory of vulnerability as 
developed by Martha Fineman. It was first advanced by Fineman in 2008 and has since 
been developed and expanded by others across a range of disciplines. It will be argued that 
Fineman’s theory of vulnerability offers a rich and nuanced understanding of universal 
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vulnerability calls for the State to respond and offer equal protection to all. Moreover, this 
thesis will offer a fresh and unique examination of the current disparate responses to 
incapacitated victims of sexual assault, offers a mechanism to challenge stereotypes, 
demand State intervention and propose practical legal reforms to assist in the reduction of 
the ever-widening justice gap. The purpose of this section is to set out the key components 
of the theory in more general terms, with application to specific legal issues, the critiques 
of the theory are considered in depth in chapter 6 before the vulnerability theory is 
suggested as a new foundation for legal reform.  
Fineman’s approach to vulnerability is based on the concept that all humans are inherently 
vulnerable.150  As explained the concept of vulnerability reflects the reality of life in that 
we are ‘all born, live and die within a fragile materiality that renders us all constantly 
susceptible to destructive external forces and internal disintegration.’151 Typically, the term 
‘vulnerable’ has been is burdened by connotations that someone is feeble or reliant on 
others for protections. Drawing on Fineman’s theory of vulnerability, this thesis seeks to 
develop this approach in relation to sexual offences and in particular the treatment of 
incapacitated complainants.  Vulnerability should be accepted and welcomed; it should be 
understood as the ‘primary human condition’ rather than simply susceptibility to harm. To 
do this, we must first acknowledge that we are all vulnerable.  
 
3.1 THE UNIVERSALITY OF VULNERABILITY  
Fineman’s theory of vulnerability encompasses several specific underlying characteristics. 
It attempts to reflect the reality of life.152 The first key aspect is that vulnerability is 
universal and is at the core of what it means to be human.153  As Fineman and Grear argue, 
vulnerability is inevitable and unavoidable.154 Secondly, vulnerability is constantly present 
in that it comes from our embodiment as humans and presents an ‘imminent ever present 
possibility of harm, injury and misfortune.’155 These harms can take many forms to which 
Fineman suggests we are all susceptible at any given time; these harms can be economic, 
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social, financial or health related.156  Moreover, these harms are often beyond human 
control, suggesting the inescapable nature of our frailty. Fineman argues that we cannot 
eradicate our vulnerability, in other words there is no concept of invulnerability.  However, 
we can take steps to reduce the possibility of harm by building resilience.157  She suggests 
things like health care, housing and financial support as means of addressing our 
vulnerability.  As will be discussed in section 5, it is argued that the State has a duty in 
assisting and promoting this resilience.158 It can provide different means of resilience and, 
it can offer protection through law and policy. It is rightly argued by Fineman that the State 
has an inherent duty to protect its citizens and this can be done through legal reforms that 
recognise the constant nature of vulnerability. Although, the theory of vulnerability is 
based on the universal nature of vulnerability, it is also acknowledged that everyone’s 
experience of vulnerability is different and particular, as discussed further below.   
 
3.2 BUT VULNERABILITY IS ALSO PARTICULAR 
Although we are always susceptible to harms, some may experience their vulnerability 
more often. In regard to minority groups and poorer populations, for example, it is 
acknowledged that such individuals are often exposed more regularly to their vulnerability 
due to lack of resilience available to them. For example, a recent report covering 3 years 
detailed that disabled women were almost twice as likely to have experienced any sexual 
assault than non- disabled women.159 Moreover, a report in 2016 exploring the experience 
of crime of the homeless revealed 30% of participants had been physically assaulted in the 
previous 6 months, and 6% had been sexually assaulted in the previous year.160 A US study 
on black women’s experience of rape and sexual assault, found that around 35% of black 
women will some form of sexual violence in their life time.161 These statistics might 
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therefore substantiate an argument to recommend particular protections for the homeless, 
for women with disabilities and for black women. However, through a theory of 
vulnerability, a different approach is proffered. Rather than focussing on characteristics, or 
particular groups of individuals who have been labelled as particularly vulnerable, we 
instead need to ask more difficult questions. Rather than assume it is the characteristic that 
makes individuals vulnerable, we ask questions that explore the root of that vulnerability. 
Why have they experience sexual violence? It is not merely the existence of a 
characteristic that makes such individuals vulnerable. Instead as Fineman recognises, 
vulnerability fluctuates depending on their positioning in society.162 Instead we focus on 
the particular rather than groups. 
Traditional users of vulnerability perceive certain groups as constantly or inherently 
vulnerable. Fineman does not acknowledge that some individuals are ‘more vulnerable’ 
than others, rather the suggestion is that they are positioned differently and lacking 
resilience.163 Basically, having less resilience equates to less access to societal protective 
factors e.g. financial circumstances, homelessness, access to health care and education etc. 
However, it could be suggested that some individuals may appear more vulnerable than 
others due to a particular characteristic, but due to protective factors in place their 
vulnerability is not realised. For example, it is arguable that all women are vulnerable to 
sexual assault. However, that vulnerability does depend on many embedded characteristics, 
such as social and financial status, our employment and our relationships with each other. 
In contrast to Fineman, it is suggested that is possible for someone to be more vulnerable 
than others in considering the ever-fluctuating nature of our vulnerability, in the sense that 
they experience a heightened sense of their vulnerability. This is not to argue that someone 
is constantly more vulnerable; instead, it is to suggest that there are moments in time when 
that vulnerability is realised making them more vulnerable at that instant. In that sense, 
different situational and environmental factors need to be considered when addressing and 
considering the extent of their vulnerability.  
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As Fineman suggests, vulnerability can morph into many forms, including physical or 
mental and it can be socially constructed because of economic relationships.  Therefore, an 
individual’s vulnerability varies over a lifetime and in accordance with particular 
situational factors. The balance of interactions should be considered in light of protective 
factors when determining one’s vulnerability on a particular occasion; hence both the 
susceptibility to harm and environmental protections should be considered simultaneously. 
In other words, the level of both resilience and vulnerability may often mirror each other. 
For example, on one day someone may be seen as a fully functional adult living 
‘autonomously’ with capacity to make choices. On another day, that same individual may 
be struck with a life-threatening disease or suffer severe economic loss rendering them 
dependent and vulnerable. The constant yet transient and fluctuating state of vulnerability 
is dependent on the person’s particular circumstances, encounters and access to adequate 
protections. 
It is thus argued that depending on the situation involved at a particular time and place, 
some people may be in fact more vulnerable than others; however, it is submitted that this 
does not diminish the notion of universal vulnerability. But what can be done to address 
this particular experience of vulnerability is to look to the State to act responsibly and 
respond accordingly to all of its subjects. Arguably, the State could respond through 
legislation that recognised this theory and afford appropriate protections dependent upon 
individuals’ particular experience of their own vulnerabilities.  
As will now be discussed in detail, Fineman claims autonomy is a myth that is used by the 
State to mask their responsibilities for individual’s well-being. She rightly argues that a 
focus on autonomy and individual responsibility leads to individuals being blamed for so 
called ‘private acts’ outside the realm of State responsibility.  A shift in focus to the theory 
of vulnerability may in fact lead to a more proactive responsive State. As Rich rightly 
states the ‘vulnerability theory justifies the call for increased government intervention 
through a rejection of the traditional liberal subject.’164 Different people experience their 
vulnerabilities in different lights due to their position in society and the resilience offered 
by the State. A realisation that our vulnerability in essence fluctuates depending on the 
actions of the State, calls for a promotion of State responsibility that spans both the public 
and private spheres which is explored below.  
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3.3 A NEED FOR STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
We have now established that our vulnerability is embodied, universal and constant. We 
accept that vulnerability can also be particular. Having acknowledged these key factors of 
the human condition, we now must explore, in the next section, how our particular 
vulnerabilities are and should be addressed by the State.  
The vulnerability theory scrutinizes the relationship between the State and its individuals. 
The nature of the theory ‘forms the basis for the claim that the State must be more 
responsive to that vulnerability.’165 As earlier noted, vulnerability cannot be eradicated.166 
However, Fineman argues that the State, through its societal institutions can and does 
create opportunities to address and promote resilience to human vulnerability.167 It allows 
us to critically explore the current distribution of resilience to reveal the privileges that are 
afforded to the few. As Fineman notes and is discussed below ‘individuals are positioned 
differently within society; some are more privileged, and others are relatively 
disadvantaged.’168  
Fineman contends that in order for equality to achieve more than simply ‘sameness of 
treatment’ the State must be more responsive to vulnerability.169 The continual promotion 
of the liberal subject and the idolisation of autonomy is drawing the State intervention line 
far outside the private realm.170 In other words, promoting autonomy in essence reduces 
the State’s responsibility for both private and public acts. Autonomy ignores our inherent 
vulnerabilities and inevitable dependencies.  
Technically one could argue that this is the correct and ideal approach to be fully 
independent without any need for dependencies; however, upon further evaluation it 
appears the fully autonomous individual does not exist. We cannot self-govern due to our 
inherent dependent and vulnerable nature. Vulnerability demands an involved State that 
provides resources such as health, education and residential care. As Fineman suggests, it 
needs to be recognised that no one person is fully independent and autonomous.171 The 
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capacity threshold is the test that an individual must pass before being determined as 
‘autonomous’. Those who fulfil the threshold are deemed fully capable functioning adults- 
making them fully responsible for their own actions. However, those who fall outside this 
remit can never make autonomous choices.172 This approach is very black and white with 
little room for uncertainties. It fails to recognise those grey areas where capacity and 
vulnerability are ever fluctuating. It is important to note that Fineman and the theory of 
vulnerability do not reject autonomy totally;173 it is merely suggested that autonomy can 
only exist in the shadow and experience of vulnerability. Vulnerability requires us to 
simply ‘re-think autonomy.’ 174 Fineman merely argues for the focus to be removed from 
achieving autonomy to recognising vulnerability.175 This would mean we would no longer 
responsibilise certain groups who have traditionally been labelled fully ‘autonomous’.  
These themes are exemplified when we consider the concept of the ‘family’. The ‘family’ 
is once such unit constructed as a separate entity labelled as an ‘autonomous institution.’176 
Within this construct the State designates the responsibility for any private acts and 
dependency issues. The public and private spheres are distinct ‘separate pillars’ of society.  
Therefore, the State refuses to take responsibility for dependency on the pretence that it is 
not a ‘public problem.’177 Dependency, Fineman argues, is an inevitable process that 
occurs at different stages of life.178 The family is assigned as the institution for caretaking 
with little or no State support. Like vulnerability, Fineman argues that dependency should 
not be shunned but should be accepted as a natural part of the human development.179 She 
argues all of us ‘were dependent as children and all of us will become dependent again 
with old age and or suffer disabilities.’180 Fineman argues that the construct of the family is 
a method by which the State masks its duties to protect such vulnerabilities and 
dependencies.181  
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It could be suggested that the State intentionally creates that divide by promoting 
unrealistic autonomy goals by assuring individuals it is for their benefit to have control 
over their own ‘private acts’. She therefore contends that private acts fall within the realm 
‘individual responsibility’. This term is used to describe how we are morally responsible 
for our own private actions that lead to harm. In that sense the State passes unwanted 
accountability to the individual to accept harm caused due to foolishness and individual 
moral failures. In other words, those who have engaged in unwise decisions are cast to the 
realm of individual responsibility. Arguably, those who become victims of sexual assault 
fall with this category. Often, the State, and its institutions, focus on the actions of victims 
that led to the harm- rather than preventing attackers. Hence, the State attempts to assign 
the individual their responsibility to not only protect themselves from harm but to avoid 
actions which could lead to exploitation.  A re-invigoration of the State’s role through a 
lens of a vulnerability theory could encourage a shift in focus from the victim onto the 
accused.  
Considering this, it is argued that we cannot escape vulnerability182 but resilience can help 
confront it, as Fineman recites ‘it is the particularity of the manifestations of vulnerability 
and the nature of resilience that are of ultimate interest. Resilience is the critical, yet 
incomplete, solution to our vulnerability’183 As Lewis and Thomson state that 
‘acknowledging universal vulnerability - and the universal vulnerable subject it 
implies the focus becomes resilience and the duty of the State is to provide us with 
the assets or tools to be resilient when our vulnerability is made manifest.’184 
She suggests the need for a responsive State to help build this resilience. The Responsive 
State would see a shift in focus from the promotion of autonomy to the acceptance of 
universal vulnerability. As will be explored in more detail in the concluding chapter, 
Martha Fineman proposes this idea of a Responsive State, responsible for providing us 
with the assets and tools to be ‘resilient’ when we experience our vulnerabilities in 
different lights. The concept of a Responsive State is intriguing and indeed a crucial 
component of the vulnerability theory; it demands that the State give equal regard to the 
shared vulnerability of all individuals, abandoning the traditional identity-based approach 
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and recognising that the State must play an essential role in protecting against 
discrimination.185 
Resilience is how we are protected from harm. Unlike vulnerability and dependency, we 
are not born with resilience, but we accumulate it ‘over the course of our lifetimes through 
an array of social structures.’186 It is the role of the Responsive State to provide us with 
access to resilience. It can be gathered through personal relationships and societal 
institutions such as education.187 Some persons may be more privileged than others,188 and 
therefore provided with more resilience hence reducing their experience of their 
vulnerability. Resilience is obtained and gathered throughout one’s lifetime. It is 
particularly important to be resilient to sexual assault.  
 
3.4 SEXUAL ASSAULT, RESILIENCE AND INDIVIDUAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Beverley Clough has recently written about how resilience can be key to individuals’ 
experience of their vulnerability to sexual assault. She suggests most sex education is 
gathered in a societal context and through personal experience.189 If perhaps someone 
suffers from a mental illness, it is unlikely that they would be exposed to similar social 
encounters and receive the same education as those who do not have a mental illness.190 
Such persons may often be sheltered from normal environments where they could build 
their social education. Fuelled through a motivation to protect such groups, the State and 
society inadvertently leave such persons less able to realise danger and hence less resilient. 
This ‘paradoxical’191 approach may leave such individuals open to a higher risk of harm; 
the State must then intervene and provide more encroaching protective measures to ensure 
their vulnerabilities are not exploited. Hence, as suggested by MacKenzie, although 
someone may have an inherent condition placing them at an increased risk of harm, their 
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vulnerability may never be experienced due to resources and access to materials that 
promote resilience.192  
We must therefore examine how the State might be active and promote resilience through a 
vulnerability theory. Whilst nevertheless endorsing this theory, it must be considered 
where the line should be drawn. There is no doubt that our vulnerability calls for a 
proactive State that accepts responsibility for its subjects; however where should individual 
responsibility lie. It is argued that there must be some element of individual responsibility 
for personal actions as otherwise we would be left as overly reliant with no sense of 
accountability. Instead we could possibly move towards a duty owed to each other not to 
exploit one another’s vulnerability.193 It is therefore submitted that we must retain our 
sense of individualism whilst acknowledging our universality and affording the State 
effective responsibility which is not overly paternalistic.194 Yet it must be acknowledged 
that autonomy ‘is meaningless and unattainable without an underlying provision of 
substantial support from society and its institutions.’195  
The question must then be how might the theory of vulnerability change our current 
legislation; how would your perspective change, can we really uproot the current liberal 
legal foundations of the law? If it is possible, is it the best solution? This is something 
which will be explored and analysed throughout this thesis, through a critical evaluation of 
societal attitudes, the current legislative framework and the potential of suggested reforms.  
This section has begun to challenge the liberal divisions between those who are vulnerable 
and those who are not by highlighting that vulnerability is in fact universal and indeed 
particular. Now that we have recognised the State’s role in promoting resilience, we need 
to address the current segregation of the so-called ‘vulnerable populations,’ The theory of 
vulnerability seeks to challenge these groups, and instead demand that our universal and 
shared vulnerability is recognised and reflected by legislation and societal institutions.  It is 
through this acceptance of our shared universal vulnerability, and the demand for State 
action, that we can begin the first step in demanding adequate protections for all by 
challenging and rejecting othering.  
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3.5 THE REJECTION OF ‘OTHERING’  
With the knowledge and acceptance that everyone is vulnerable, and that vulnerability 
fluctuates and can be affected by the resilience offered by the State, we can now use that 
understanding to challenge and critically analyse the treatment of those who are 
traditionally perceived as more vulnerable.  
In Fineman’s analysis of vulnerability, she highlights that there are currently sections of 
people grouped together and designated as ‘vulnerable populations.’196 She highlights the 
elderly, the poor and the disabled as likely to be labelled as a ‘vulnerable population’. 
Their vulnerability is positioned by a shared characteristic such as old age or mental 
illness. Fineman argues against this segregation of society, as such a differentiation from 
the norm, ignores the inherent vulnerability of  human kind.197 Moreover, she rightly 
argues that such a separation of ‘vulnerable populations’ leads to different categories of 
‘vulnerable people’ battling for the most protection and access to services.198 Groups are 
pitted against each other to determine who deserves the most benefits/protections.199 In an 
effort to safeguard, groups have been delineated as incapable due to an embodied 
difference that assigns them to a designation of a vulnerable group in need of protection. 
Arguably, this categorisation of particular individuals arises from our notions of autonomy 
and the liberal self. If society deems a group of persons as not fully autonomous, they tend 
to be labelled as dependent, decisions are often made on their behalf, with society 
perceiving such individuals through a stereotypical lens.200 
Arguably, these groupings and designation of populations leads to the unequal and 
discriminatory distribution of resilience. Indeed, there has been much literature 
surrounding the dangers of labelling particular groups as inherently vulnerable. Indeed, as 
Stanley has argued, state intervention into vulnerable groups can ‘worsen 
vulnerabilities.’201 She states that identifying groups as particular groups of children as 
vulnerable can lead to ‘contradictory discourses’ and more ‘harmful experiences.’202   
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 Fineman does, however, recognise that there are some benefits from this intentional 
divide. In particular, she recognises the heightened access to benefits and care facilities 
available to ‘vulnerable populations.’ Conversely, those who are segregated into such 
populations often face stigmatisation and stereotypical myths as to their capabilities.203 
They often suffer from assumptions of incapacity and endure a paternalistic approach to 
their life and decision making abilities.204 As Karpin writes ‘the closer individual 
embodiment approximates normative expectations, the more likely that particular 
embodied subject will be constituted as an impenetrable, autonomous, independent, rights-
bearing legal subject.’205 Hence, Fineman seeks to move away from the characterisation of 
certain populations as ‘vulnerable’ by stripping the notion that a shared characteristic 
deems you vulnerable or in-vulnerable; instead moving towards the idea that we are all 
vulnerable and deserving of equal protection. However, despite Fineman’s assertation that 
vulnerable groups should be avoided, as Kohn notes, she has succumbed to targeting 
groups in her discussion of the theory in relation to elderly laws.206 Kohn notes that 
Fineman uses the vulnerability theory to target older adults for particular protections on the 
basis of age.207  
It is acknowledged that the vulnerability theory indeed would be limited if it were used to 
target particular groups. There is of course a concern that failing to rely on the core values 
of the theory will lead to inadequacies. It is therefore imperative that these failures are not 
realised. Indeed, at the heart of the vulnerability theory, Fineman seeks for universality to 
be recognised together with a particular focus on individuals’ experiences. For the theory 
to realise its full potential as a prescriptive tool, these underpinning values must be upheld. 
As Clough posits ‘the vulnerability thesis draws attention to the experience of 
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vulnerability, rather than the presence of a particular condition.’208 By doing so, the stigma 
associated with vulnerability would be eliminated and replaced by a collective acceptance 
of our human frailty. The above sections have highlighted the universality and particularity 
of vulnerability whilst rejecting the othering approach an autonomy lens provides. 
The above sections have provided an overview of the key components of the vulnerability 
theory. It has highlighted the potential of this theory. As will be seen in the following 
chapters, the theory of vulnerability is an important and useful tool that we can use as a 
lens to challenge our traditional norms. Moreover, as we move throughout the remaining 
chapters, the concept of vulnerability will be explored in the context of sexual offences, 
helping us to challenge the current approaches and offer potential solutions to current 
problems and concerns. Firstly, concerns raised by other academics as to the potential of 
vulnerability must be considered.  
 
4. THE CRITIQUES 
Before considering how a legal response might be framed through a theory of 
vulnerability, the critiques must be explored. As alluded to above, the theory of 
vulnerability has been subject to substantial criticism for various reasons including the 
consequences of the rejection of an autonomy approach. Likewise, as identified in the 
introduction, the theory has been criticised for its vagueness and abstract nature.209 The 
potential of a theory of vulnerability will be realised through the critical analysis of the 
law, and through the informing of legislative reforms. The below outlines other concerns 
and criticisms and addresses how these potential pitfalls can be overcome.  
(a) The term ‘vulnerable’  
The first criticism that must be explored is a linguistic concern. The use of the term 
‘vulnerability’ itself has been denounced by some academics due to its perceived negative 
connotations210 and even so far as to be described as a ‘sexy’211 trait in women. In 
particular, Fitzgearld  and Munro state that using the term ‘vulnerable’ seems ‘to suggest 
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that there is something wrong, less-than desirable, about being a vulnerable person.’212 It is 
acknowledged by Fineman that the term carries with it a derogatory air and has negative 
associations.213 Arguably, many people may associate the term with weakness and 
helplessness; the term may then linked with stereotypes regarding capacity and autonomy, 
hence the negative connotations.214 However, Fineman and this thesis seeks to reclaim215 
the term ‘vulnerable’ through the demand for State responsibility. Kaul however, argues 
that simply removing the term from its normative context will only make it ‘imaginable’ 
and not accomplish its aims.216 On the other hand, Satz endorses Fineman’s position by 
suggesting that its aims can be achieved by ‘appealing to universal vulnerabilities which 
removes the stigma of needing assistance and improves protections for all, eliminating 
backlash by those who would otherwise fail to receive protections.’217  Despite the current 
connotations with the term vulnerability, it is argued that this perception is not so grounded 
in our culture that it is not susceptible to change. Arguably then, it is possible to reclaim 
vulnerability and alter societal understanding of the term, re-imagining it through careful 
adaptation and explanation of what it truly means to be vulnerable.  
(b) Rejecting the identity-based approach 
Although other academics somewhat agree with Fineman’s recommendations, the finer 
details of the theory appear to still be criticised. As MacDowell argues, Fineman’s 
vulnerability theory does not ‘tell us how to prioritize vulnerabilities’ or how the State 
should respond to vulnerabilities.218 Indeed, arguably Fineman’s theory intentionally 
avoids such a suggestion, as privileging one vulnerability over another may lead to the 
unequal distribution of resilience and produce further inequalities and privileges. Cooper 
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approves of the necessity for a strong State that provides resilience to its subjects.219 
However, he disagrees with other aspects of the theory on the basis that it apparently 
‘ignores race’.  He argues that the vulnerability theory should be revised to explore racial 
profiling and how privileges have been conferred on the white heterosexual male.220 
Moreover, MacDowell suggests that to take privilege seriously requires an analysis of 
vulnerability in a context-specific manner.221 She continues and argues this ‘specificity 
should include the value of autonomy for individuals and groups, especially those for 
whom autonomy has historically been limited.’222 Perhaps Cooper and MacDowell’s 
critiques suggest a stronger focus on privilege to eradicate racial profiling; however, 
arguably Fineman’s suggestions appear to encompass this too. She merely suggests that an 
identity-based approach to vulnerability fails to recognise the core actualities of the human 
experience. Rather than focus on identity-based vulnerabilities she suggests we examine 
‘the institutional practices that produce the identities and inequalities in the first place.’223 
Similarly, she simply contends that focusing on groups distorts individual’s particular 
experience of their vulnerability. Segregating classes of people based on their underlying 
characteristics has itself led to unequal treatment where groups of less privileged 
individuals compete against each other for extra protections. Kohn endorses this approach 
stating this new interpretation as progressive with real potential for reform.224  
Arguably, Fineman is suggesting that all individuals should have similar access to 
resilience as someone who may be deemed as ‘less vulnerable’ may pragmatically be more 
vulnerable in a particular circumstance. She is therefore simply arguing the removal of 
these presumptions to afford greater uniform access to resilience to address everyone’s 
vulnerability to harm. Moreover, as will be argued in chapters 3 and 4, it is not necessarily 
positive when groups are assigned protections. Stereotypical attitudes, expectations and 
myths permeate the response to such groups. Indeed, when certain groups of individuals 
are identified as particularly vulnerable, they are often pitted against others to determine 
who deserves the most protection. By removing this segregation, we can demand a 
response that is tailored to the need of each individual.  
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Despite these criticisms, it will be argued that the theory has potential to be a foundation 
for sexual offences law. The theory offers us a unique opportunity to scrutinize the 
somewhat overlooked situational factors of sexual relations and allows us to critically 
consider encounters which might normally have been disregarded and considered 
autonomous decision making. 
MacKenzie argues that vulnerability theorists ‘need to be alert to the dangers of 
vulnerability’.225 She argues that historically theories of vulnerability have been used to 
justify coercive or paternalistic social relations policies and institutions which often 
compounds into groups.226 However, this is the traditional understanding of the concept of 
vulnerability. The new conceptual understanding of vulnerability challenges these notions 
and the use of vulnerability as a tool of inferiroisation. With autonomy on a pedestal, 
vulnerability was positioned as a weakness and therefore those identified as ‘less than’ are 
grouped together as ’others’. If we change our approach and universally acknowledge our 
vulnerability, we can avoid the risk of othering and grouping and instead shift from 
identity-based approach to universal and particular understanding of our vulnerability.  
 
5.  THE POTENTIAL OF THE THEORY OF VULNERABILITY AS A 
FOUNDATION FOR LEGAL REFORM    
 
We have now examined and revealed some of the key problems with an autonomy-based 
approach. Moreover, the pitfalls of coercion have been revealed and instead we looked 
towards vulnerability as a lens through which we can view our lived experience. We have 
begun to see how an autonomy and coercion focus is problematic in the context of te 
current law regarding sexual offences.227 Therefore, the purpose of this section is to briefly 
explore how the characteristics highlighted in the above sections, come together as the 
vulnerability theory and may act as a potential foundation for sexual assault legal reform.  
Vulnerability offers us a unique nuanced lens to critically evaluate both how and why the 
current is failing to equally and adequately protect individuals.  
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5.1 THE POTENTIAL OF VULNERABILITY IN CIVIL LAW 
 
It is useful to consider how the vulnerability theory has been used to suggest reforms to 
civil law. This can provide us with an insight into the potential for reform to the criminal 
law through a theory of vulnerability. Indeed, Beverley Clough has written on the potential 
value that this theory could have in regard to reforming the concept of capacity in civil 
law.228 Her examination is an excellent example of the practical application the theory of 
vulnerability. Moreover, she offers a detailed analysis of capacity and vulnerability in 
which key comparisons can be made with the criminal law.  In particular, she argues that 
the theory provides a different aspect in which capacity and autonomy can be analysed and 
discuss how the current approach obscures many key considerations.229 Interestingly, she 
suggests that theorists could use the theory to elucidate concerns regarding issues of 
consent and capacity.230 This highlights the practical effect the vulnerability theory can 
have. As part of her analysis, Clough explores the current ‘act specific’ nature of the 
capacity test for sexual activity.  She suggests that currently, the ‘State attempts to protect 
the vulnerable can simply exacerbate powerlessness.’231 It is claimed that this is due to the 
promotion of autonomy and rejection of State interference.232 Arguably, this interpretation 
suggests how the current law fails to recognise universal vulnerability. Moreover, it shows 
how vulnerability is used as a derogatory term that is only applicable to a certain group of 
‘dependent individuals.’ This suggests that vulnerability has been associated with people 
who apparently drain the State, rather than a communal term that reflects our inherent 
characteristics and the promotion of State intervention and dependency. Drawing on 
Fineman’s theory, she posits that without resilience and acknowledgement of vulnerability 
‘autonomy and capabilities are an illusion.’233  She rightly suggests that a vulnerability lens 
could reform the current test for capacity with a move from ‘assumptions about the sexual 
vulnerability of people with cognitive impairments’ to paying attention to the situational 
aspects of the decision.234 In light of this, it is suggested that if such an approach was 
implemented, the attention would be shifted from the vulnerable victim-survivor’s actions 
on to the situational factors including the exploitative nature of the defendant’s behaviour. 
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This section has highlighted the potential of the vulnerability theory for reform in civil law 
and therefore its potential as a theoretical foundation for reforms to sexual assault law. 
Later in chapter 6, we will delve further into the possibilities and opportunities that a 
vulnerability lens can bring for reforms to criminal sexual assault law.  
 
6.   THE TOOLS TO MOVE FORWARD  
This chapter has outlined the key values and underpinning concepts of the liberal legal 
autonomous subject, highlighting some of its merits and identifying some of its 
weaknesses. Throughout this thesis these values and understanding of our ontological 
existence will be further revealed. This will aid us in our understanding of how and why 
society and the State respond to victims of sexual assault inadequately.  
This chapter also examined Fineman’s theory of vulnerability; with particular reference to 
its key underpinning values whilst also identifying how the theory might challenge some of 
the traditional norms we understand as a result of the long-standing emphasis on the liberal 
legal autonomous subject. By shifting our focus onto vulnerability theory as a more 
suitable understanding of our existence and our interactions with others and institutions, a 
vulnerability theory can expose some of the elements of autonomy as myths and in essence 
unattainable goals.  
Once we reveal that autonomy is in fact a myth, we can challenge our preconceived 
notions and expectations that we place on individuals, especially with regards to sexual 
relations. We can use the above-mentioned key concepts of the vulnerability theory as 
helpful tools to unpick unfavourable societal attitudes towards complainants of sexual 
assault. Therefore, the following chapter, with such tools in hand, explores the prevalence 
of rape myths in society. It will detail rape myths and stereotypical attitudes that permeate 
society and suggest that their prevalence is closely linked with the autonomy approach. 
With this background knowledge of a vulnerability theory, we can challenge the concepts 
of the ‘ideal’ victim,235 and challenge how and what is expected of the autonomous liberal 
legal subject. This will be the first step in revealing how the promotion of autonomy has 
resulted in the unfair and unequal treatment of victims of sexual assault. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Rape myths and attitudes- the impact of autonomy 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The previous chapter argued that the core problem with the current response to sexual 
assault complainants lies within the autonomy approach. This chapter will strengthen this 
argument by suggesting that rape myths, stereotypical attitudes and expectations placed on 
complainants are also closely linked to, and shaped by, this autonomy approach  
Rape myths and stereotypes are commonly understood as ‘descriptive or prescriptive 
beliefs about rape that serve to deny downplay or justify sexual violence that men commit 
against women.’236 The fundamental problem with rape myths is the fact that they are 
myths and or ‘genalizations about all rapes.’237 Moreover, they remove the attention from 
the perpetrator on to the behaviour of the victim. Myths appear to distort the wrongdoing 
and emphasise either why she supposedly deserved the attack, that it did not happen or that 
she failed to communicate her resistance clearly. Stereotypical views on rape cannot be 
listed exhaustively.238  Myths are constantly evolving with society, yet at their core, myths 
have remained as a means of shifting blame from the assailant onto the complainant. These 
expectations of behaviour are informed through a lens of autonomy. As most individuals 
are presumed capable of resisting sexual assault, there is arguably an expectation of 
resistance and rational behaviour which can lead to victim-blame. As will be explored 
below, complainants of sexual assault are typically blamed through myths and attitudes for 
failing to avoid harm as a result of our understanding and presumption of the autonomous 
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liberal legal subject. This responsibilisation is then manifested in legalisation,239 and within 
general societal, political and judicial attitudes towards treatment of rape complainants.  
It will be argued that the conceptual underpinnings of our societal and legal response to 
sexual assault complainants requires a complete overhaul. It will also be argued that myths 
and adverse attitudes have the potential to substantially and adversely impact a 
complainant at every stage of the criminal justice system, therefore significantly effecting 
their access to justice and experience post-assault. Moreover, these myths and attitudes 
impact and inform the legal response, particularly to intoxicated complainants, and 
therefore need to be addressed.  
To achieve this, many of the key myths and attitudes will be critically evaluated to 
determine their links with an autonomy approach. Section 1.1 will explore false allegations 
and how an autonomy approach leads individuals to deny or downplay the existence of 
rape. Section 1.2 will examine how intoxication effects the treatment of complainants, 
arguing that the autonomous choice to become intoxicated often carries the burden of 
responsibility to avoid assault. Section 1.3 will build on this point with reference to so-
called provocative clothing. Section 1.4 will explore the existence of the expectation of 
complainants to resist sexual assaults, arguing its existence may be linked to the autonomy 
approach. Section 2 will evaluate how these attitudes and myths are being manipulated by 
legal professionals to distract jurors from the defendant’s exploitative behaviour and 
instead criticising and responsibilising the complainant. Before concluding, section 3 will 
detail how a vulnerability theory might challenge these preconceived ideas and 
expectations placed on complainants. It will be argued that we require a systemic change to 
attitudes and the law to substantively and successfully reform the inadequate response to 
sexual assault complainants.  
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1.1 FALSE ALLEGATIONS 
‘The fear of false allegations has been used to justify evidential rules in cases… and 
continues to influence police and prosecutorial decision making.’240 
 
The belief that there is a high incidence of false allegations is a myth that is widely 
accepted/speculated amongst the public.241 It appears most other myths stem from the 
belief in the prevalence of false allegations- in that they often serve to deny the occurrence 
of rape. This section will briefly outline and challenge the myth that the level of false 
allegations is high. It will seek to reveal the connection between the autonomy approach 
and the unequal distribution of resilience with the endorsement of this inaccurate belief.  
 
There is evidence of this belief in the bible and in Greek mythology. According to the 
biblical story, Potiphars’ wife attempted to seduce Joseph who refused her advances.242 
The story says that Joseph fled after she then claimed he had raped her.243 He was 
imprisoned but eventually got a full pardon and became prime minister.244 The moral is 
that if a woman cries rape she can get a good man into trouble.245 Similarly, the Greek 
myth of Hippolyphus and Phaedra mirrors this story.246 When the woman’s advances were 
rejected, she claimed she had been raped. The myth that women can often falsely claim 
rape has developed throughout history. Famously, in the 17th century judge Sir Matthew 
Hale orated that rape is ‘an accusation easily to be made, hard to be proved and harder to 
be defended by the party accused never so innocent.’247 This quote has been echoed in 
many courtrooms since it was first spoken especially when issuing a corroboration warning 
to juries.248 As Justice Sutcliffe said in 1976: ‘it is well known that women in particular… 
are liable to be untruthful and invent stories.’249  These statements wrongly suggests that 
rape is very difficult to defend even where untrue. This suggests that women can easily 
falsify rape claims and secure convictions. Yet as will be discussed below, statistics have 
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revealed low levels of convictions for rape and sexual assault with a substantial number of 
allegations not proceeding to trial.250 It could be argued that traditionally, the belief that 
women falsely claimed rape was endorsed as a means of protecting men from 
criminalisation. This is one means of distributing resilience.251 In other words, as the legal 
response treated women’s claims of rape with scepticism, the law was affording resilience 
to defendants rather than protecting complainants.  
 
Although statistics cannot accurately account for false allegations, it has not been proven 
that false allegations of rape are more common than false claims of other crimes.252 It is 
speculated that the correct figure is around 3%.253 Saunders suggested that the percentages 
of apparent false allegations vary across studies.254 It was suggested that this might be 
because of differing definitions as what amounts to false.255 In 2012/2013 statistics showed 
how rape was ‘no crimed’256  six times more than other victim based crimes.257 Other 
research previously showed the decrease in the use of no-crime has been replaced by No 
further Action (NFA’s).258 It was found that around 56% of allegations were either labelled 
as no crime or NFA.259 Yet some police officers still maintain that ‘a good half’, ‘a lot’ and 
even ‘most’ rape cases are false.260 As Munro and Kelly argue, many police officers 
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predict how juries will perceive a complainant, hence endorsing rape myths and doubting 
allegations, making the problem ‘compounded by a vicious cycle of attrition.’261  
There have been many studies that have highlighted the scepticism of jurors towards rape 
complaints. In one study by Ellison and Munro mock jurors appeared to be preoccupied 
with false allegations. In the initial questionnaires, participants were ambivalent to the 
statements like ‘rape accusations are often used as a way of getting back at men.’262 
However, when put under the pressure of reaching a unanimous verdict in jury 
deliberations participants relied on the fact that ‘false allegations are routinely made.’263 
Moreover, it appears that many people downplay or deny rape where the complainant was 
intoxicated.  One study suggested that the individual concerned may have engaged in sex 
and later regretted her drunken behaviour and then claimed rape.264 This association leads 
people to believe that intoxicated acquaintance rape is simply drunken sex and not rape as 
legally defined. 265   
 
A combination of these together with the promotion of autonomy may impact a 
complainant’s chance at justice. For example, through an autonomy lens, many individuals 
may seek to deny or downplay the existence of rape and other forms of sexual assault. If 
we understand that we are all independent and capable of resisting sexual assault, jurors 
may deny the complainants experience. Indeed, the AVA report referred to a study which 
suggested complainants who had been intoxicated at the time of the offence had a greater 
sense of self blame.266 
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From the aforementioned studies, it would appear that some may believe that many women 
falsely claim they have been raped or sexually assaulted. Arguably the existence of such 
beliefs may have a direct impact on a complainant’s access to both support from society at 
large and indeed to securing justice. The endorsement of such beliefs may also inhibit 
complainants from reporting their assault; as previously mentioned 27.7% number of 
victim-survivors failed to inform the police due to fear of not being believed.267 This 
therefore contributes to the ever-widening justice gap and ill treatment of complainants in 
both law and society. It appears that assumptions of the prevalence of false allegations are 
so strong that it may have affected policy. For example, Parliaments’ reluctance 268 to alter 
the law on rape may be based on ‘untested assumptions on the frequency of false 
allegations.’269   
 
As will be argued throughout, it is in fact because of this focus on autonomy that many rely 
on myths and stereotypical attitudes towards rape complaints to justify or excuse rape. 
With the belief that all individuals are free independent and capable at the core of our 
understanding of our ontological existence, more myths and attitudes surface to justify or 
downplay any alleged harm.  This is manifested in many ways, particularly when 
complainants are intoxicated. For example, from a recent studies it was shown that around 
‘one in 10 are unsure or think it’s usually not rape to have sex with a woman who is asleep 
or too drunk to consent.’270 The autonomous decision to consume alcohol tends to be 
perceived as an acceptance of the risks attached to drinking excessively, thereby burdening 
individuals with responsibility to avoid sexual assault.  
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1.2 THE RESPONSIBILISATION OF INTOXICATION 
‘If recreational drugs were tools, alcohol would be a sledgehammer. Few cognitive 
functions or behaviours escape the impact of alcohol, a fact that has been long 
recognised in literature.’271  
 
Closely linked with the idea that many rape complaints are false, is the denial of rape 
where a complainant was intoxicated. This section will explore how the autonomy 
approach has led to the responsibilsation of complainants where they were voluntarily 
intoxicated at the time of the offence. This section will argue that there is a link between 
the conceptual underpinnings of autonomous choice and attributing blame to the 
complainant. The further individuals deviate from the ‘ideal victim’ who is rationale and 
self-preserving, the more likely a societal response will attribute blame to them.  
 
Alcohol plays a very prominent role in society, carrying many connotations including an 
association with the desire to get ‘loose’, ‘disinhibited’272  and be sociable.273 It has been 
suggested that alcohol is also thought to be a social medium for communicating sexual 
interest.274 With that, comes a series of complications considering 38% of rape 
complainants reported that they and the assailant were under the influence of alcohol at the 
time of the offence.275 Moreover, studies have shown the prevalence of a binge-drinking 
culture,276 and some studies have suggested that women are more likely to be ‘victimised’ 
when intoxicated.277  According to a Home Office study, women who went to a pub once a 
week or a night club three times a week were at a higher risk of sexual victimization.278 
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While, those who go to a nightclub at least 4 times a month are at the highest risk of sexual 
victimization.279 The situational factor with intoxicated individuals may contribute to 
victimization.280 However, it would appear that society’s response to such exploitation is to 
victim-blame rather than denouncing the actions of the defendant. Arguably this is as a 
result of our emphasis on autonomy and therefore responsibility.  
 
Instead of preventing rape, it appears women are told to act more ‘responsible’ and 
‘careful’ by not becoming intoxicated and therefore susceptible to predators. It appears that 
those who apparently chose to become incapacitated at the time of the offence are deemed 
to have contributed to their exploitation. Equally, many public campaigns ‘to protect’ 
women appear to have a similar message underpinned by autonomy and responsibilisation. 
Campaigns encourage women to avoid harm by avoiding so called risky situations and to 
take responsibility for themselves. For example, Munro references several different 
campaigns that highlight this responsibilisation. In particular Sussex Police’s poster 
campaign questioned ‘which one of your friends is most vulnerable’? Followed by the 
answer ‘the one you leave behind’; the use of ‘vulnerable’ here is applied ‘simply by 
consequence of their being female and out in public.’281 In 2018, Devon and Cornwall 
police launched a #spike aware campaign, introducing drink spiking kits into bars and 
night clubs. Although a positive step to help identify the symptoms of drink spiking, the 
posters associated with the campaign have clear connotations of responsibilsation. For 
example, one such poster states ‘[d]rink spiking can lead to drowsiness, confusion and 
vulnerability- don’t be a victim!.’282  The wording of this poster suggests that women have 
a choice or not whether to be ‘victimised’. Similarly, in 2012, West Mercia police 
launched a poster campaign, communicating that intoxication makes young women 
vulnerable to rape, and also that the victim’s contributory responsibility in getting drunk 
before any sexual attack should occasion retrospective regret.283 Meanwhile, this instilled 
fear of women’s perpetual risk of sexual assault ensures a vulnerable condition that must 
be managed diligently – by not drinking and limiting social activities – if she is to avoid 
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condemnation for a contributory role in her victimization.284 The reiteration of the need to 
stay safe keeps women in a ‘constant state of fear’285 and has been argued as a ‘weapon 
men use to perpetuate their dominance of women.’286 Hence, any sign of ‘independence by 
women is often interpreted as asking to be raped’; 287 similarly it is often endorsed that if a 
‘man wanted her she must have wanted him.’288 Similar messages have been shared in 
Canada. For example, a police force released a statement encouraging women to ‘avoid 
dressing like sluts in order not to be victimised.’289 As Don McPherson states: ‘we raise 
women to survive in a rape culture… yet we do nothing to talk to men about not raping.’290 
Moreover, as Munro rightly contends, such campaigns and beliefs are based on gender 
stereotypes of women as sexual gatekeepers and men as sexual predators with the 
responsibility of avoiding sexual assault ‘borne heavily by the woman.’291  
 
Indeed, studies have shown the effect alcohol can have on the outcome of a case. It seems 
from research that women who are drunk at the time of the assault are held more 
responsible and blameworthy.292 If a woman cannot control her actions, she tends to be 
viewed in a derogatory way.293 Her character is viewed less favourably, less credible294 and 
she appears to be assigned more responsibility for her behaviour.295 For instance, in 
another study by Munro and Ellison, they tested the attribution of blame to an intoxicated 
victim.296 The lessons learned from this study are quite shocking. It appears that where a 
woman is drunk her expected behaviour and responsibility for herself are extraordinarily 
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high.297 In the Wake up to the Research Report, 64% of people thought that victims who 
drank to excess prior to the assault should accept responsibility for being raped.298 
Arguably, this responsibilsation is because of our autonomy approach and the expectations 
placed on complainants to conform to the ideal victim. Conversely, male perpetrators 
appears to be blamed less if he is intoxicated at the time of the assault,299 as he is perceived 
to be unable to control his actions.300 It seems that no matter whether a man is drunk (too 
intoxicated to be blameworthy) or tipsy (blame the woman for being seductive) or sober 
(more credible) there is always some excuse available from society to accept his 
behaviour.301 He is therefore viewed more favourably and less responsible.302 This could 
arguably be informed by how our current legal response lends us to scrutinize the 
complainant’s behaviour rather than the defendant’s exploitative actions.303 With 
autonomy promoted as a progressive step towards gender equality, the realities of 
responsibilisation are masked. Arguably, autonomy has acted as a mask that protects men 
from allegations, blaming victims from contributing to or causing their harm through 
unwise choices. 
 
One aspect that the vulnerability theory attempts to challenge is the unequal distribution of 
resilience which is, as Fineman states, at the heart of inequality. It would appear, as will be 
discussed in more detail later, that our laws and therefore our societal attitudes are carved 
out of a need to protect men from ‘false’ or unwarranted allegations of sexual assault.304 
This section has demonstrated that individuals who are voluntarily intoxicated at the time 
of the assault are perceived to have contributed to their harm and are responsibilised. The 
autonomous choice to become intoxicated is perceived as risky behaviour and the burden 
of responsibility to avoid being raped is therefore placed on the individual. Likewise, other 
socio-legal studies have evidenced the reliance on these attitudes. It appears that 
provocative behaviour, seductive clothing, and lack of resistance can be relied on by jurors, 
the judiciary and the police to disbelieve or discontinue a complaint.  
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1.3 B(E)ARING RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHAT YOUR WEAR 
‘Men control the whole situation from the physical rape itself, to the way society 
perceives the act, to the final judgment’.305 
 
Although this quote is from 1975, much of the essence remains the same. It appears that 
rape myths and stereotypical attitudes about rape are held by the public, victims, police and 
indeed other members of the justice system.306 This section will outline the attitudes that 
suggest a complainant is to blame for contributing to their assault if they wear provocative 
clothing or behave in a provocative manner. It will be argued that through an autonomy 
lens, individuals are responsibilised for acting or wearing provocative clothing, a belief 
which appears to be permeate many stages of the justice system.  
 
UK studies have revealed that some police endorse myths or aware of societies attitudes 
towards rape complainants which then have an impact on their decisions with regards to 
case progression.307 Moreover, some police officers’ attitudes are effected by what clothing 
the complainant was wearing at the time of the attack. According to one particular study, it 
was recorded that if a victim was wearing provocative clothing she was viewed as less 
credible.308 This highlights that rape myths and stereotypical attitudes can affect 
complainants at the earliest stage of their complaint. It has recently been announced that 
complainants of sexual assault may now be required to submit their phones and other smart 
technology to the police for investigation.309 Although the article stated that such measures 
would only be taken where the line of enquiry was ‘reasonable’, it is arguably likely that 
such efforts will be relied upon by the police regularly, especially where the police doubt 
their credibility due to myths and stereotypes.310 This may leave many complainants 
feeling victimised and interrogated whilst also potentially dissuading legitimate complaints 
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from being reported. This may further fuel a culture where complainants’ credibility, rather 
than the defendant’s behaviour, is the subject of interrogation. Such police decisions may 
be influenced by the public’s scrutiny of complainants’ behaviour.  
 
For instance, in the 2010 Havens Report 28% of people thought a victim should be 
responsible where she dressed provocatively.311 Similarly 21% thought so if she acted 
flirtatiously and 22% agreed where she was dancing in a sexy way with her attacker.312 
This report received significant public attention, with many organisations and media outlet 
reporting the concerning findings.313 Amnesty International conducted a national telephone 
survey in 2005, it has since received much academic attention,314 as cited by Reece.315 The 
study recorded that 34% of people believed that a victim was totally or partially 
responsible for her attack if she acted promiscuously; and a further 26% believed so if she 
was wearing provocative clothing.316 Arguably, this suggests that 1 in 3 persons believe a 
woman precipitated rape perhaps because she chose to wear clothes that might put her at 
risk of sexual assault. It is this concept that appears to be endorsed by some, where a 
woman exercises her autonomous right to wear any clothing, she must then take 
responsibility for any potential repercussions of such a choice.  
 
Other studies have also revealed the prevalence of similar attitudes. In Westmarland & 
Grahams’ internet based study, posters discussed the high heels worn by the victim.317 One 
poster commented ‘well if she was wearing those…’318 and she should be careful not to 
give the wrong impression.’319  Similarly ‘wearing provocative clothing’320 can be seen as 
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a distinguishing feature of onlookers who attempt to source why she deserved the attack.  
A recent study found that at least 20% of students agreed ‘a woman who dresses in skimpy 
clothes shouldn’t be surprised if a man tries to have sex with her.’321 Moreover, Amnesty 
International conducted a national telephone survey in 2005, which showed that 34% of 
people believed that a victim was totally or partially responsible for her attack if she acted 
promiscuously.322 A further 22% believed she was totally or partially responsible where 
she had several previous sexual partners.323 In the Havens Report 18% of respondents 
agreed that most claims of rape are false. 21% endorsed the myth that a victim is 
responsible if she flirted with the perpetrator. Similarly, 29% agreed she was responsible if 
she went back to the perpetrators house while 66% agreed so if she went into his bed. 
These results reveal the expected standard of behaviour borne by women, both to avoid 
sexual assault and to avoid instigating sexual interest; women appear to be responsibilised, 
told to act with caution to avoid signalling sexual interest and to avoid the dressing 
provocatively to prevent inferred meanings. Arguably, through the expectation that 
individuals are autonomous and self-governing, they are expected to act in a particular 
way. Therefore, when an individual is harmed, through this privatisation of the right to 
choose, they bear the burden of responsibility for any harm endured as a result of their 
actions. This highlights the focus on and scrutiny of complainants’ behaviour, especially 
where the assault doesn’t fir the traditional ‘real rape’ script.  
 
1.4 EXPECTATION OF RESISTANCE  
Stranger rape or ‘real rape’ is typically perpetrated by a crazed male outdoors, late at night 
with violence and surprise.324 This stereotype is usually depicted when people are asked to 
define rape.325  Despite this, the reality is that around 87% of the victims of serious sexual 
assault knew their perpetrator.326 Similarly, 45% of the attackers were current or previous 
partners of the victim.327 The notion that rapists are sex starved or insane supports stranger 
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rape attitudes.328 Although it has been recently shown that the ‘real rape’ stereotype has 
fallen out of favour329 as the only rape these studies show how people’s views are still 
biased against other types of rape with expectations of resistance/injury still rife.330 This 
expectation of resistance may have a particular impact on intoxicated complainants. 
Studies have revealed that intoxicants may affect the ability to resist.331 This suggests that 
many intoxicated complainants may not be capable of physically resisting and therefore 
may be perceived as less credible for failing to do so. Many mock juror studies have noted 
this expectation of resistance.   
 
For example, in one study, participants argued that the woman had a ‘civic duty… to fight 
back and hopefully gain enough of an injury to have hard evidence…’332 In a 2010 
study,333 60% of jurors strongly disagreed with questionnaire statements like ‘if a woman 
doesn't fight back you can't really say it was rape.’334 Yet, the majority of participants 
‘strongly defended’ that a complainant would resist physically and verbally, the unwanted 
advances of the defendant.335 Although many were aware that most rapes are not 
committed by strangers but by acquaintances,336 they believed that a complainant would 
‘done her utmost to avoid the assault by issuing strong verbal protests and fighting 
back.’337 Similarly, some believed that a victim of acquaintance rape would have sustained 
physical injuries.338 This is despite the fact that force or violence are not a legal 
requirement for the legal definition of rape.339 Even where the victim of an acquaintance 
rape had sustained injuries participants somehow concocted an unsupported scenario that 
 
328 Martha R. Burt, ‘Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape’ [1980] Vol. 38 No 2 Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 217, 217.   
329 Louise Ellison & Vanessa E. Munro, ‘A stranger in the Bushes, or an Elephant in the Room? Critical 
reflections upon received rape myth wisdom in the context of a mock jury study’, Fall [2010] 13(4) New 
Criminal Law Review 781-801, 789 
330 Ibid 790. 
331 Bushman & Cooper (n 277) 341 see also Antonia Abbey, Tina Zawacki, Philip O. Buck, A. Monique 
Clinton, & Pam McAuslan, ‘ Alcohol and Sexual assault’[2001] 25(1) Alcohol Research & Health 43-51 
which found ‘alcohol’s motor impairments reduce ability to resist [sexual assault] effectively’. AVA (n 251) 
‘intoxicated victims are less physically able to resist assault’ citing Testa, M., Livingston, J.A. & Collins, 
R.L., ‘The role of women's alcohol consumption in evaluation of vulnerability to sexual aggression’ [2000] 8 
Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology 185-191  
332 Westmarland & Grham (n 317) 94. 
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339 Kathyrn M. Ryan, ‘The Relationship between rape myths and Sexual Scripts: The Social Construction of 
Rape’ [2011] 65 Sex Roles 774-782,777 
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the couple had been engaging in ‘kinky’ ‘rough’ sex.340 It appears that many individuals 
responsibilise women to fight an acquaintance, they imagine she would sustain physical 
injuries and they presume she would report it immediately. However, research has shown 
that victims react in many different ways, which will arguably require a more nuanced 
response.341 Some freeze, some cooperate and others resist.342 Moreover, where a 
complainant is intoxicated, due to the effect of alcohol on their ability to resist, it is likely 
this attitude will have a particular impact on such complainants. Moreover, this inaccurate 
belief is of particular concern as victims of acquaintance rape are less likely to define their 
own experience as rape.343 If they haven’t been injured they presume they haven’t 
technically been raped.344 This leads the victims to also blame themselves taking 
responsibility for failing to engage their negative autonomy rights clearly. Although it may 
not be overly relied upon its historical endorsement may well still have ramifications for 
rape complainants.  
 
Despite the conclusion that real rape myth is no longer widely endorsed, this does not take 
away from the prevalence and widespread nature of the aforementioned attitudes towards 
rape complainants. Despite Reece’s claim that the existence of myths is in fact itself a 
myth or as she states we have created ‘myths about myths’345 it does appear from mock 
juror studies particularly Finch and Munro’s work,346 together with reports and other 
research conducted that there is an endorsement of these common misconceptions. One 
reason Reece suggests caution when accepting the existence of such attitudes lays within 
the wording of the questions posed by the Amnesty Research and the Wake up to research 
report. She places substantial emphasis on the fact that neither report use the word ‘blame’ 
and instead ‘responsible’ is referred to throughout.347  She suggests that the term 
 
340 Louise Ellison & Vanessa E. Munro, ‘Better the Devil you know? “Real Rape” stereotypes and relevance 
of previous relationship in (mock) juror deliberations’ [2013] 17(4) International Journal of Evidence & 
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343 Kathyrn M. Ryan, ‘The Relationship between rape myths and Sexual Scripts: The Social Construction of 
Rape’ [2011] 65 Sex Roles 774-782,777 
344 Ibid 776. 
345 Reece (n 252) 445. 
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responsible carries with it many connotations including ‘accountable; in control; causally 
implicated; and of course blameworthy.’348 Reece argues that respondents didn’t mean 
‘blame’ when recording their answers, and instead suggests perhaps ‘causal connection’ 
may more accurately reflect their thought process. For example, she argues that 
respondents may have felt the victims dress or intoxication was causally connected to their 
assault thereby increasing their risk of harm.349  
Arguably as Reece herself states, responsible carries notions of blame within it. It is very 
difficult to accept Reece’s argument as it is almost impossible to detach responsibility from 
blame. Moreover, the two other terms Reece cites as a primary explanation of 
responsibility namely in control and accountable would both be understood by lay persons 
as inferring blame. Perhaps a very small percentage of respondents may have perceived the 
question and their response in the manner Reece suggests. However, it is highly unlikely 
that 34% of people answered a woman was responsible for their assault because they acted 
promiscuously but really meaning a ‘causal link’ existed. Even if a very small selection of 
respondents did happen to interpret the meaning of responsible in this non-conventional 
way, it is quite unlikely that there would be a substantial change to the statistics.  
Unfortunately, there is far too much evidence to suggest that myths and stereotypical 
attitudes exist, are endorsed and adversely affect sexual assault complainants. This 
includes research which has shown how barristers have exploited societal beliefs to 
undermine the credibility of complainants.  
 
2. THE EXPLOITATION OF MYTHS 
The above sections have outlined the most prominent and widely endorsed attitudes 
regarding complainants of sexual assaults. This section will now seek to analyse how 
barristers have used rape myths at trial to undermine the credibility of the complainant. 
This section will reveal how the use of these myths at trial compounds the ‘cycle of 
attrition’.350 This section will highlight the link between these stereotypical attitudes and 
expectations and how they inform legal decisions.  
 
 
348 Ibid 469. 
349 Ibid. 
350 Munro & Kelly (n 261). 
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Studies have revealed that some defence counsel rely on rape myths to change the focus 
from the defendant on to the complainant.351 Temkin notes that there has been no research 
done to calculate how often myths are used by defence counsel.352 However, in her and 
Krahé’s book Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap they interviewed barristers and judges 
who commented on the poor practices of defence counsel in rape cases.353 They said that 
defence counsel intentionally exploit stereotypical rape myths and attempt to undermine 
her character.354 One said, ‘there are barristers who… want to destroy a complainant.’355 
Another said how the battle is very unfair;356 a well experienced barrister in his/her 
comfort zone versus an already scared ‘highly emotional’357 complainant. A more recent 
rape trial study undertaken by Temkin et al revealed that the use of myths by defence 
barristers is still ‘well-entrenched.’358 This is a major problem in the justice system. The 
myths used by barristers detract from the exploitative actions of the defendant and may 
deny complainants access to justice.  
 
The Court process has notoriously been likened to ‘being raped all over again.’359 Perhaps 
a reason for this ‘secondary victimisation’360 may be because the CPS barrister is a 
representative of the state and the public and is technically not the victim’s lawyer;361 the 
Stern Review also revealed that many cases ‘were not properly prepared.’362 Similarly, in 
an interview based study barristers and judges noted the poor standard of prosecution.363 
More recently, Smith and Skinner conducted court evaluations over a period of ten months 
in 2012.364  It was found that myths were often invoked to scrutinize complainants’ 
behaviour and cast doubt in jurors’ minds. Findings revealed barristers used myths to 
oversimplify the offence,365 relying on complainants delayed reporting,366 lack of physical 
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resistance.367 These myths appear to be used to distinguish the complainants’ behaviour 
from what is perceived to be rational decision making. In this study, barristers attempted to 
reveal inconsistencies in complainants’ statements and actions before and during the 
assault.368 Such inconsistencies included examples given where a complainant was once 
described as being assertive and then later stating they were too scared to resist.369 These 
efforts attempt to undermine complainants credibility and in essence, oversimplify how 
individuals might respond to an assault. By focusing on rational reactions and consistent 
approaches that in fact ignore the nuanced and situational variables of a sexual assault, 
complainants’ responses are undermined. As Smith and Skinner state myths are used as a 
form of ‘rational ideal.’370 Through the development of this expectation, with the 
autonomous rational decision maker complainant at its core, any departure from expected 
behaviour that appears inconsistent with a rational response is scrutinized and thereby 
undermined. It would therefore seem that the cycle of attrition371 is complete. A substantial 
proportion of mock jurors, the general public, police, barristers and judges appear to 
endorse these attitudes which adversely affect rape complainants.  
 
Now consider the process involved after a sexual assault. The first stage may see 
complainants blaming themselves, questioning their own actions, what they did or didn’t 
do to avoid the assault and potentially trivialising or disregarding their own experience.  
Later if a complainant accepts their assaulted, they may fear they will be judged, 
preventing them from reporting or confiding in another person. If complainants do report 
their assault to the police they may then be met by suspicion from investigators, critically 
analysing their behaviour, clothing and scrutinizing whether their response was rational. If 
their case happens to be one of the few372 that does go to Court, complainants may be 
subject to further scrutiny where barristers, judges and jurors may rely on preconceived 
ideas of what rape is and how a normal person might respond. We therefore can conclude 
that myths and adverse attitudes have the potential to substantially and adversely impact a 
complainant at every stage, therefore significantly contributing to the justice gap. 
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Moreover, as will be argued in the next chapter, these myths and attitudes are then 
manifested in the hierarchal protections afforded to different complainants. 
 
Substantial and systemic change us required to address societal attitudes and legal reform. 
It must therefore be asked what can be done to change these routinely used myths and 
conceptualisations of expected behaviour to achieve systemic and institutional change. 
Firstly, we must explore alternative suggestions as to how myths can be tackled from a 
procedural lens.  
 
3. USING VULNERABILITY TO CHALLENGE EXPECTATIONS AND 
MYTHS.  
As outlined in Chapter 1 at the heart of the theory of vulnerability is the notion that we are 
all vulnerable. We can all be harmed at any moment in our lives due to our ‘fleshiness’ or 
human embodiment. The acknowledgement that we are all vulnerable allows us to 
challenge notions of autonomy that suggest we are all capable and free agents unless 
otherwise assigned. Once we accept our vulnerability, we can challenge the 
responsibilisation that comes with the realities of a liberal subject. The theory also 
acknowledges that our vulnerability is embedded. It is constant but fluid and ever-
fluctuating state of being that varies depending on our situational circumstances and our 
access to resilience.  Through a lens of vulnerability, we can challenge this distribution of 
resilience. We question who is protected and why, we recognise and ask why privileges are 
unequally distributed. We reveal that resilience has been afforded to men through the 
articulation of policies, sexual scripts and expectations. Such an unequal distribution has 
compounded the myths and attitudes. We demand that the shift in our focus change from 
the protection of men from false allegations and instead to the protection of all from 
exploitation. If we acknowledge that our attitudes are framed through this unequal 
distribution of resilience, hidden by a mask of ‘autonomous choice’, we can demand this 
transformation of attitude.  
 
If we challenge such pre-conditions, we challenge the heart of myths, we challenge the 
responsibilities assigned to women to avoid assault; we challenge the expectations set on 
‘autonomous’ individuals, particularly how they should act and respond to sexual assault. 
We confront and tackle the attitude that someone was assaulted because of what she wore, 
because she didn’t physically resist or because she flirted. Vulnerability allows us to 
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refocus, it encourages us to shift our perspective; we remove our emphasis from what the 
victim-survivor did to be harmed onto what the defendant did to exploit her vulnerability. 
A vulnerability lens encourages a shift away from individuals onto the State. Rather than 
placing responsibility on an individual to avoid harm, we welcome and accept our inherent 
and fluctuating vulnerabilities. The onus is then shifted elsewhere, we demand a state that 
protects everyone equally. We can also put an expectation on individuals, not to avoid 
assault but to not exploit each-others vulnerability. The duty is not one of individual 
responsibility but instead one to not wrong each other. In doing this, we are refocusing our 
attention onto the exploitative actions of the defendant rather than examining the 
complainant’s actions, and therefore invoking myths and expectations about their 
behaviour. For example, if a complainant is intoxicated, a vulnerability lens might, 
depending on the circumstances, acknowledge that a complainant is experiencing a 
heightened sense of vulnerability. We would not link the choice to consume alcohol with 
the onus of avoiding an assault. Instead, we would recognise that individuals should be 
aware of their particular vulnerabilities and to take extra precautions not to exploit them at 
that particular time. Through this theory myths and stereotypical attitudes can be 
challenged and instead shift our focus away from scrutinizing sexual assault complainants.   
 
Once our expectations are set, we ask how to implement these systemic changes. We can 
ask difficult questions of the State and its institutions. We can make difficult demands to 
create radical shifts in procedures, polices, attitudes and education.373 Currently as 
autonomous liberal legal agents we are told we are free to make our own choices, we are 
particularly free to choose how to act in the so called ‘private realm’; but because of those 
choices made our behaviour is scrutinized and entangled with myths and expectations. 
Instead we must demand protection from social institutions and the State, to recognise and 
protect our inherent and constant vulnerability regardless of our own actions or choices. 
The existence of myths and these stereotypical attitudes that pervade a victim-survivors 
experience need to be tackled. The only way this can be achieved is through systemic 
overhaul of our understanding of the lived human experience. Once we have tackled our 
attitudes and unwoven the autonomous liberal legal subject from our understanding of 
sexual relations, we can then start to reinvent and recalibrate legal reforms through a 
theory of vulnerability. This chapter has argued that because of the current autonomy 
 
373 As explored in the conclusion chapter 
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approach, sexual assault complainants are responsbilised and attributed blame through 
myths and attitudes that place undue expectations on their behaviour. Arguably these 
stereotypical attitudes and expectations through an autonomy lens have informed and 
shaped the legal response to sexual offences which has resulted in inadequate and 
hierarchal protections. To argue this, the following chapter will critically analyse the 
development and implementation of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.  
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Chapter 3 
 
THE PROBLEMS WITH AN AUTONOMY APPROACH, INTOXICATION, 
INCAPACITATION AND CONSENT. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The previous chapter argued that problematic attitudes towards rape complainants are 
prevalent and widely endorsed as a result of the conceptual underpinnings of autonomy. 
This chapter will argue how this autonomy approach has been manifested in the drafting 
and interpretation of sexual offences legislation. This chapter will argue that through this 
autonomy approach individuals are responsibilised. Through a focus on the determination 
of capacity with reference to voluntary and involuntarily intoxicated complainants, it will 
be argued that different incapacitated victims are protected in accordance with their 
apparent blameworthiness. This chapter will suggest how a vulnerability theory might 
challenge this unequal distribution of resilience and demand a responsive State which 
provides equal and adequate protection to all through legislation. Moreover, this chapter 
will contribute to the overall thesis argument that the autonomy approach is at the core of 
the problem with the current legal and societal response to complainants of sexual assault.  
Prior to the introduction of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 the law of rape was considered 
‘archaic’374 and ‘incoherent.’375 The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 introduced a 
new definition of rape concerning the consent of the victim, which removed the need to 
prove fear fraud376 or force for rape; 377 but it had failed to ‘delineate between consent and 
non-consent.’378 Following much debate,379 the Sexual Offences Act 2003 attempted to 
 
374 Protecting the Public: Strengthening protection against sex offenders and reforming the law on sexual 
offences, [2002] White Paper Cm 5668, Home Office Found at http://www.parliament.the-
stationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo021119/debtext/21119-05.htm  
375 Ibid [505]  
376 David Selfe, ‘The meaning of consent within the Sexual Offences Act 2003’ [2008] 178 The Criminal 
Lawyer 3-5, 4 
377 Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 s.1 
378 Emily Finch and Vanessa Munro, ‘The Sexual Offences Act 2003: intoxicated consent and drug assisted 
rape revisited’ [2004] Oct Criminal Law Review 789-802, 793 
379 For a discussion see, Jacqueline Scott, ‘The concept of Consent under the Sexual Offences Act 2003’ 
[2010] 1 Plymouth Law Review 22-41, 22 
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address the inadequacies left by the 1976 legislation. The Act provides a definition of 
consent and lists certain circumstances (rebuttable and conclusive) whereby consent will 
be presumed to be absent including those situations relating to incapacity.380 The question 
must therefore be asked as to whether or not these changes have been effective in 
addressing previous failures. The White Paper381 ‘Protecting the Public, Strengthening 
Protection against Sex Offenders and Reforming the Law on Sexual Offences’ and later the 
Home office382 recognised that the protection of autonomy was one of the most serious 
concerns for the new legislation. They were ‘determined to ensure the definitions [of 
capacity and consent] adopted were appropriate for use in the criminal law… these should 
enable the law to deliver effective protection while preserving sexual autonomy.’383 It must 
therefore be determined whether this autonomy approach has been effective or created 
more problems with the response to sexual assault complainants, with a particular focus on 
the determination of capacity and consent. 
The first section of this chapter will briefly outline the responsibilisation that an autonomy 
approach carries.384 Section 2 will explore the concepts of capacity, the presumptions and 
consent. Before examining the detail of the legislation each section will outline the 
discussions that helped inform their drafting.  Firstly, the issue of ‘capacity’ will be 
explored to suggest how the law determines when an individual retains or loses their 
capacity. Linked to this, the following section looks at the protections provided to specific 
complainants,385 whereby the law either conclusively or rebuttably presumes the 
complainant did not consent.386 It will then continue by examining the section 75 
rebuttable presumptions,387 focussing on the issues of voluntary intoxication and incapacity 
through unconsciousness. It will ask, whether these presumptions offer protection and how 
they are interpreted in relation to voluntarily intoxicated victims. The definition of consent 
and its apparent downfalls will then be examined. Following this, section 3 will analyse the 
case law to determine how consent and capacity is being interpreted and defined in relation 
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to voluntarily intoxicated complainants. Before concluding, section 4 will explore the 
defence of reasonable belief in consent.  
Overall, it will be argued that consent is vague and inadequately defined; the presumptions 
are hierarchically framed to exclude many instances of voluntarily intoxicated victims, and 
‘capacity’ fails to acknowledge our vulnerabilities because of the conceptual underpinnings 
of autonomy. In essence, it will be argued that in light of the detailed analysis, the current 
law is unsatisfactory as it is underpinned by the liberal legal autonomous subject, 
responsibilising individuals, and failing to adequately and equally protect victims of sexual 
assault.  
1.1 A REMINDER- THE RESPONIBILISATION OF AUTONOMY 
As explored in Chapter 1, the vulnerability theory has the potential to offer us a unique and 
nuanced lens to challenge our traditional norms. Before critically evaluating the law, this 
section will briefly set out how an autonomy approach in sexual offences causes an 
unequal distribution of resilience and responisbilises complainants. This section will act as 
a brief reminder of the key elements of an approach with autonomy underpinning the legal 
response to sexual offences.  
It will also be argued that the current law takes an unsatisfactory approach to sexual 
autonomy. As Munro has rightly stated in her analysis of consent, ‘simply asserting that a 
complainant should have the freedom to make a choice tells us little about what sort of 
level of freedom suffices.’388 It will be argued that the law is drafted in such a way as to 
avoid interfering with a person’s rights to autonomy. It must be asked whether this 
approach is acceptable. Although attractive in theory, the promotion of self-government 
and idealisation of independence is a tool used for inaction, the divisive line between 
public and private lives helps to justify this retrogression. Currently, there is an apparent 
integral battle between the law’s protection of both aspects of sexual autonomy; the right to 
choose and the right to refuse. It is an impossible balance to strike as we ‘respect an 
agent’s negative autonomy when we protect her from intentions by others that do not 
reflect her will…[and] we respect her positive autonomy when we allow her to render it 
permissible for others to engage in relationships with her.’389 Arguably the law ‘currently 
 
388 Vanessa Munro, ‘An Unholy Trinity? Non-consent, Coercion and Exploitation in Contemporary Legal 
Responses to Sexual Violence in England and Wales’ [2010] 63(1) Current Legal Problems 45-71, 52   
389 Alan Wertheimer, ‘Intoxicated Consent to Sexual Relations’ [2001] Law and Philosophy 373-401, 376  
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operates in favour of capacity’390; in that people are generally presumed capable of their 
own decision-making.  It is usually presumed that an agent retains capacity unless there is 
significant evidence to the contrary.  As will be exposed below, such a balance in favour of 
both capacity and consent creates further barriers for complainants leaving them with 
insufficient protection.  
As Fineman contends, the theory of autonomy, and the focus our society currently has on 
this, is a myth that is used by the State to mask their responsibilities for individuals’ well-
being. As Fineman rightly argues, a focus on autonomy and individual responsibility leads 
to individuals being blamed for so called ‘private acts’ outside the realm of State 
responsibility. As will be referred to throughout this chapter, the current conceptual 
underpinnings of autonomy leads to the responsibilisation of individuals. As Gotell 
explains many feminists ‘have emphasized how privacy reinforces the idea that the 
personal and private are distinct from the social and political.’391 Moreover, as explained 
by Randall, this responsibilsation forms victim-blaming that ‘deviates away from 
recognizing public responsibility for social problems such as violence against women and, 
instead, endorses a radically decontextualized, de-gendered focus on “problematic” 
individual.’ 392 It is through the conceptual underpinnings of autonomy and privitisation 
that the State denies their responsibility and burdens individuals to avoid harm. As 
Cormack and Peter articulate ‘individuals are encouraged to see themselves as active 
subjects responsible for enhancing their own well-being’…393 they go on to rightly argue 
that  ‘responsibilization slips too easily into "blaming the victim" for all that has happened 
to her.’394 This responsibility to avoid harm and play the ‘ideal victim’ who as Gotell states 
is ‘valorized victim is a responsible, security conscious, crime preventing subject who acts 
to minimize her own sexual risk’395 is further complicated through intoxication. Nils 
Christie first referred to this concept of the ideal victim in 1986. Christie refers to the 
portrayal of an idealised socially constructed concept of victims. He originally described 
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the ideal victim as a person ‘who when hit by crime- are given the complete and legitimate 
status of being a victim’.396  Such idealised victims are as perceived as traditionally 
vulnerable and innocent, ‘defenceless, innocent’397 and worthy of ‘sympathy and 
compassion’.398  Indeed in Davies, Francis & Greer’s exploration of the ideal victim, they 
compare the disparate media attention received in two similar missing persons cases, 
demonstrating the impact background, class and previous behaviour has on worthy 
victimhood status.399 As Nils suggests, ‘virgins walking home from caring for others’400 
are ideal victims as innocent and defenceless individuals. The ideal victim is one who 
cannot be said to be responsible for their harm. As Christie further argues, the more 
independent a woman becomes or is perceived, the more likely she should have known 
better and cannot rely on the lack of possibilities for self-protection.401 This ideal victim, 
thereby creates a ‘hierarchy of victimisation’402- delineating between those who are 
deserving or not.  
In particular, self-induced intoxication ‘marks a critical deviation from the rationalized and 
responsibilized norms of the explicit consent standard. Intoxicated complainants can be 
constructed as defying standards of sexual safekeeping by placing themselves at risk.’ 403 
Through the below analysis of the treatment of incapacitated complainants, especially 
where they are voluntarily intoxicated, we can reveal this responsibilsation as a result of an 
autonomy approach where ‘vulnerability [is] reconstructed as an individual problem and an 
effect of risk-taking.’404 
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2. THE ROAD TO REFORMS- CAPACITY, THE PRESUMPTIONS AND 
THE CONSENT DEFINITION. 
As previously mentioned the law of rape pre-2003 was in need of ‘modernisation’405 and 
was not suitable for the 21st Century.406 It was old fashioned ‘confusing’ and was 
‘contributing to the low conviction rates.’407 The law was mostly governed by the 
provisions of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 which lacked a definition of consent and 
unnecessarily focused on fear fraud and force; thereby ignoring the will of the woman. The 
Sexual Offences act was drafted in response to outcry from feminists to adequately reflect 
the role of women in sexual encounters, and in particular to afford women the freedom and 
autonomy to make choices and reflect that freedom in the legislation. As Rumney noted, 
part of the emphasis appeared to be on communication in an effort to promote sexual self-
determination; reflecting that there are two actors in a sexual encounter, and 
communication between both is key.408 
Before exploring their interpretation and application through a case law analysis, this 
section will critically analyse how and why the Sexual Offences Act 2003 was drafted with 
a particular focus on capacity, the presumptions and the definition of consent. It will 
evaluate the discussions surrounding the drafting of the legislation and analyse the 
motivations and the conceptual underpinning the aims of the law.  It will be argued that 
that the legislation was drafted with a foundation of autonomy.  
 
2.1 CAPACITY AND INTOXICATION 
Capacity to consent was considered in depth before the legislative reforms in 2003. In 
2000, both the Law Commission and the Home Office published reviews that informed 
these discussions. The purpose of these papers was to examine the law on sexual offences 
and recommend suggestions for reform.409 This section will examine how self-induced 
 
405 Jennifer Temkin and Andrew Ashworth, ‘The Sexual Offences Act 2003: Rape, Sexual assaults and the 
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406 Protecting the Public (n 374) [4].  
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(Routledge: 2010) 147. 
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intoxication was deemed to effect an individual’s capacity to consent, and therefore how a 
legislative response might be drafted where the individuals incapacity was self-inflicted. It 
will be argued that because of the conceptual underpinnings of the suggested reforms, the 
Law Commission’s and the Home Office’s suggestions were ignored and instead 
voluntarily intoxicated individuals were/are responsibilised.  
In determining who has and has not retained capacity, the Law Commission suggested that 
persons with a mental disability should be presumed not to have the capacity to consent to 
sexual activity if they were unable to ‘understand or retain the information relevant to the 
decision.’410  However, they extended this line of reasoning to include persons who were 
unable to communicate consent because of unconsciousness for any reason.411  The paper 
went on to rightly recommend that intoxicated victims, voluntarily or otherwise, should be 
afforded this protection under the law if it is proved they could not communicate their 
consent or were incapable of giving valid consent.412 Their suggestion would therefore not 
include any unnecessary distinction that implicitly suggests that voluntarily intoxicated 
victims are blameworthy. Providing involuntarily intoxicated victims with extra protection 
suggests a hierarchy of offences. It suggests that exploiting a complainant who voluntarily 
became intoxicated is less serious than a victim who became so through no fault of their 
own.  It is the state of vulnerability and how the complainant is experiencing their 
environment that should be considered. Both victims are experiencing their vulnerability in 
a similar light and the law should instead focus on the defendant’s exploitation of their 
incapacity: As the Law Commission right stated: 
‘We believe that if a person is so drunk or drugged as to be incapable of giving a 
valid consent, and the fact finding tribunal is sure that the defendant was aware of 
this (or was reckless as to the matter) at the relevant time, then there is no reason 
why the criminal law should not extend the protection to that person and such an 
incapacity would be recognised under our definition.’413  
Through the analysis below it will be revealed that the Government did not draw on these 
suggestions. It is noteworthy that the Law Commission suggested that voluntarily 
intoxicated victims be protected. They justly did not distinguish between the means by 
 
should include penetration of the mouth, vagina or anus. This was rejected on the basis that all rape offences 
should be treated as serious as one another.  
410 The Law Commission ‘Consent in Sexual Offences: a report to the Home Office Sex Offences Review’ 
[2000] at para 4.29 
411 Ibid 4.33. 
412 Ibid 4.53. 
413 Ibid. 
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which the person was rendered intoxicated, moreover the focus was on their ability to 
communicate their consent. Such a recognition suggests the reality that intoxicated victims 
may experience a sense of heightened vulnerability, hence more likely to be assaulted and 
therefore in need of greater protection from sexual exploitation.414 This is true as far as 
voluntarily intoxicated victims may be inhibited from refusing sexual advances due to their 
incapacity; moreover, these victims also face stereotypical attitudes and myths from 
society415 hence become at risk of criticisms from the public.  
Moreover, in 2002, Home Office released a white paper called ‘Protecting the Public: 
strengthening protection against sex offenders and reforming the law on sexual offences’ 
suggesting and discussing potential reforms to the law of rape. It suggested that those with 
a mental disorder should be given protection, as they referred to their particular 
vulnerability to rape. On that basis, they suggested that ‘a new offence of sex acts with a 
person who could not have had the capacity to consent’416 should be introduced.417 Such a 
reform could potentially reflect the theory of vulnerability, affording all incapacitated 
complainants equal protection. Although not recognised, this offence could have 
encapsulated all individuals irrelevant of the existence of a mental disorder. However, this 
approach was not implemented.    
The sensible suggestions made that a person should be deemed incapable of consenting 
where they had been too affected by drink or drugs to freely agree, was not followed by 
Parliament. The Home Secretary stated: 
‘it is worth making it clear that I have rejected the suggestion that someone 
inebriated could claim that they were unable to give consent—as opposed to 
someone who was unconscious for whatever reason, including because of alcohol, 
and was therefore unable to do so—on the ground that we do not want mischievous 
accusations in circumstances where someone genuinely had reasonable and honest 
belief of consent.’418 
Therefore, although Parliament had recognised the vulnerability of those who do not have 
(or are close to losing) the capacity to consent, the Law Commissions suggestions to 
include individuals who retained consciousness but were incapable of consenting was not 
 
414 Almost one in three victims (32%) said they ‘were under the influence of alcohol and 3% were under the 
influence of drugs’ at the time of the assault Crime Survey England and Wales, ‘Focus on: violent crimes and 
Sexual offences 2011/2012’ [2013] Statistical bulletin 63 
415 Havens (n 298).  
416 Protecting the Public (n 374) [510]; a discussion of a similar approach in Canada is contained within 
chapter 5 
417 As will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
418 Protecting the Public (n 374) [512].  
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followed. The above statement is ill founded as it assumes that individuals who are 
substantially intoxicated will always have the capacity to consent if they remain conscious. 
Moreover, it ignores the realities and the vulnerabilities of individuals who retain 
consciousness but are more likely to be exploited because of their inability to refuse 
unwanted advances. It fails to reflect the stereotypical attitudes and expectations burdened 
by women and instead inadvertently supports the idea that drunk women are more sexually 
available and more likely to false claim rape. Moreover, it could be suggested that these 
proposals were not adopted because of responsibilisation. Arguably, as these reforms were 
informed through an autonomy lens the focus on prioritisation is on ‘choice’ and self-
determination shaping the legislative reforms. Therefore, the choice of becoming 
voluntarily intoxicated carries with it the responsibility of avoiding any harm that might 
result from the exploitation of that vulnerability. As we will discuss in detail below, the 
State has opted to unequally distribute resilience here by failing to follow proposals that 
would offer equal protection to all and instead favour a hierarchal approach which 
differentiates protections for incapacities.   The actual determination of capacity must now 
be considered.  
Capacity is an ‘integral element’419 of consent; and consent itself is a very complex notion. 
As will be discussed in detail below, in order to ascertain whether there was valid consent 
to sexual relations it must be shown that the complainant had the capacity to consent. If the 
complainant is deemed not to have had the capacity to agree or disagree to sexual activity 
at the time of the offence, they will be deemed to not have consented.420 The focus of the 
legislation is therefore on two (or more) capable autonomous individuals exercising their 
rights and abilities to engage in wanted sexual activity.  
The meaning and understanding of capacity have ‘been the subject of argument and 
criticism’421 since the introduction of the 2003 Act. The definition of consent contains the 
phrase ‘capacity to agree by choice’; this in essence means the ability to communicate 
through words or otherwise their decision. The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is ‘vague’422 as 
it contains no definition of capacity. Instead its meaning is left open to the interpretation of 
 
419 LH Leigh, ‘Case comment: Two cases on consent in rape’ [2007] 5 Archbold News 6-9, 7 
420 Witmer- Rich (n 66) 377. 
421 Damian Warburton, ‘Court of Appeal: Rape: Consent and Capacity’ [2007] 71(5) Journal of Criminal 
Law 1-3,2  
422 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Case comment: rape consent- intoxication’ [2007] Nov Criminal Law Review 901-
903, 902 
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the jury on a case by case basis with judicial and case law guidance.423 The concept is 
therefore malleable and confusing, which is arguably worsened where intoxication is the 
basis of questioning capacity.  
As Cowan argues, excessive alcohol/drug ingestion may affect the motor and mental skills 
of a person424 potentially ‘render[ing] consent obscure.’425 As mentioned, if a voluntarily 
intoxicated victim-survivor becomes so intoxicated that she falls unconscious the law will 
presume she did not consent. However, where he or she is so affected by alcohol/drugs yet 
remains conscious it will be open to the prosecution to claim that she was incapable of 
consenting because of intoxication.426 As will be analysed below it appears the law 
presumes capacity is retained despite the obvious vulnerable circumstances.  
The grey areas of capacity do not appear to be dealt with appropriately by case law. It also 
seems that where complainants are deemed to have individuals who are substantially 
intoxicated should not be perceived as having retained capacity. As will be revealed below, 
the law appears more concerned with the autonomous decision of the person to become 
intoxicated rather than their obvious vulnerable state. It seems to preserve autonomy and 
assume the woman consented in the incident. There are some situations where it can be 
presumed that the complainant did not have the capacity to consent because of the 
situational circumstances of the encounter. These are known as rebuttable and conclusive 
presumptions contained within s75 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 which are explored 
below. 
2.2 THE (HIERARCHAL) PRESUMPTIONS 
Although the Law Commissions suggestions to include voluntarily intoxicated 
complainants within the capacity definition was not followed, their recommendations did 
not go unheard. This section will outline the presumptions of non-consent that were 
initially suggested. However, it will be argued that because of the conceptual 
underpinnings of autonomy, the drafting of these presumptions implied a hierarchy of 
protections.  
 
423 See section below for a discussion on capacity in practice.  
424 Bushman & Cooper (n 277) 341. 
425 Cowan (n 43) 904.  
426 Office for Criminal Justice reform, ‘Convicting rapists and protecting victims- Justice for victims of rape’ 
[2006] Consultation paper 1-45, 13 
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In a similar vein to the Law Commissions position, the Home Office Review suggested 
that a non-exhaustive list of circumstances should be made where the law should presume 
the person did not consent.427 The suggested list included situations concerning deception, 
unlawful detention, unable to understand fear fraud or force, threats to themselves or others 
and most importantly was asleep, unconscious or too affected by alcohol or drugs to give 
free agreement.428 The italicised point is noteworthy. Arguably, both voluntarily and 
involuntarily intoxicated persons fall within this category. This suggestion is in accordance 
with the Law Commissions’ recommendations. Such a recognition highlights the 
vulnerability of all intoxicated victims. The focus is removed from the cause of the 
incapacitation and intoxication hence affording equal protection, avoiding the attribution of 
blame on individuals.429 Although this suggestion was not followed, a slightly different 
approach was instead implemented. Although a minor amendment, it arguably has 
substantial implications for the treatment of intoxicated complainants.  
In line with the suggestions made by the Home Office430 and the Law Commission431 the 
Sexual Offences Act contains two sections with a list of presumptions whereby consent or 
capacity to consent will be deemed absent (rebuttable and conclusive presumptions). We 
must now explore the wording of the legislation and argue that different protections have 
been allocated to different victims because of the role they played in contributing to their 
harm. The law has failed to address the obvious vulnerability of voluntarily intoxicated 
victims and instead chosen an autonomy-based approach that examines the cause of the 
incapacitation and the blameworthiness of the victim. It has not provided voluntarily 
intoxicated victims with equal protection and has explicitly distinguished them from 
involuntarily intoxicated victims because of their role in exercising their free choice.  
 
Section 76 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 contains conclusive presumptions which refer 
to the evidence of deception, fraud and impersonation. If evidence is adduced to prove that 
there had been deception fraud or impersonation it will be conclusive that the complainant 
could not and therefore did not give consent. The primary focus is on the rebuttable 
 
427 Setting the Boundaries (n 132).  
428  Ibid [xii].  
429 That said, even if this had been implemented the focus remains unsatisfactorily upon the victims’ ability 
to agree and therefore her sexual autonomy. If the wording reflected an inability to refuse unwanted 
advances, the victims’ vulnerability and defendants’ exploitative actions would be highlighted; hence 
potentially altering the perspective of jurors. 
430 Protecting the Public (n 374).  
431 The Law Commission (n 410).  
84 
 
presumptions. Section 75 is central to the analysis of the treatment of voluntarily 
intoxicated victims. This section sets out a number of instances where the defendant has the 
burden of adducing some evidence that the complainant consented to the sexual activity.432 
If any of the circumstances listed within s75 exist at the time of the offence, it will be 
presumed that the complainant could not and therefore did not give free consent. The issue 
will then revert to consent and his reasonable belief in consent.  
 
These presumptions were introduced to433 help increase prosecution rates in aiding the 
definition of consent. This section contains a list of evidential presumptions. It is then open 
to the defence to rebut the existence of such a situation and provide evidence that there was 
consent.434 The situations of particular interest435 are:  
‘(2)… 
(d)the complainant was asleep or otherwise unconscious at the time of the relevant 
act; 
(f)any person had administered to or caused to be taken by the complainant, 
without the complainant’s consent, a substance which, having regard to when it was 
administered or taken, was capable of causing or enabling the complainant to be 
stupefied or overpowered at the time of the relevant act.’436 
The two presumptions that will be analysed are 2(d) the complainant was unconscious at 
the time and 2(f) that the complainant was involuntarily intoxicated at the time of the 
offence. These sections are important for the overall argument of this chapter and thesis, in 
that the law provides different treatment to individuals depending on how blameworthy 
they are perceived to be.  
 
Section 75(2)(d) protects those who are vulnerable to rape because of ‘unconsciousness’. 
This is therefore interpreted as protecting both voluntary and involuntary intoxicated 
complainants where they are so drunk/affected by drugs that they fall unconscious. 
Arguably, this suggests that if you retain consciousness you retain capacity which 
 
432 Jenny Mc Ewan, ‘Proving consent in sexual cases: Legislative change and cultural revolution’ [2005] 9 
(1) International Journal of Evidence and proof 1-23, 3 
433 Clare Gunby, Anna Carline Caryl Beynon, ‘Alcohol related rape cases: Barristers perspectives on the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003 and its impact on practice’ [2010] 74(6) Journal of Criminal Law 579-600, 583  
434 Tadros (n 48) 525.  
435 Other presumptions can be found in s75 of SOA 2003, including the threat or use of violence to the 
complainant or another; where the complainant was the defendant was not unlawfully detained and; where 
the complainant was suffering from a physical disability which rendered them incapable of communicating 
consent or non-consent.  
436 Sexual Offences Act 2003 s75(2) 
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oversimplifies the situation. It has since been recognised in the appeal of R v Bree437 that 
voluntarily intoxicated victims may lose their ability to consent before falling 
unconscious.438 However, the benchmark to which this applies appears to be extremely 
high.439 
Section 75(2)(f) covers complainants who were incapacitated at the time of their assault 
due to involuntarily becoming intoxicated. This section covers those victims who have 
been spiked through drink or drugs or tricked somehow into consumption, rendering them 
‘stupified’ or over-powered by the substance taken. In order to rely on this section then it is 
not necessary for the involuntarily intoxicated complainant to be totally incapacitated. It is 
enough to show that the substance taken has overpowered them in such a way rendering 
them incapable of consenting. Moreover, the wording of this section suggests that the 
administrator of the substance need not be the perpetrator of the assault. Therefore, it is 
possible for someone to rely on this presumption where through drugging by one person 
they become intoxicated and later be sexual assaulted by another. The latter person need 
not have any knowledge that they were involuntarily intoxicated, it is enough that they 
were overpowered by the substance administered to them. For comparison, we must look 
at how complainants who were intoxicated voluntarily at the time of the assault are 
covered in the legislation. 
As earlier mentioned despite suggestions to include voluntarily intoxicated victims within 
these presumptions, the law does not provide such persons with extra legislative 
protections. Complainants who chose to become intoxicated and were later assaulted do 
not fall within the rebuttable presumptions contained within s75. They do however receive 
protection where they are deemed to have fallen unconscious at the time, however as 
aforementioned this causes evidential difficulties. Despite both voluntary and involuntarily 
intoxicated victims are both over-powered by a substance at the time of the offence, they 
are offered different protections, arguably because of the idea autonomy and 
responsibilisation.  
 
437 [2007] EWCA 804 
438 A detailed discussion of the interpretation and application of the law follows below with a critical analysis 
of the key case law.  
439 This will be discussed fully in the next section on capacity in practice.  
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As Khan states ‘the Act is silent about the impact of excessive but voluntary alcohol 
consumption on the ability to give consent to intercourse, or indeed to consent generally.440 
This reasoning may be due to the notion of prior fault. The exclusion of such victims may 
indirectly support rape myths such as ‘she was asking for it.’441 This appears to support the 
assumption that women are responsible for avoiding rape;442 and that they should avoid 
becoming vulnerable to attacks. Masked behind the notions of autonomy, such statements 
reinforce the stereotypical ‘victim-blame’ attitudes of ‘individual responsibility.’443 
 
By passing the responsibility to the victim, the State reduces their resilience by heightening 
their vulnerability to scrutiny hence simultaneously reducing their credibility. Thankfully, 
the CICS decision was reversed due to public outcry;444  however, as Temkin notes ‘it was 
not without its supporters.’445 For instance, in a study by Munro and Ellison they tested the 
attribution of blame to an intoxicated victim.446 The lessons learned from this study are 
quite shocking. It appears that where a woman is drunk or sober her expected behaviour 
and responsibility for herself are extraordinarily high.447 In the Wake up to the Research 
Report 64% of people thought that victims who drank to excess prior to the assault should 
accept responsibility for being raped.448 Conversely, it appears that some people blame a 
man is less if he is intoxicated at the time of the assault. His behaviour is usually forgiven 
due to his ‘unintentional behaviour’; he is so intoxicated he is unable to control his 
actions.449 It seems that no matter whether a man is drunk (too intoxicated to be 
blameworthy) or tipsy (blame the woman for being seductive) or sober (more credible) 
there is always some excuse available from society to accept his behaviour.450 He is 
 
440 Tahir Khan, ‘Voluntary intoxication and Consent in cases of Rape’ [2013] 8 February Criminal Law and 
Justice Weekly 114, 114 
441 Frey & Douglas (n 286) 246. 
442 Helen A. Stuggart, ‘The missing text: Rape and Women’s sexuality’ [1994] 17(1) Women and Language 
12-28, 18 
443 As explored in chapter 2 on Rape myths. Although since amended, the Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Scheme ruled that awards to drunken rape victims should be reduced as ‘alcohol was a contributing factor to 
the incident’. This is an example of the State failing to take responsibility for vulnerable victims. Attempting 
to reduce compensation awards for intoxicated victims highlights the State’s attempts to further draw 
distinctions between the public and private sphere see  Temkin (n 237) 717; and UK Legal News Analysis, 
Rape victim wins back full compensation reward 28th August 2008.  
444 Temkin (n 351) 717. 
445 Ibid. 
446 Ellison & Munro (n 295) 310. 
447 Ibid. 
448 Havens (n 298) and more recently ‘A third of men think if a woman has flirted on a date it generally 
wouldn’t be rape, even if she hasn’t consented to sex (21% of women believe this)’ see YouGov (n 255). 
449 Pollard (n 299). 
450 Ellison & Munro (n 295) 309. 
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therefore viewed more favourably and less responsible.451 It therefore appears there is a 
general reluctance to label intoxicated non-consensual cases as rape.452 This attitude 
creates a ‘double standard’ whereby ‘women are blamed more for a sexual assault offence 
when they have consumed alcohol ... and the defendants are viewed less likely to have 
perpetrated the crime.’453  
 
According to a study conducted by Anna Carline and Clare Gunby the section 75 
presumptions have not been effective.454 They refer to the fact that the burden on the 
defendant to rebut the presumption is not onerous and all that is required is for a defendant 
to ‘convince the judge there is an issue with regard to consent.’455 They conducted a 
qualitative study interviewing barristers as to their use and impact at trial. Overall the 
general opinion appeared to be that the presumptions have been ‘overwhelming 
unsuccessful.’456  Similarly, the Consultation paper Convicting Rapists and protecting 
victims [2006] has said the presumptions have ‘not enjoyed great usage.’457 The ‘sufficient 
evidence’ required by a defendant to rebut the existence of a circumstance listed in section 
75 is quite a ‘minimal standard’ 458 and as the consultation paper notes this standard is not 
particularly ‘onerous’459 suggesting it would be easily disengaged.460 As said in the case of 
R v Ciccarelli461 ‘some evidence beyond the fanciful or speculative had to be adduced to 
support the reasonableness of his belief.’462 In that case where the presumption was 
introduced the court held that the defendant must adduce evidence rather than his own 
asserted belief as to consent.  
 
This suggests a higher burden than the aforementioned studies refer to, which if enforced 
consistently, might increase reliance on presumptions. Perhaps a more robust approach 
would be to remove any differentiation between incapacities. A theory of vulnerability 
 
451 Pollard (n 299). 
452 Discussed further in rape myth chapter 
453 Clare Gunby, Anna Carline, Mark A Bellis & Carly Beynon, ‘Gender differences in alcohol related non-
consensual sex’ [2012] BMC Public health available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/216 
454 Anna Carline and Clare Gunby, ‘Barristers perspectives on Rape and the Sexual Offences Act 2003’ 
[2010] 31 Criminal Law and Justice Weekly 579-600, 593 
455 Ibid. 
456 Ibid. 
457 Office for Criminal Justice reform (n 426) 15.  
458 Finch & Munro (n 378) 793. 
459 Office for Criminal Justice reform (n 426) 15. 
460 A full exploration of the treatment of involuntarily intoxicated victims is found in the next chapter. 
461 [2011] EWCA Crim 2665 at 18 
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suggests that we are all inherently, unavoidably vulnerable subjects. Firstly, it must 
therefore be asked whether the law should distinguish between different means of 
incapacity? As Elliot and De Than argue ‘there is no need for the law to distinguish 
between different reasons for incapacity including age, mental disorder and incapacity. A 
single test should be adopted which would apply to all offences and to all causes of 
incapacity’463 Potential suggested reforms such as this will be explored in chapter 6 on 
reforms.  
This section has revealed that the State and its institutions do not sufficiently protect those 
who are exploited because they voluntarily became intoxicated. Because of the conceptual 
underpinning of autonomy, this may inadvertently suggest that those who were intoxicated 
voluntarily at the time of their assault were partly responsible for their harm and should 
therefore bear some responsibility. This allows the State to draw a line between private and 
public acts, shifting their burden by affording every individual responsibility for their own 
actions/safety. As we have seen those victims who become involuntarily intoxicated are 
given certain protections; yet those voluntarily intoxicated victims who are just as 
vulnerable receive no such separate protection. The focus appears to be somewhat on the 
administration of the substance rather than the effect of the drugs/alcohol on the capacity 
of the victim.464 This may be illogical as the law now says that the person who administers 
the substance to the victim does not have to be the person who takes advantage of her 
intoxicated state.465 Therefore, the law appears to place an unjustifiably high burden on the 
victim suggesting those who become voluntarily intoxicated put themselves at risk of rape. 
Perhaps it was felt that consent and capacity alone would sufficiently address the issue of 
voluntarily intoxicated victims. However, it appears that leaving voluntarily intoxicated 
victims unprotected in essence promotes rape myths and stereotypes and leaves victims 
less clearly protected.  
When voluntarily intoxicated complainants retain consciousness and capacity, or if a 
defendant adduced evidence to rebut the circumstances listed within s 75, the issue then 
falls to whether consent was given freely and voluntarily. We must therefore consider the 
adequacy of the definition of consent.  
 
463 Catherine Elliot and Claire de Than, ‘The case for a rational reconstruction of consent in criminal law’ 
[2007] 70(2) Modern Law Review 225-249, 241.  
464 As will be further revealed in section x below.  
465 S75(2)(f) SOA 2003 
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2.3 CONSENT: ONE STEP FORWARD TWO STEPS BACK? 
As earlier stated, consent is a term that only entered into legislation in 1976. The focus 
before the statutory definition of consent was introduced was whether the woman had 
rejected and resisted her attacker. The meaning of consent and its understanding was 
developed through common law,466 which arguably has been formulated around the 
concept of positive sexual autonomy. As previously mentioned, it has evolved since the 
early case of R v Camplin.467 In essence, consent is critical as it differentiates ‘between 
rape and permissible sexual intercourse.’468  Rape cases often have no separate evidence 
and may often rely on the complainant’s testimony alone.469 The notion later evolved in R 
v Olujobja470 whereby it was held consent is a state of mind. After this decision, it was 
decided that a jury should be directed to understand consent ‘in its ordinary meaning.’471 
However, this approach was unsatisfactory as it lacked certainty and clarity; leaving juries 
with little direction and confused as to it meaning, thereby creating a demand for clarity 
through legal reform. 
 
The Law Commission published a paper in 2000.472 They suggested that the term consent 
be defined using the terms free, genuine and agreement.473 Following the Law 
Commission’s review, in 2000 the Home Office published ‘Setting the Boundaries: 
Reforming the law on Sex Offences.’ The Home Office suggested that there should be a 
statutory definition of consent to sexual activity. It rejected the definition proposed by The 
Law Commission suggesting it was too complex instead opting for ‘free agreement.’474 
The paper reasoned that this definition encapsulates the term ‘genuine’. Including the term 
‘free’ is important as freedom is often linked to the concept of autonomy. They suggested 
that this potentially clearer definition would eliminate any confusion surrounding the issue 
of consent. It posited that detailed definition together with accurate guidance could 
potentially provide juries with a more meaningful understanding of consent. thereby 
 
466 Gunby, Carline & Beynon (n 433) 580.   
467 [1845] 9 JP 424 
468 Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, ‘Clarifying consent: Peter Westen’s the Logic of Consent’ [2006] 25 Law and 
Philosophy 193-217, 214 
469  Office for Criminal Justice Reform (n 426) 15. 
470 [1982] 1 QB 
471 Ibid. 
472 The Law Commission (n 410).   
473 Protecting the Public (n 132) 2.10. 
474 Ibid (v) 
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potentially reaching more reliable verdicts. However, it appears that the chosen definition 
lacked clarity and has instead served to provide more confusion rather than certainty.475 
Such uncertainty appears not to have protected rape complainants leaving jurors reliant on 
potentially stereotypical attitudes and expectations. Therefore, we must consider how the 
legislator drafted the definition to determine its conceptual underpinnings.  
As aforementioned if the presumptions are not applicable or have been successfully 
rebutted by the defence, the focus then shifts onto the definition of consent within s74.476 
This section will therefore critically analyse the wording of the legislation and ask whether 
on paper the reforms and introduction of a definition has adequately protected individuals 
or whether through an autonomy approach has resulted in responsibilisation. 
As consent is at the heart of the offence477 it is essential that the law is as clear and 
unambiguous with its definition. For these reasons, in 2003 it was found that this ad-hoc 
approach was no longer appropriate. A new more precise definition was required to help 
juries understand consent. Where the facts do not ‘fall squarely’478 within the presumptions 
of section 75 and 76,479 section 74 will apply; defining consent as: 
‘For the purposes of this Part, a person consents if he agrees by choice, and has the 
freedom and capacity to make that choice’480 
This definition appears to have complicated the notion of consent by using the terms 
freedom and capacity to define consent yet failing to provide definition or direction as to 
their meaning. Assigning undefined terms to a word in order to explain its meaning, does 
not clarify the original words actual definition. As was rightly argued by Temkin and 
Ashworth, the definition has complex ‘philosophical issues as to freedom and choice.’481 
Similarly, Temkin and Ashworth have noted the deep philosophical issues with the 
definition.482 They have also commented; 
‘Insofar as the definition of ‘consent’ is a pivotal element in the new law on adult 
sex offences, we have seen that s.74 is vague in its terms and that a large part of the 
new law is left to the interpretation of juries, under the guidance of model 
directions prepared by the Judicial Studies Board. Even as a residual definition, 
 
475 As is discussed in the following sections 
476 Sexual Offences Act, 2003 
477 Professor John Cooper, ‘Consent- How to prove?’ [2011] 23 Criminal Law and Justice weekly 330, 330 
478 Temkin & Ashworth (n 405) 336. 
479 Which will be discussed in the next section 
480 Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.74 
481 Ashworth (n 422) 902. 
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s.74 leaves too much uncertainty in the application of the law to a whole range of 
familiar situations.483 
It would therefore appear at a first glance that the definition has not fully met its aims and 
has not in fact clearly defined consent. It attempts to recognise the autonomy of 
complainants, yet the terms ‘freedom’ and ‘capacity’ remain vague and undefined. 
However, it must be asked what this definition means and the ramifications of its 
interpretation. As Rumney rightly recognises, the term ‘free agreement’ suggests a ‘two-
way process of communication or exchange,484 whilst ‘challenging the assumption that a 
woman is available for intercourse when she is in no position to choose.’485Arguably this 
emphasis on communication may have been in an effort to recognise the active role women 
do and should have in sexual activity. Moreover, the review referred to the responsibility 
of each party for their own actions; arguably again as it has been informed by the liberal 
legal autonomous subject. As Rumney accurately articulates, in light of the prevalence of 
rape myths and victim blame, it is highly likely that the responsibility to communicate 
agreement ‘may disproportionately fall upon rape complainants.’486 The expectation that 
all individuals are free and independent, capable of making decision free from outside 
inferences, appears to have informed this definition of consent. Where individuals fall 
short of this rational subject decision maker, failing to adhere to expected norms, they are 
responsibilised and in essence blamed for contributing to the harm caused.   
However, as Tadros acknowledges, the law now recognises ‘the possibility that yes does 
not always mean yes.’487 The concept of consent must therefore be scrutinized. As 
Wallerstein explains, consent is broken into both legal and factual consent.488 He says that 
the definition clearly requires legal consent. Factual consent is that a person agrees by 
choice; this is an essential element of legal consent but is insufficient on its own.489 He 
says two more conditions must be satisfied for a valid legal consent: a person must be free 
to agree and have the capacity to agree.490 Therefore, there are three integral elements of 
consent. None of these elements will be sufficient on their own as someone may agree by 
 
483 Ibid.   
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485 Ibid. Also see chapter 5 for a discussion on the affirmative consent model. 
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choice to sex but this agreement might be made out of fear or they may not understand 
what they are agreeing to. Tadros rightly argues that consent is complex. and it is unclear 
how a jury is to determine its existence;  
‘[a]re the jury to determine whether the complainant agreed by choice first and then 
determine whether she had the relevant capacity and freedom? Or are they to 
address the question of capacity and freedom first … and conclude she did not 
agree by choice?’491  
It appears that the definition of consent may be too complex for juries to understand 
leaving them ‘confused’492 and its meaning open to potential influence from stereotypical 
views.493 As one barrister said, ‘despite the existence of the statutory definition, juries 
frequently relied upon their own personal definitions and understandings of consent to 
sexual activity to draw conclusions in rape cases.’494 Hence, it could be suggested that this 
definition is not as unambiguous as envisioned, instead it iss complex and philosophical. 
However, even if the definition was precise and accessible, if underpinned by an autonomy 
lens the outcome would be similar, with barristers and jurors interpreting and manipulating 
the law to responsibilise complainants.  
Anna Carline and Clare Gunby conducted a study examining barristers perspectives of the 
new legislation.495 One quote from a barrister who commented on the definition of consent 
stated ‘[h]ow an ordinary jury makes sense of it is a mystery.’496 Arguably, considering the 
complexity of the definition and lack of clear directions, there is a risk that jurors may 
ignore the law and revert to pre-conceived notions of victim blame. The consensus 
appeared to be that the definition was more helpful to lawyers rather than jurors as 
intended.497 As Tadros potently suggested, it is very easy to imagine defence barristers 
exploiting the ambivalence of consent ‘which could come to be distracted from the central 
question of whether the complainant engaged in intercourse freely by focusing on whether 
her words or actions indicated agreement.’498 The recommendation of statutory judicial 
directions as to the meaning of consent was rejected by Government of the time who have 
 
491 Tadros (n 48) 520.  
492 Anna Carline and Clare Gunby, ‘‘How an ordinary jury makes sense of it is a mystery’: Barristers’ 
perspectives on rape, consent and the sexual offences act 2003’ [2011] 32 Liverpool Law Review 237-250, 
241 
493 As is discussed in Chapter 2 on rape myths and stereotypical societal attitudes 
494 Carline & Gunby (n 492). 
495 Ibid. 
496 Ibid 240. 
497 Ibid 241. 
498 Tadros (n 48) 522.  
93 
 
instead opted for a standard direction to be developed by the Judicial Studies Board and the 
Court of Appeal which could then be tailored to every case.499 
In March 2010, the Judicial Studies Board published jury directions on the meaning of 
capacity, consent and voluntary intoxication.500 The main purpose of these directions is to 
reiterate that the law should be interpreted on the facts of the case and it is ‘not just an 
abstract concept of consent.’501 It provides scenarios and detailed examples of a how a jury 
might answer the questions of intoxicated capacity to consent to sex.502 One such direction 
states that alcohol may make a person inhibited than s/he might be when sober. The 
articulation of this direction appears to be yet another manifestation of autonomy, 
reiterating and reinforcing the responsibility of complainants to avoid harm. The updated 
guidance instead details an example of a jury direction detailing that just because a 
complainant got intoxicated does not mean they wanted to have sex. However, it also states 
that ‘consumption of alcohol or drugs may cause someone to become disinhibited and 
behave differently.’503 
Instead, perhaps the guidance should refocus, and rephrase, the direction to reflect the 
increased likelihood of exploitation when intoxicated. It appears that the State has passed 
its responsibility to protect individuals onto the individual. Through this promotion of 
autonomous choice individuals are led to believe that the State are acting in our best 
interests, however upon reflection it appears the State has merely masked its 
responsibilities. Although the directions are optional guidance for judges to employ, it 
would appear from other jurisdictions that implementing same into legislation does little to 
alleviate stereotypical attitudes.504   
For example, in the Australian territory Victoria, jury directions on consent have been 
introduced in legislation. These directions are issued to help juries and to ‘address 
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stereotypical views.’505 These directions specifically detail common stereotypes to juries 
and strongly state that these cannot be relied upon as proof of consent. It attempts to 
minimise any myths and preconceptions that jurors may have and encourages them to base 
their decisions on the facts and law alone. As Scott said ‘[a]cademics agree that trial judges 
need to provide sufficient guidance to remove such preconceptions held by jurors.’506 But 
Flynn & Henry have argued that these directions have merely served to confuse juries with 
many convictions overturned because of judicial mis-directions.507 It would therefore 
appear that the direction applied were too complex for juries to comprehend lending them 
to rely on preconceived ideas about rape and consent.508  
It would therefore appear that the promotion of autonomy and the terminology used to 
underpin consent is a cause for concern. It is too malleable, open to manipulation and 
subjective of a concept. As will be explored in more detail in chapter 6, consent alone is 
inadequate and needs to be reformed in light of a vulnerability theory. Firstly though, the 
implications of this must now be considered through an examination of the determination 
of consent, capacity and the presumptions in case law. Considering the significant overlap 
between consent capacity and the rebuttable presumptions, the following section will 
analyse each of these concepts together, unpicking their interpretation and significance in 
case law.    
 
3. CONSENT, CAPACITY AND THE PRESUMPTIONS: OPERATION IN 
PRACTICE. 
The clarity of the terms consent and capacity consent remain in dispute since their 
introduction in 2003. Once they are coupled with excessive alcohol and/or drugs 
consumption their application becomes even hazier with complicated evidential rules. As 
this section will go on to analyse, the interpretation in practice of capacity, consent and the 
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presumptions is problematic. The legislative reforms, as informed by an autonomous lens, 
appear to be interpreted and manipulated in such a way as to heighten the burdens on 
complainants to avoid harm or communicate non-consent, thereby failing to afford 
adequate and equal protection.    
One of the first and well renowned cases that attempted to decipher their meaning in 
relation to intoxication was R v Dougal.509 In that case, the complainant was so intoxicated 
that she could not exactly remember whether she consented or not.510 The prosecution 
deemed that this was fatal to their case and withdrew. It would therefore appear that the 
failure of this case was therefore due to the incorrect understanding of the law on consent. 
It could be argued that the prosecution did not understand the definition hence ignoring the 
question of capacity. Moreover, this case is most known for Judge Roderick Evans 
infamous utterance ‘drunken consent is still consent.’511 This famous statement also 
highlights the misinterpretation of the law as it fails to recognise the effect of alcohol on 
capacity to consent. It could have been possible for the prosecution to argue that the 
complainant did not have the capacity to consent. It appears this issue was ignored, and the 
sole focus of the case was consent. This highlights the failure of both the prosecution and 
the judge to recognise the complainant’s vulnerability and defendant’s potentially 
exploitative actions. It appears that the assumption is if a woman remains conscious, she 
retains the capacity to consent.512 The resilience of her and her environment appear to have 
been ignored. She was clearly experiencing a heightened state of vulnerability through her 
intoxication. Yet instead, the link between disinhibition and alcohol appears to suggest that 
drunken women are almost presumed to have consented to intoxicated sexual relations 
when conscious. As Vera Baird states it ‘seems to reverse the burden of proof, requiring 
her to show she didn’t say yes.’513 This reveals how the law appears to presume consent, 
that the law is framed in such a way as to protect men from allegations rather than protect 
individuals from sexual assault. This represents the unequal distribution of resilience. 
However, it is worth noting that the judicial guidelines have since directed judges away 
from relying on the phrase ‘drunken consent is still consent’ to avoid distress.514 Dougal 
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was the first case faced with the effect of intoxication on consent, which arguably did not 
interpret the law in accordance with its aims; excessively focusing on the complainant’s 
behaviour and ignoring the issue of capacity.  
Similarly, the case of R v Gardner515 overlooked the issue of capacity when considering 
whether an underage girl consented to being digitally penetrated whilst she vomited.516 In 
sentencing, it was concluded that she had consented despite her intoxicated state and the 
defendants’ obvious awareness of this state.517 The decision failed to fully explore the 
effect of her intoxication on her capacity to consent. The judge said, ‘what the defendant 
did was consensual, despite the fact it was drunken consent and despite that the young 
woman was taken advantage of.’518 The latter part of that statement is the most concerning. 
To state that a young girl can give ‘free agreement’ despite her obvious intoxicated state 
and whilst acknowledging the exploitative actions of the defendant, is very concerning. 
This further exposes what an undue focus on autonomy produces; reinforcing stereotypical 
attitudes and myths whilst responsibilising the victim and ignoring the predatory actions of 
the defendant.    What the  
R v Bree519 was the next notorious case that dealt with the complex web of intoxication 
capacity and consent. This case concerned a rape of a complainant who had been vomiting 
because of her intoxicated state.520 Originally the prosecution had claimed that the 
complainant was unconscious throughout the majority of the incident and could not 
therefore have consented as she lacked capacity as per the rebuttable presumption 
contained in s75(2)d of SOA 2003.521 Later in the case, it was conceded by the 
complainant and the prosecution, that the memory blackouts of the incident may have been 
caused by the effect of alcohol rather than unconsciousness.522 The prosecution then 
decided to argue that the complainant did not consent.523 The judge failed to advise the jury 
of this change in the prosecution’s case.524 It had been open to the prosecution to argue that 
she lacked capacity to consent and that these blackouts were evidence of incapacity. 
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Similarly, she had testified that ‘I felt as if I wasn’t in my body…I knew I didn’t want this 
but I didn’t know how to go about stopping it.’525 Such evidence would suggest that the 
complainant was so intoxicated she was incapable of resisting; she was experiencing a 
heightened state of vulnerability with little or no resilience.  Moreover, this suggests she 
was incapacitated and this argument should have been put forward by prosecution. The 
failure to do so reflects the treatment of capacity as an ‘all or nothing issue.’526 
Interestingly, the defendant testified that the complainant welcomed his advances and ‘did 
nothing to stop him.’527 This again suggests a reliance on the myth that a complainant must 
resist advances. It would appear from the complainant’s evidence that she was too 
intoxicated to resist therefore suggesting the defendants’ exploitation of her vulnerability. 
Furthermore, the judge did not refer to the effect of alcohol on the complainant and on her 
capacity to consent528 and hence her experience of her vulnerability. Frustratingly, the 
Judge briefly mentioned that intoxication may affect her credibility. Once again, promoting 
the stereotypical myths associated with drunken rape victims. On another note, it appears 
that both the prosecution and the judge sidestepped the issue of capacity. Unsurprisingly, it 
was because of these poor guidelines that the case was overturned and deemed unsafe, 
stating:529  
‘If, through drink, or for any other reason, a complainant had temporarily lost her 
capacity to choose whether to have sexual intercourse, she was not consenting, and 
subject to the defendant’s state of mind, if intercourse took place, that would be 
rape. However, where a complainant had voluntarily consumed substantial 
quantities of alcohol, but nevertheless remained capable of choosing whether to 
have intercourse, and agreed to do so, that would not be rape’530 
It would appear that autonomy has been used as a guise here to responsibilise the 
complainant, as Sir Igor P stated that ‘both were adults, neither acted unlawfully in 
drinking to excess… free to choose how much to drink and with whom… free to have 
intercourse with each other.’531 The focus again is on the positive aspects of autonomy- the 
right to have drunken sexual intercourse and shunning any state intervention. In giving 
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judgment, the Court of Appeal briefly referred to the case of R v Malone532 that said 
‘[s]ubmitting to an act of sexual intercourse, because through drink she was unable 
physically to resist, though she wished to, is not consent.’533 Sir Igor P also clarified the 
statement ‘drunken consent is still consent’ in that it is ‘broadly true’534 as it is a ‘useful 
shorthand accurately encapsulating the legal position.’ Though he went onto state that ‘as a 
matter of practical reality, capacity to consent may evaporate well before a complainant 
becomes unconscious.’ Although recognising this, the point at which capacity may 
evaporate was not detailed; i.e. how and when can ‘well before’535 be determined? How 
might we determine when someone loses capacity? Perhaps evidence of blackouts from the 
complainant should be interpreted as evidence of incapacity? Or we might change our 
perspective completely. Instead of asking the complainant whether they had the capacity to 
consent, considering the evidentially difficulties in proving so because of its nature, we 
might instead revert to the defendant and ask his knowledge of her capacity at the time of 
the offence.536  
Despite these apparent qualifying comments, it is argued that the alleged ‘useful 
shorthand’537 will be what is remembered and relied upon. Of course, media headlines 
were based on the slogan from the case of Dougal, 538 hence acting to distort the reality of 
intoxication and sexual encounters. To state ‘drunken consent is still consent’ is misleading 
as it suggests that, in more cases than not, an incapacitated complainant can (and does) 
consent to sex thereby reinforcing expectations and stereotypical attitudes. Moreover, the 
shorthand carries theoretical concerns as it connotes an unequal balance favouring the 
presumption of consent, creating further barriers for complainants who must demonstrate 
non-consent to secure justice.  It completely ignores the particulars of each case and the 
obvious heightened vulnerability of complainants in sexual exchanges. This statement 
overlooks the power imbalance between drunken and sober capacities; similarly, it 
disregards the potential for exploitation of a drunken victim. Likewise, should both be 
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intoxicated at the time of the assault, it responsibilises the complainant to demonstrate 
(arguably quite vehemently for evidential purposes) their non-consent. Moreover, it 
arguably overlooks the defendant’s role and responsibility to obtain valid free agreement 
and indeed reinforces their belief in consent as reasonable because of the complainant’s 
intoxication.   
It appears that the prosecution in both Bree and Dougal failed because poor judicial 
directions,539 and more so because of the interpretation and application of the law through 
an autonomy lens. The law is currently too concerned with recognising autonomy that it 
fails to protect those who are vulnerable to exploitation. In essence, this focus shifts the 
burden from the State onto the individual. We are drawn to the autonomy myth; led to 
believe it is for our benefit that we self-govern when in reality we have less access to 
resilience and are more likely to be exploited.  Persistently, cases like the aforementioned 
return unsatisfactory verdicts reinforcing individual responsibility and stereotypical myths. 
Although there have been some steps to address this unsatisfactory shorthand, the 
interpretation of the law and its application appears to still unjustly favour the defendant.  
Leaving every case to be decided on its facts ‘creates a malleable and unpredictable legal 
test.’540  Perhaps, if judicial guidelines had been legislated, these cases would have not 
collapsed, however the accuracy and effectiveness of such guidelines are debatable. The 
law on capacity to consent may have been clearer thus encouraging the prosecution to 
argue incapacity to consent. The government of the time proposed a number of measures541 
to help increase convictions rates of ‘intoxicated rapes’ that were rejected by the Council 
of Circuit Judges.542 These measures included a new definition of capacity, use of expert 
witnesses to dispel rape myths and the introduction of videotaped initial interviews with 
the complainant.543 The Council rejected these proposals insisting amongst other 
oppositions that such complications were unnecessary and the common sense of jurors 
should suffice.544  Such directions might also have helped the jury and prevented 
stereotypical attitudes from affecting their decision. Realistically, it is likely that such 
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directions would be drafted on a foundation of autonomy, focussing far too much on the 
complainants’ actions and far too little on the exploitative actions of the defendant.  
 
3.1 POST DOUGAL AND BREE  
In R v Hysa545 a 16-year-old girl claimed she had been raped by a stranger in the back of a 
car, moments after meeting him. She had smoked a substantial amount of cannabis and 
drank alcohol to excess.546 After admitting that he could not be sure whether she said no at 
the time of penetration, the defence submitted that there was no case to answer on these 
grounds.547 The judge dismissed the case but on appeal, Lady Justice Hallet said the fact 
that she could not remember saying no at the point of penetration was not fatal to the 
prosecution’s case.548 The judge had trespassed into the jury’s territory and there was other 
substantial evidence that could have been left to the jury to decide whether she consented 
or whether she had the capacity to consent. Lady Justice Hallet said the defence could not 
rely on the notion that because she cannot remember if she consented or not (as in Bree) 
the case should be dismissed because this had been ‘expressly disavowed’ by the Court in 
Bree. This case makes progress in acknowledging that lack of memory as to consent does 
not equate with consent. Although this is a significant step forward, it could be argued that 
perhaps the court could have been more progressive to interpret memory blackouts as lack 
of capacity to consent,549 and as a factor contributing to vulnerability. 550 
More recently, the judgment in R v Gael Tameu Kamki551 showed significant progression 
in jury directions as to the meaning of capacity.  This was an appeal against a rape 
conviction where the complainant was severely intoxicated and the evidence showed that 
she had vomited on herself as a result.552 She stated that she did not recall a lot of the 
incident. The defendant had however admitted to touching the complainant sexually whilst 
she was asleep.  The prosecution had always argued that she had not the capacity to 
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consent because she was either unconscious or close to that state throughout, 553  which 
arguably would have been obvious to the defendant. Rather than reiterating ’drunken 
consent is still consent’ and thereby insinuating a retention of capacity would equate to 
consent, the Judge directed the jury to focus on issues of capacity.  
The sole ground of the appeal was that the judge had failed to properly direct the jury on 
the issue of capacity to consent and the difference between capacity and consent.554 The 
appeal was dismissed as clear directions were given- the judge discussed various stages of 
consciousness and stated, ‘through intoxication if a woman loses her capacity to consent 
she would then not be consenting.’ He detailed from being wide-awake to a state of dim 
and drunken awareness they may not be in a condition in which they are capable of making 
a choice one way or another.555 He directed the jury to decide on the state of consciousness 
of the complainant and whether she was capable of consenting ‘if you are sure she was not 
[capable] then she was obviously not consenting.’556 As Warburton rightly argues, the 
prosecutors had their case already made for them and that ‘prosecutors should give thought 
to making use of the provisions when appropriate.’557 This appears to be a reoccurring 
theme in intoxicated rape cases. Prosecutors are failing to recognise appropriate arguments 
and seem to misunderstand the purpose of the section 75 and 76 presumptions. However, 
the unconscious presumption contained within s75(2)d may not have been the most 
appropriate argument here, considering the complainant could not recall whether her 
memory was distorted through intoxication or through unconsciousness. 
This impressive judgment clearly outlined the issue of capacity to the jury. It also refers to 
the defendant’s awareness of the complainant’s intoxication; which shifted the focus from 
the complainant’s behaviour onto the defendant’s predatory actions. However, in this 
particular case the complainant was ‘in and out of consciousness’ which seems to suggest 
that this is the standard required. It is argued however, that those victims who remain 
conscious yet incapacitated should be similarly protected from sexual exploitation. Severe 
impediments of mobility and speech should be considered as factors heightening the 
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complainant’s vulnerability; evidence of unconsciousness could be listed as circumstances 
to doubt the defendant’s belief in capacity and consent. 
R v Tambedou558 mirrors the above judgment of R v Hysa. The complainant said that she 
had little memory of the events. The defence argued no case to answer but the judge said 
sufficient evidence should be left to the jury to decide on consent.559 The appeal was 
dismissed; it was held that the jury had been entitled to consider the issue of absence of 
consent and to distinguish it from absence of memory.560 In any event, evidence of 
blackouts should not go against the credibility of the complainant but instead it should 
strengthen the argument that she was too intoxicated to consent.  
Some might argue that the law has a come a long way since R v Dougal.  For example, in 
2008 Miles argued that ‘the law on this is now probably as clear as it can be’ given the 
complexities of the concept of capacity.561 However, has much really changed since 2008? 
It appears that the law still does not provide clear directions or a definition as to the 
meaning of capacity and freedom. As Temkin and Krahé argue, this approach is 
inconsistent, hence a clear universal definition of capacity and directions to juries need to 
be established.562 The Office for Criminal Justice Reform’s consultation document 
recognized that this use of the term 'capacity' raised some difficulties as regards the 
validity of drunken consent;563 and that the term needs a clear definition.564 In response to 
this consultation paper, a submission from Kent University supported the introduction of a 
definition of capacity;565 and the organisation Justice responded saying such a definition is 
essential as the current practice ‘compromises legal certainty.’566 The Mental Capacity Act 
2005567 provides a clear definition of people who lack capacity568 and perhaps this could be 
a useful starting point to the complex cases of voluntary intoxication. Currently, capacity 
remains guided by the Judicial Bench book.569 Prior to 2016 the judicial studies board 
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guidance had merely ‘replicated the wording of the section in stating that '[a] person 
consents only if he/she agrees by choice and has the freedom and capacity to make that 
choice.'570  As earlier mentioned, the most recent edition provided the latest interpretations 
of consent and capacity, including some directions as to evidence of non-consent which are 
not a significant departure from the legislation.571 Moreover, the Court of Appeal has 
offered no further explanation or directions that could clarify the position holistically.572 
Yet it is unclear whether any of these suggestions would significantly alter the position. It 
is likely that any definition of capacity and/or jury directions would be framed by 
autonomy; hence it is likely that the same outcome would be reached. To challenge the 
core of how we understand rape and victims experience of rape, these provisions would 
need to be drafted on a foundation of vulnerability.  
 
Despite both voluntarily and involuntarily intoxicated victims being in the same state of 
mind the law fails to adequately protect those who caused themselves to be intoxicated. 
Perhaps the law is merely reflecting the public’s perceptions of victims. This is not an 
acceptable approach as the law should be aiming to eradicate unwanted stereotypes and 
protect the vulnerable.573 However, it is unlikely that public perception will be changed 
without State involvement. Conversely, the State would need to completely transform its 
current position that overly relies on notions of autonomy. For effective protection, the 
State would need to reform its practices through a theory of vulnerability by accepting its 
duty to protect complainants and offering resilience through State intervention. We need to 
shift our focus from the promotion of the unachievable liberal legal autonomous subject to 
a realisation and acceptance of vulnerability.  
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From the above analysis it can be argued that the drafting of the legislation and the liberal 
legal autonomous interpretation of the law makes it very difficult for voluntarily 
intoxicated victims to fall into a rebuttable presumption or sufficiently evidence their 
incapacity. Moreover, it can be argued that the law and its application have furthered the 
burdens on victim-survivors. The above analysis reveals that the law responsibilises 
individuals to avoid sexual assault reinforcing societal attitudes and expectations; affording 
different protections depending on their role, thereby placing an excessive focus on the 
complainant and what they did to contribute to their harm which in essence encourages us 
to overlook the potentially predatory behaviour of the defendant. Equally, the 
interpretation of the law responsibilises individuals to demonstrate their non-consent in 
such a manner that can be used as evidence at trial, a threshold which is arguably incapable 
of being met. Additionally, even where a complainant acts accordingly, the threshold of 
‘reasonable belief’ in consent appears to be easily surpassed. Considering the balance of 
the law appears to lean towards a presumption of consent, it is unsurprising that a 
defendant’s belief in consent will often satisfy the criteria to be deemed reasonable.   
 
4. REASONABLE BELIEF IN CONSENT 
The drafting and interpretation of consent, capacity and the treatment of intoxicated 
complainants through the rebuttable presumptions has been examined. It has been argued 
that the legislation is drafted and interpreted so as to promote autonomy thereby 
responsibilising complainants to avoid harm. If a complainant denies consent, or capacity 
to consent, the focus shifts onto the defendant’s belief as to its existence. Therefore, we 
must now be critically analyse how the reasonableness of a defendants belief in consent is 
determined. This section will evaluate the legislative approach to these issues to determine 
whether, through the conceptual underpinnings of autonomy, the legal response acts not to 
protect individuals from harm but instead to favour a defendant’s belief in the existence of 
consent.  
Prior to the introduction of the Sexual offences Act 2003 a defendant’s subjective belief in 
consent was a defence to a charge of rape. The House of Lords maintained in DPP v 
Morgan574 that a defendant could not be convicted, if he honestly believed the complainant 
was consenting, despite the unreasonableness of this belief. Section 1(1)(c) of the Act 
 
574 [1976] AC 182 
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abolishes this ‘Morgan’ subjective test and now says the prosecution must prove the 
defendant did not ‘reasonably believe’ that s/he was consenting.575 The original Setting the 
Boundaries Report advocated for Morgan to be overturned to avoid situations where a 
defendant could hold an honest but irrational belief in consent.576 To do so would have 
serious social policy issues including victims who felt violated having their experience 
ignored; moreover, this approach attempts to challenge male assumptions about the 
presumption of consent without validation.577 Another reason cited for avoiding a wholly 
subjective approach was that it would ‘undermine the fundamental concept of sexual 
autonomy’578. We can therefore see that the autonomy of the complainant also informed 
the drafting of the defence of reasonable belief in consent. However, its interpretation, 
coupled with the assumptions of consent, appears to in fact protect defendants from 
allegations of assault, rather than protect complainants’ sexual autonomy.  
In the context of a trial, a complainant may first rely on either a presumption or their lack 
of capacity (if the circumstances allow). If not proven, or if some evidence is adduced by 
the defendant to the contrary, the issue then goes to whether the act was done with or 
without consent. If a complainant alleges that they did not consent, then the defendant’s 
belief in consent must be explored. Therefore, part of the mens rea of the offence is that the 
defendant did not reasonably believe that the complainant consented.579 The 
reasonableness of his belief will depend on all the circumstances of the case and the steps 
taken by the defendant.580 The test however, combines both subjective and objective 
elements. The caveat of ‘all circumstances’ and steps taken suggest that there is also a 
subjective element to the reasonableness of this belief. Such an approach directly ‘invites 
jury scrutiny of the complainant’s behaviour.’581 There are no guidelines as what amounts 
to a reasonable belief or what does not; therefore, the law appears vague and open to 
interpretation. The suggestions by the Setting the Boundaries report that the defence refer 
to an honest belief that should not be available where it is informed through self-induced 
intoxication, recklessness or where all steps were not taken to ascertain consent appear to 
have been ignored. This suggestion seems to have been based on the Canadian criminal 
 
575 Cooper (n 477) 330. 
576 Setting the Boundaries (n 132) 24 
577 Ibid. 
578 Ibid 26. 
579 Sexual Offences Act 2003 s1(1)(c) 
580 Ibid. 
581 McGlynn (n 407) 144. 
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code which lists situations whereby a defendant will not be allowed to rely on the defence 
of honest belief- most notably where the belief arose from his own intoxication:  
‘273.2 It is not a defence to a charge under section 271, 272 or 273 that the accused 
believed that the complainant consented to the activity that forms the subject-matter 
of the charge, where 
(a) the accused’s belief arose from the accused’s 
(i) self-induced intoxication’  
Arguably, these suggestions were not followed and instead an objective element of 
reasonableness was included. Arguably, the directions that a belief cannot be reasonable if 
it arose from self-induced intoxication should also have been included in the legislation. 
The objective element of the defence appears to be somewhat ignored and the Sexual 
Offences Act contains no such directions, as the focus remains on the ‘reasonableness’ of 
such a belief. There is no guidance as what counts as a ‘reasonable belief’ and at what 
standard that must be shown. Arguably this may allow defendants to rely on stereotypical 
attitudes and expectations of sexual behaviour to inform their belief.  The recent case of R 
v Grewal582 found that a defendant’s drunkenness ‘may be relevant to whether the 
defendant believed she was consenting’583 but cannot be taken into account when 
determining the reasonableness of his belief. As Warburton recognises ‘an accused's belief 
in a complainant's consent cannot be reasonable if it is not honest, but that is the limit of 
relevance in the subjective aspect.’584 However, it appears that the subjective element of 
the belief plays a far more significant role than initially intended.  
It is argued that there are different implications interpreted when determining the effect of 
alcohol on the complainant and the defendant. For example, in Bree585 the only mention of 
intoxication was the potential effect on the credibility of the complainant. The effect on the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s belief in consent (and indeed his credibility) was not 
explored despite admitting having consumed a substantial amount of alcohol. As the 
Judicial Studies Board has advised,  a defendant's intoxication has no bearing on his belief 
and he is to be judged as if he were sober.586 Yet it is noted in the Judicial Studies Board 
 
582 [2010] EWCA Crim 2448 
583 Natalie Wortley,’ Reasonable belief in consent under the Sexual Offences Act 2003’ [2013] 77(3) Journal 
of Criminal Law 184-187, 186 
584 Warburton (n 536). 
585 R v Bree [2007] All ER 412 
586 Judicial Studies Board (n 500). 
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directions that ‘alcohol or drugs may have a disinhibiting effect on the complainant.’587 
Therefore, although the law appears clear in this regard, it remains unsatisfactory that a 
complainant’s intoxication may affect her credibility but a defendant's intoxication does 
not act to undermine the reasonableness of his belief. In other words, there is no guidance 
to suggest that the defendant’s intoxication may make him less likely to have regard to the 
consent of the complainant. This may be very significant in cases where both parties were 
significantly intoxicated yet not satisfying the criteria contained in the section 75 
presumptions. If a complainant’s credibility as to consent can be doubted because of 
alcohol, then perhaps a defendant’s belief in consent and or disinhibited actions (more 
likely to disregard non-consent whilst drunk) should also be considered to determine the 
unreasonableness of his belief.  It could be argued that the burden of proving a reasonable 
belief in not overly cumbersome. It would appear that the expectations and 
responsibilsation placed on individuals to avoid harm carries greater significance. The 
wording and interpretation of the legislation leads to a focus on the complainant actions in 
what they did not contribute to their harm. Instead, we require a complete shift in our 
focus, rather than looking to what a defendant did or knew as a part of a defence to sexual 
assault, we should examine their knowledge as part of the offence of sexual assault. This 
would help alter our perspectives and challenge the stereotypical attitudes and expectations 
that are placed on complainants.   
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
It is therefore argued that despite law reform, victims of sexual assault remain 
unsatisfactorily protected. Arguably, this failure to protect voluntarily intoxicated victims 
inadvertently supports stereotypes and a hierarchy of offences. From the above analysis, it 
can be concluded that the law is unsatisfactory, especially in relation to capacity. At a 
minimum, ‘capacity’ desperately needs to be defined and clear directions need to be given 
as to its meaning in order to ensure coherent universal application.  However, this alone 
would not result is any substantive change.  
The effect of intoxication on capacity should be considered in all cases even where it has 
been determined the complainant was able to consent. The mental effect of intoxication, 
 
587 Ibid 372. 
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‘the voluntariness of consent and the balance of power between the parties’588 should be 
factors that the court considers. As McGlynn correctly argues ‘there is… a far greater 
danger in assuming that women in extreme states of drunkenness retain capacity.’589 This 
leaves such victims more likely to be exploited and less likely to achieve justice. This 
precautionary argument would justify a vulnerability approach.  
Consent has been determined on a case-by-case basis and has failed to protect 
complainants consistently. Moreover, the effect that intoxication has on consent and one’s 
capacity to consent appears to be sidestepped. This suggests that the definition is futile in 
that capacity seems to be ignored. The reality is that one may reform the law every year in 
a hope for a better outcome; however, different results will only ever be achieved once the 
basis for reformation has itself changed. In other words, amending legislation on the 
notions of autonomy, that seemingly promote self-responsibility, will not appropriately 
protect rape complainants. To achieve a different outcome the very foundation of the law 
needs to be uprooted and replanted. The theory of vulnerability offers us that opportunity 
to reconstruct the law and potentially reduce the ever-growing ‘justice gap’590 and equally 
protect all individuals. It is clear from the above analysis that the law is inadequate and in 
need of imminent reform. The autonomy-based consent model is failing victims of sexual 
assault, especially those voluntarily intoxicated complainants. Therefore, what is required 
is a complete overhaul in legislation, revisiting how we perceive sexual encounters both in 
law and society through a theory of vulnerability.  
As Wallerstein said the law plays ‘an important role in challenging existing unwelcome 
social norms which can cause harm.’591 Therefore, it could be suggested that the law and 
therefore the State, has the ability to help diminish some of the stereotypical beliefs 
surrounding intoxicated victims should it wish to do so.   The law does play a crucial 
symbolic role that helps inform ideas and attitudes and is therefore a key tool that can be 
utilised to challenge norms. However, the law on its own is not enough to challenge and 
eradicate our preconceived traditional understandings of sexual offences. As Rumney notes 
that focusing  
‘exclusively upon the revision of the legal definition of rape, the Review was 
unable to examine what is arguably the most important issue facing rape law today, 
 
588 Benedet (n 549) 461. 
589 McGlynn (n 407) 144. 
590 Temkin & Krahé (n 2). 
591 Wallerstein (n 488) 329. 
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that is, how that legal definition of rape is interpreted and enforced by the criminal 
justice system. As with previous law reform efforts that have focused upon issues 
of ‘black-letter’ law.592 
 
Therefore, what is required is a complete reimagination of the theoretical underpinnings of 
our legal and sociologically understanding of our existence and sexual relationships to 
achieve widespread and systemic change. This, as will be argued in chapter 6 in detail, can 
be achieved through a theory of vulnerability. The following chapter will explore how 
vulnerability has been traditionally understood through the exploration of the treatment of 
complainants who were suffering from a ‘mental disorder’ at the time of the offence. It will 
further suggest how the conceptual underpinnings of autonomy have manifested 
themselves through the othering of those with a mental disability. Moreover, this chapter 
will strengthen the argument raised here, that different victims are protected in accordance 
with their apparent ‘blameworthiness’ because of the autonomy approach. 
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Chapter 4 
 
LEARNING LESSONS FROM LAWS ON MENTALLY DISORDERED 
COMPLAINANTS 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter analysed the law of intoxicated complainants through a vulnerability 
lens, arguing that intoxicated complainants are responsibilised. Through this vulnerability 
lens, we can continue the analysis of the legal response to mentally disordered rape 
complainants. Despite both mentally ‘disordered’593 individuals and intoxicated 
complainants suffering from an incapacity at the time of the offence, the current law 
affords different protections. Moreover, in comparison to the previous chapter, we see that 
the protections afforded are greater to those with a mental disorder, as they are perceived 
as the most vulnerable and least blameworthy for their incapacity. This distinctive line 
between those who are capable and incapable, blameworthy or blameless, clouds the 
realities of our ontological existence. It oversimplifies capacities and fails to take into 
consideration the fluid nature of our vulnerability and the realities in which we exercise 
choice. It will be argued that this grouping, known as othering through a vulnerability 
lens,594 has resulted in differential treatment of people with mental disabilities because of 
the conceptual underpinnings of autonomy. 
 
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to contribute to the critical analysis in this thesis that 
argues that the autonomy approach is at the core of the problematic response to 
complainants of sexual assault. This chapter will determine whether any lessons can be 
learned to help inform legal reforms that are based on a theory of vulnerability. To achieve 
this, it will firstly critically analyse the historic treatment of mentally disordered 
 
593 This terminology is taken directly from the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The author does not agree that this 
is the most appropriate language to use in referring to those with a mental disability, but for the sake of 
consistency this term will be sued throughout. 
594 As discussed in chapter 2. 
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complainants in section 1.1. It will suggest that an autonomy approach has historically 
categorised those with a mental disability as less than. The treatment and isolation of those 
with a mental disorder will be detailed to reveal how an autonomy approach had previously 
justified the denial of rights through a guise of protection.   
 
Section 2 will discuss the internal battle between the need to protect those who are deemed 
vulnerable whilst affording them sexual autonomy.595 It will explore how the law must 
‘strike a delicate balance’596 in attempting to afford protection whilst avoiding being overly 
paternalistic. The discussions prior to the 2003 Act were informed by the concept that 
capacity fluctuates. These discussions began to accept that those with a mental disorder 
may have the ability to exercise their autonomy at particular times. Therefore, these 
discussions are valuable as they represent genuine efforts to attempt to promote choice and 
control for individuals whilst recognising their vulnerability.     
 
Section 3 critically evaluates the culmination of these discussions through an analysis of 
the s30 offence which aims to protect the ‘mentally disordered’ from sexual exploitation. It 
aims to recognise that, generally, those who suffer from a ‘mental disorder’ do and can 
engage in consensual sexual activity. However, it also identifies their distinct 
‘vulnerability’ and times where their disorder may prevent them from ‘refusing’597 sexual 
relations. Arguably, this is the first provision that has tried to balance autonomy with 
protection. Therefore, it must be asked whether any lessons can be learned from this 
approach and indeed, whether the response in s30 could be applicable to other sexual 
assault complainants. The interpretation, application and use of section 30 will be critically 
analysed to determine its worth and to consider whether there can be any lessons learned 
that might inform our suggested legal response through a vulnerability lens. Section 4 will 
then briefly examine the civil law approach to mental capacity to inform and shape the 
legal response through a vulnerability lens.  
 
Through this critical exploration of the treatment of mentally disordered complainants, it 
will be argued that all individuals, because of our universal and inherent vulnerabilities, 
 
595 As explored in depth in chapter 1. 
596 Jonathan Herring, ‘R v C: Sex and Mental disorder Case comment’ [2010] 126 Law Quarterly Review 36-
39, 36 
597 Sexual Offences Act 2003 s30  
112 
 
should be treated alike. It will be argued that we need to move away from identifying 
vulnerabilities and distributing protections based on the existence of particular 
characteristics. Instead we must accept and address our universal and inherent vulnerability 
and pose difficult questions around the source of that vulnerability.  
 
1.1 THE DENIAL OF AUTONOMY: THE OTHERING OF THOSE WITH A 
MENTAL DISABILITY PRIOR TO 2003 
 
To understand the treatment of people with a mental disability, we must look to the 
historical response to such sexual offences. This section will provide an overview of the 
historical legislative approach to sex with a person with a mental disability. In doing so, 
key cases will be analysed to reveal how those with a mental disability were unjustly 
segregated from society and othered because of an autonomy approach. It will also argue 
that the language used can segregate individuals, and therefore we must carefully consider 
the wording of future legislative reforms.  
 
As Herring has stated, individuals with a mental disorder have had an ‘unhappy history.’598 
They have been depicted as either as adult children with no sexual feelings or as ‘driven by 
animal instincts’ resulting in ‘curtailing sexual freedom’ or left ‘unprotected from sexual 
abuse.’ 599 The law surrounding sexual relations of mentally disordered persons was 
limited in focus prior to the introduction of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. A series of case 
law in the 19th Century accepted that ‘mentally disordered’ persons could consent to 
sexual activity through ‘animal instincts.’600 It was the law that no ‘man’ could engage in 
sexual intercourse with a woman who had a disorder. As section 7 of the Sexual Offences 
Act 1956 stated: 
‘7. It is an offence for a man to have unlawful sexual intercourse 
with a woman whom he knows to be an idiot or imbecile.’ 
 
The language of the legislation is clearly problematic. Moreover, it would appear that the 
law in 1956 did not recognise the sexual autonomy of those who suffered from a mental 
 
598 Jonathan Herring, ‘Mental Disability and Capacity to consent to sex: A local authority v H [2012] EWHC 
49 (COP)’ [2012] 34(4) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 471-478, 471 
599 Ibid. 
600 Tracey Elliot, ‘Capacity, sex and the mentally disordered’ [2008] Archbold News 6-9, 6; for a full 
discussion of the development of the animal instincts historical legislative approach see Ralph Sandland, 
‘Sex and Capacity: The Management of Monsters’ [2013] 76(6) Modern Law Review 981-1009. 
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disability. The law was overly restrictive as it made it essentially impossible for a woman 
within the meaning of section 7 to engage in sexual relations. As Kurtis and Kelson 
suggest ‘[a defective] person was automatically assumed to lack capacity to consent to 
sexual activity.’601 Therefore, it could be said that this section was both overly restrictive 
and under inclusive, acting to segregate those with a mental disorder from normal 
individuals. It could be argued that this approach claimed to protect the ‘severely’ disabled 
through a denial of autonomous choice. This is the first example of where an autonomy 
approach designated those who did not fulfil the criteria of the autonomous individual, 
were unjustly denied rights.  
 
The law appeared to offer protection to those who were suffering from the most serious of 
mental disorders. It could be said that this approach was very problematic, not least 
because the term defective is ‘demeaning and derogatory.’602 Moreover, those who fell 
outside the remit of ‘severe subnormality’ were treated as any other victim and deemed 
capable of consenting. The assumption of incapacity for those with a severe subnormality 
within the meaning of the MHA denied those of their sexual autonomy. The law made it 
illegal for men to have sex with such ‘defectives’ thereby making it essentially illegal for 
‘defectives’ to consensually engage in sexual relations. Moreover, the law afforded a 
defence of ignorance to be relied upon which arguably weakened the protection due to the 
inherently subjective nature of the test. As argued by Sandland, in discourses around 
mental deficiency ‘the vulnerability of mentally defective females was seen to imply 
dangerousness, at least when their actions were understood as being driven by instinct.’603 
Rather than protect those with a ‘defect’, the law was instead framed in a defensive way to 
protect men from dangerous defective women, othering them as incapable individuals and 
justifying such intrusion. Arguably, the language used was therefore twofold, to segregate 
individuals with a disorder and to justify the denial of rights.   
 
The law still failed to recognise the sexual autonomy of ‘defective’ women. Instead it 
appeared to automatically presume that ‘defective’ women did not have the capacity to 
engage in sexual relations. The definition was also amended with the terms ‘idiot and 
 
601 Martin Curtice & Emma Kelson, ‘The Sexual Offences Act 2003 and people with mental disorders’ 
[2011] 35 The Psychiatrist 261-265, 261  
602 Setting the Boundaries (n 132) 63. 
603 Ralph Sandland, ‘Sex and Capacity: The Management of Monsters’ [2013] 76(6) Modern Law Review 
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imbecile’ removed and replaced by the term ‘defective’ and the term ‘severe subnormality’ 
was introduced. It could be argued that the term defective is just as offensive as its 
predecessors. The Oxford English dictionary defines ‘defective’ as ‘imperfect… 
lacking...deficient… faulty.’604 These are very offensive and insensitive terms, arguably 
they imply the incompleteness of persons with a mental disability.  
 
The ‘defective’ definition was later replaced by the Mental Health Amendment Act 1983 
which removed the term defective and replaced its definition as ‘a person suffering from a 
state of arrested or incomplete development of mind which includes severe impairment of 
intelligence and social functioning’. It could be argued that replacing the term ‘severe sub-
normality’ with ‘severe impairment’ does not make any significant impact on the 
interpretation for the law. Yet the introduction of the term defective is problematic. To be 
defective suggests that you are incomplete, inadequate or incapable. Its symbolism is 
powerful suggesting those categorised as such are somehow different or less worthy than 
others. Arguably, by categorising those with a mental disability as different, they have 
been othered, justifying differential treatment because they have been depicted as most 
vulnerable.  A further problem that this paper noted was that the offence of sexual activity 
with a ‘defective’ only carried a maximum 2-year penalty.605 This obviously downgraded 
the seriousness of the offence and offered little protection to those apparently most 
vulnerable. Moreover, the disparity between the punishment for rape and intercourse with a 
defective, perhaps symbolised the trivial treatment of such an offence. The sentencing 
options available for this defence may support Sandland’s argument that the vulnerability 
of the mentally defective was in fact dangerous,606 and the law instead protected men from 
allegations rather than women from exploitation.   
 
The case of R v Jenkins607 caused ‘outrage’608 by referring to ‘animal instincts’609 and 
prompted the reforms to the law. As Sandland claims ‘the mentally defective were a social, 
political, moral and economic problem at least as much if not more than a psychiatric 
problem.’610 In this case a care worker was charged with raping a mentally disordered 
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patient who was deemed to have a mental age of about 2 or 3 years old.611 The complainant 
fell pregnant and the defendant was charged with rape rather than ‘sexual intercourse with 
a woman who is defective’ under the 1956 Sexual Offences Act.612 An expert gave 
evidence as to how her capacity should be determined in accordance with law society 
guidelines.613 Moreover, several experts gave evidence that the woman ‘had no 
understanding of pregnancy or contraception.’614 The prosecution attempted to change the 
charge to intercourse with a defective but the judge refused on the basis the defence had 
prepared for a charge of rape.615 Judge Colart ignored this guidance and relied on a historic 
case from the 1800’s determining she had consented through her ‘animal instincts.’616 The 
trial judge found the defendant not guilty on this basis stating that ‘[i]f consent can be 
given through animal instinct then understanding becomes irrelevant.’617 The decision in 
Jenkins highlighted the need for a clear definition of capacity to consent to sexual relations 
and the need for adequate protection of so called vulnerable persons. Moreover, the 
analysis of this case reveals how the interpretation and application of the legislation 
reinforced the othering of individuals with a mental disorder. Using terminology such as 
animals or instincts suggests that such individuals were incapable of giving genuine 
consent, were different to other people, and would therefore need protection. It prompted 
the reform to provide a higher threshold than merely understanding the sexual act or the 
abhorrent notion of ‘submitting to their animal instincts.’618  
The reforms also attempted to widen that definition to include other persons who suffered 
from a mental disorder and to afford proper protection to those who are vulnerable to 
exploitation whilst promoting autonomy. The discussions prior to the introduction of the 
reforms are important to understand how the legislation was drafted to accept the 
autonomy of individuals with a mental disorder.  
 
 
 
 
611 Law Reform Commission Sexual Offences and Capacity to Consent 2013 
612 Clare Dyer, ‘Care worker's release on rape charge prompts CPS to seek review of law’ 24 January 2000 
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613 Ibid. 
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2. THE STRIVE FOR BALANCE 
As above mentioned, the aim of legal reforms was to attempt to strike a delicate balance 
between promoting choice and sexual freedom and protection. This of course was an 
underpinning aim for all legislative reforms including intoxicated complainants. In 
addressing this delicate balance, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 attempted to draw to afford 
more protection to the vulnerable from exploitation, whilst recognising their autonomy.619 
As the Home Secretary Jack Straw stated, the new Act was created ‘[t]o provide coherent 
and clear sexual offences which protect individuals, especially children and the more 
vulnerable from exploitation.’620 This section will explore this balancing act. As this 
section will argue, the focus on protection appears to be more evident than the previous 
chapter analysis of intoxicated complainants. Although there is an underpinning theme of 
autonomy, the discussions surrounding the legislation appear to be more concerned with 
the particular vulnerabilities of those with a mental disorder. However, an analysis of the 
below information is useful to reveal how discussions were informed by a genuine attempt 
to balance protection and autonomy. Moreover, it will be analysed whether, through a 
vulnerability lens, these discussions could equally apply to other individuals who were 
‘incapacitated’ at the time of the offence.  
 
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 was informed by consultation papers. The Consultation 
paper Setting the Boundaries produced in 2000 contained many suggested reforms to 
inform the drafting of the 2003 Act.621 The Government also undertook a ‘Review of Sex 
Offenders Act’ and published a ‘public consultation by the Home Office in July 2001.’622 
These reviews then led to the White Paper Protecting the public which helped develop the 
Sexual Offences Bill.623 Discussions in the House of Commons surrounding the Bill raised 
many concerns and doubts regarding the new offences created by the Act.  
 
Chapter 1 of Setting the Boundaries outlines the purpose of the paper was contributing 
towards the Home Offices aim of creating a society that is ‘safe, just and tolerant.’624 It 
 
619 Gavin Berman & Grahame Danby, ‘The Sexual Offences Bill [HL]: Policy Background’ [2003] Home 
Affairs 03/61 Research Paper 1-68, 3. 
620 House of Commons Debate 25th January 1999 as cited Ibid. 
621 Setting the Boundaries (n 132). 
622 Berman & Danby (n 619).  
623 Protecting the Public (n 374).   
624 Setting the Boundaries (n 132) 1. 
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noted that although society had undergone significant changes the law had not reflected 
this.625 In particular, it stated the law does not permit a ‘defective’ to have sex, and in order 
to protect a victim-survivor, they must be proved to be a ‘defective’ in court.626 The 
entirety of Chapter 4 deals with ‘vulnerable people.’627 Describing the mentally impaired 
as ‘vulnerable people’ it notes that they are easily suggestible and may ‘not be able to resist 
inappropriate behaviour.’628 Arguably this too could be said of many individuals, those 
who are intoxicated, those who are suggestible, those who are in a weak position 
professionally or economically. The categorisation of vulnerable people here could 
arguably be extended to most individuals in particular situations.  
Although Setting the Boundaries notes the particular vulnerabilities of the mentally 
impaired, it also recognised their right to a private life. Moreover it recognised their right 
to a sexual private life, as protected by the European Convention of Human Rights.629 As 
articulated by Munro and Stychin, with ‘liberal credentials’ underpinning suggested 
reforms, the boundaries requiring that the law not to infringe into the private sphere,630 
whilst affording appropriate protection, was a difficult balancing act to achieve.  
 
From public analysis there seemed to be general support for more protection of the 
vulnerable,631 recognising that the mentally impaired are ‘easily influenced and easily 
tricked.’632 The report rightly states that the complexities of capacity and consent, coupled 
with the problematic vulnerabilities of the mentally impaired create undeniable 
complications. The ‘real tension’633 between private life and the right to sexual life caused 
sincere difficulties when considering reform. This report noted that ‘there were other and 
more effective ways for the law to provide increased protection for less severely disabled 
people.’634  
 
Notably, MENCAP, Respond and Voice UK wrote a joint response to Setting the 
Boundaries with a focus on the mentally disabled. They suggested that everyone should 
 
625 Ibid 2. 
626 Ibid. 
627 Ibid ch 4. 
628 Ibid 61. 
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630 Munro, V., & Stychin C., Sexuality and the law: Feminist engagements (Routledge London: 2007) 3 
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have equal protection under the law and fair treatment in the criminal justice system.635 
Moreover, they mentioned the narrow definition of the law that only protected those with a 
‘severe mental impairment’636 and did not extend to those with other more minor learning 
difficulties. They also suggested that capacity to consent should be defined in clear terms. 
They rightly argued that it can be even more difficult to establish a lack of consent when 
the complainant suffers from a mental impairment. They suggested a functional test 637 for 
capacity that would focus on ‘whether an individual has the capacity to consent to a 
specific decision, in specific circumstances.’638 This test requires an understanding of the 
nature or reasonably foreseeable consequences of the activity.639 As Series explains,  ‘this 
‘functional’ approach to mental capacity purports to focus on the process by which a 
person made a decision, not the outcome of that decision.’640 Such a test would highlight 
the abovementioned transient nature of a person’s capacity which arguably could apply to 
all individuals, not just those with a mental disorder. It was submitted that a definition of 
capacity should question the person’s knowledge of sexual activity, the basic elements of 
sex and the reasonably foreseeable consequences of engaging in sexual activity. Although 
such suggestions may be beneficial for a test of capacity, it is submitted that such a test 
may set the standard too low. It could be argued if these were the three core elements of a 
capacity definition, protection would only be afforded to those with severe mental 
disabilities; despite that many individuals who may not have the capacity to consent at the 
particular time concerned. Moreover, although the paper recognised the transient state of 
capacity, it could be said that these suggestions do not recognise the complex nature of 
refusing intercourse. Instead it appears that the motives appeared to be to protect those who 
were categorised as most vulnerable rather than recognising universal vulnerability. This is 
unfortunate, as the government had the opportunity to widen the scope and applicability of 
these tests to protect all individuals equally.  
 
 
635 As a defendant wold be reasonably expected to know the victim had a mental disorder see MENCAP (n 
614). 
636 Ibid.  
637 Approach to decision making discussed more below in civil law section.  
638 MENCAP (n 614).  
639 Anna Arstein-Kerslake,’Understanding sex: the right to legal capacity to consent to sex’ [2015] 30(10) 
Disability and Society 1459-1473, 1466 
640 Lucy Series, ‘The Use of Legal Capacity Legislation to Control the Sexuality of People with Intellectual 
Disabilities’, in Disability Research Today: International Perspectives, Shakespeare T., (Ed) (Routledge 
2015) 150. 
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The White Paper ‘Protecting the Public’641 was the culmination of Setting the Boundaries 
and its responses. It too recognised that those with a mental impairment or learning 
difficulty are particularly vulnerable to exploitation.642 This ‘presaged’643 the Sexual 
Offences Bill 2003 which was introduced in the House of Lords in January 2003. The 
Governmental review provided a background and outlined the old legislation and areas 
where there was a need for reform.644 Chapter 1(b) referred to the protection of vulnerable 
people. It raised major concerns with the legal response. It similarly highlighted the 
derogatory nature of the law and the interference with the right to a private life of such 
persons.645  The underpinning aim of the bill was ‘to protect the most vulnerable, can be 
lost in consideration of whether or not actively expressing sexuality was actually 
consent.’646 
 
On the 18 June 2003, the Bill was introduced in the House of Commons. The report 
covered several issues including the protection of the vulnerable.647 The design of offences 
relating to the mentally disordered was ‘intentional’ as it was worded to ‘capture 
exploitative behaviour... by people who take advantage of an individual’s incapacity to 
refuse or vulnerability.’648 The paper clarified the government’s position on use of the term 
refuse rather than unable to consent. It noted the Government’s response to appeals to 
amend the term refuse by stating the definition of consent (which entails capacity) would 
make the definition circular.649 Moreover, the Government recognised the concern that ‘the 
test of capacity is set at such a level that those with a learning difficulty may be required to 
be more aware of the implication of sexual activity than others.’650  The aim here is to 
capture exploitative behaviour, but there is a failure to recognise that in most sexual 
offences defendants exploit individual’s vulnerability regardless of the existence of any 
disorder. Arguably, because of the autonomy approach, individuals who do not fall into a 
category of traditionally vulnerable, they are presumed capable and therefore capable of 
 
641 Protecting the Public (n 374) [506]. 
642 Ibid. 
643 Berman & Danby (n 619).  
644 The Sexual Offences Bill [HL]: Policy Background’ [2003] Home Affairs 03/61 Research Paper at 11 
645 The Sexual Offences Bill [HL]: Policy Background’ [2003] Home Affairs 03/61 Research Paper at 11 
646 Ibid 12. 
647 House of Commons, Sexual Offences Bill Home Affairs Committee Fifth Report of Session 2002-2003 
648 Ibid 11. 
649 Ibid 38. 
650 HL Deb 9 June 2003 c51 quoted in House of Commons, Sexual Offences Bill Home Affairs Committee 
Fifth Report of Session 2002-2003  
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resisting exploitation. Yet this fails to recognise the realities of sexual relationships and our 
universal and particular vulnerability. 
 
On the 10th April 2003, the House of Commons met and discussed the Sexual Offences 
Bill.651 There was extensive commentary surrounding the working of section 30. The 
debate mainly concerned the use of the phrase ‘unable to refuse’ rather than ‘unable to 
consent’. The Bill used the terms ‘unable to refuse’ and some Lords proposed amendments 
to replace this term with ‘unable to consent.’652  Lord Campbell could not see the 
distinction between the terms. Lord Falconer rightly recognises, the wording ‘unable to 
refuse’ highlights the vulnerability of the victim and highlights the exploitative nature of 
the defendant’s actions. By removing the need to disprove consent, the focus is shifted 
from the complainant onto the defendant; arguably this may have a positive impact by 
refocussing jurors’ minds on the exploitative actions of the defendant rather than 
attempting to attribute blame to the complainant. Moreover, the wording suggests that 
those with a ‘disorder’ may, in general, be capable of giving valid consent to sexual 
relations. This is a positive step towards recognising the autonomous decision-making 
powers of people with mental disabilities. It recognises that there may be times when a 
person would be unable to refuse because of their condition, but generally those with a 
mental disorder are in fact recognised as being able to consent despite having a mental 
disability.  It identifies that disorders are often not permanent, and their effects may 
fluctuate. It is at that time when an individual’s disorder impinges on them so much so that 
they are unable to resist unwanted advances that protection is required. However, as 
Keywood argued ‘the proposals make no mention of the fact that capacity is not an 
immutable state of being for most people, dissociated from social relationships and 
environments.’653  
 
The term ‘mental disorder’ was also extensively discussed at the debate. Lord Rix, 
amongst others, suggested that ‘learning disability’ be included alongside mental 
disorder.654 It was later agreed that learning difficulties comes within the definition of 
 
651 House of Lords Debate, Sexual Offences Bill April 2003 Found at 
http://www.theyworkforyou.com/lords/?id=2003-04-10a.385.4#g396.1  
652 Ibid.  
653 Kirsty Keywood, ‘Supported to be sexual? Developing Sexual Rights for People with Learning 
Disabilities’ [2003] 8(3) Learning Disability Review 30-36, 33 
654 House of Lords Debate, Sexual Offences Bill April 2003 Found at 
http://www.theyworkforyou.com/lords/?id=2003-04-10a.385.4#g396.1 
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mental disorder and therefore ‘does not need to be dealt with separately.’655 Arguably this 
terminology in itself is quite derogatory.656 The word ‘disorder’ connotes something quite 
severe and permanent. This is not the aim of the act as the definition was drawn to include 
those who suffer from permanent or transient defects that range from mild to severe. 
Despite the problematic terminology, the interpretation and the application of section 30 
must be considered to determine its success and future potential.  
 
3. SECTION 30- SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT 2003: ANY LESSONS TO BE 
LEARNED? 
In light of the aforementioned debates that informed the drafting of the sexual offences act 
it must now be determined whether the legalisation has achieved its proposed aims. This 
section will set out the particulars of section 30, following this, the interpretation of the 
legislation in case law will be explored. It will be argued that this continued segregation of 
individuals deemed different does not serve to protect individuals, rather it instead acts to 
justify intrusive treatment. As Peter Barlett has argued the legal response is to attempt to 
‘maximise the amount of people who can consent to sex.’657 However, there are some 
potential benefits to the section 30 approach that must be examined and may be useful to 
contribute to the suggested legal reforms in later chapters.  
 
Section 30 has been introduced as a ‘fail safe.’658 There are a range of offences available to 
the CPS in determining the most appropriate charge. It is open to the prosecution to pursue 
an offence of rape contrary to section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act and argue that the 
sexual activity was non-consensual. Equally, it is possible to pursue s1 rape and argue that 
the complainant did not have the capacity to consent at the time of the offence and 
therefore did not consent. Alternatively, section 30 provides a distinct separate offence of 
‘engaging in sexual activity S with a person with a mental disorder impeding choice’ 
which states: 
 
‘(1)A person (A) commits an offence if— 
 
655 Ibid Lord Falconer of Thoroton. 
656 Ibid. In the debate Lord Falconer of Thoroton mentioned the problematic use of the term mental disorder. 
Although the Law Commission had suggested mental disability would be more appropriate, Lord Falconer 
suggested that the definition of mental disability had not been finalised for the Mental Health Bill and 
therefore suggested it would be unwise to adopt it.  
657 Peter Barlett, ‘Sex, Dementia, Capacity and Care Homes’ [2010] 31 Liverpool Law Review 137-154, 144 
658 Setting the Boundaries (n 132) 74. 
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(a)he intentionally touches another person (B), 
(b)the touching is sexual, 
(c)B is unable to refuse because of or for a reason related to a mental disorder, and 
(d)A knows or could reasonably be expected to know that B has a mental disorder 
and that because of it or for a reason related to it B is likely to be unable to refuse. 
(2)B is unable to refuse if— 
(a)he lacks the capacity to choose whether to agree to the touching (whether 
because he lacks sufficient understanding of the nature or reasonably foreseeable 
consequences of what is being done, or for any other reason), or 
(b)he is unable to communicate such a choice to A.’659 
 
Section 30 therefore makes it an offence to engage in sexual activity with a person who, by 
reason of their disorder, is incapable of refusing sexual advances. As explained by 
Saunders, to fulfil this offence, the prosecution must prove in the first instance that sexual 
activity took place.660 Therefore, if a defendant contends that sexual activity occurred, it 
might be difficult to rely on section 30 for evidential reasons.661 Next it is for the 
prosecution to show that the complainant was ‘unable to refuse because of or for a reason 
related to a mental disorder’. Following this, the prosecution must show that the defendant 
was aware or could reasonably be expected to be aware that the complainant was likely 
unable to refuse as a result.662 With regard to the inability to refuse, this centres on the lack 
of capacity to choose, or being unable to communicate such a choice.663 What is most 
noteworthy, as identified by Saunders is that ‘it is not necessary for the prosecution to 
establish non-consent.664 Instead the articulation focuses on the ability to refuse. As earlier 
mentioned, the aim of this section was to provide protection to the vulnerable and protect 
sexual autonomy.665 The section reflects the suggestions of the Law Commission. In 
particular, the specific wording ‘lacks sufficient understanding of the reasonably 
foreseeable consequences’ was taken from the suggestions of the Law Commission and 
was placed directly into the legislation.666 They may lack understanding ‘for any other 
reason’ which as Curtice and Mayo note, encompasses a ‘wide range of circumstances in 
which a person’s mental disorder may rob them of the ability to make an autonomous 
choice when they have sufficient understanding of the information 
 
659 Sexual Offences Act s30 
660 Candida Saunders, ‘Making It Count: Sexual Offences, Evidential Sufficiency, and the Mentally 
Disordered Complainant’ [2010] 31 Liverpool Law Review 177-206. 186 
661 Ibid. 
662 Ibid. 
663 S30(2) (a)  
664 Saunders (n 682).  
665 Cooper (n 682). 
666 Lord Falconor House of Lords Debate (n 651).  
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relevant to making it.’667 This is a positive step towards recognising that people with a 
mental disorder do have the capacity to consent to sex. It is moving away from the 
historical approach of deeming those with a mental disorder as permanently incapable to 
consenting. Therefore, the law has attempted, as Maher suggests, to respect the autonomy 
of those with a mental disorder to engage in sexual activity.668 The danger of course is 
restricting choice where decisions are free but seem unwise and the courts determine they 
lack capacity.   
 
Moreover, there is a danger that the wording used may instead suggest a presumption of 
consent unless their mental disability affected their ability to refuse. Furthermore, it could 
be argued that the notion of refusal also carries responsibilisation. Therefore although this 
appears to be a positive step towards recognising the autonomy of those with a mental 
disorder, in fact through its wording there is arguably a responsibility placed on such 
individuals to demonstrate their refusal of sexual advances where their disorder is not 
impacting them at that moment in time. To examine the true effectiveness of section 30, its 
practical application and interpretation must now be assessed.  
 
3.1 THE APPLICATION OF S30 
The first case to deal with this new legislation was in 2006.669 Hulme v DPP 670 explored 
the use of section 30. The focus appeared to be on the inability to refuse and the 
expectation placed on the requirement to say no. The absence of ‘no’ in this instance 
appeared to be interpreted as an inability to refuse because of her mental disorder. In this 
case, the complainant had cerebral palsy.671 The defendant denied the accusation that he 
placed her hand on his soft penis.672 In the complainant’s evidence, she explained that she 
did not want him to touch her and she pulled her hand away; she said it made her feel ‘sad, 
hurt and upset.’673 It was found on the facts that the defendant did touch her and the 
complainant wanted to stop him but did not know what to do.674 Initially, the magistrates 
 
667 Martin Curtice and Jonathon Mayo, ‘Consent and sex invulnerable adults: a review of the case law’ 
[2012] 41 British Journal of Learning Disabilities 280-287. 283 
668 Gerry Maher, Rape and other things: Sexual Offences and People with a Mental Disorder’ [2010] 
Edinburgh Law Review 129-133, 131 
669 Hulme v DPP [2006] EWHC 1347 (Queens Bench Division) 
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held that due to her disability she was incapable of stopping him. As rightly argued by 
Saunders, however, often it is someone ‘bigger and stronger engaging in sexual activity 
which may make anyone physically incapable of stopping the activity—regardless of their 
desire (or otherwise) to do so.’675 Why then it is asked, was it not argued that she merely 
did not consent? Arguably, her mental disability was not relevant at the time and therefore 
logically the judgment should have been the same regardless. As Saunders suggests s30 
may have been misused here as this was not necessarily a case of incapacity to refuse, 
rather an absence of consent. 676 As noted by Curtice and Kelson, the importance was 
placed on her ability to say ‘no.’677 It was held that although she understood the nature of 
the acts, she did not have the capacity to understand she could refuse to be touched 
sexually.678  The Justices had determined that the complainant had not been able to 
communicate her lack of consent.679 Despite the complainant in this case not consenting, 
the focus appeared to be on her mental disorder. Perhaps the reliance on the existence of 
her mental disorder was used to justify the conviction and protection. 
 
The Court of Appeal in this case accepted the magistrates’ decision despite the fact they 
had not delved deep into the reasons for lack of communication. The exploitative nature of 
the defendant’s actions was also referred to which reflects a positive refocus from the acts 
of the complainant. The Magistrates referred to the defendant’s obvious awareness of her 
condition. This suggests that the new approach is less restrictive than the 1956 Act. 
Previously, the law was concerned with the disorder the complainant was suffering from. 
They tested the severity of that disorder and the awareness of the defendant. His ignorance 
to the fact may have given him a full defence to the act in question. However, the reformed 
law removes the need to prove a ‘severe disability’ and lack of consent which shifts the 
focus rightly to the defendant’s intentions and exploitative actions. This is therefore a 
progressive and welcomed interpretation and application of section 30 that would be 
beneficial to all complainants. 
 
 
675 Candida Saunders, ‘Making It Count: Sexual Offences, Evidential Sufficiency, and the Mentally 
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The judgment was appealed on the grounds that the Court failed to address the second limb 
of s30(2) in that she was unable to communicate choice to the defendant. However the 
Court of Appeal determined that this was not a sound ground for appeal as it could only 
sensibly follow that by reason of her disorder she could not communicate choice and 
therefore there was no need to explore this part in detail.680 The High Court was unduly 
restrictive in interpreting section 30(2)(b) inability to communicate. As the complainant 
had stated she did not know what to do, the ‘sensible conclusion’681 of the High Court was 
that she could not refuse by reason of her mental disorder. Arguably many complainants 
without a mental disability would not know what to do in the circumstances, especially 
where someone is intoxicated or otherwise incapacitated. It seems unclear why the 
judgment suggested her inability to refuse was a result of her condition.  
 
The Court of Appeal ruling suggests that the ambit of ‘inability to communicate by reason 
of a mental disorder or for any other reason’ should be given a wide scope and appears to 
cover extensive circumstances. It could be argued that if this defendant had been charged 
with sexual touching within Sexual Offences Act 2003, the prosecution may have faced a 
more difficult challenge in proving lack of consent rather than inability to refuse. The 
interpretation of the wording in section 30 was later clarified in the case of R v Cooper. 
 
The House of Lords decision of R v Cooper682 is the primary authority for section 30.683  In 
this particular case, the complainant had a long history of mental disability.684 She had a 
schizo-affective disorder and an emotionally unstable personality.685 On the day of the 
assault, the complainant visited a community health centre where the defendant later met 
her outside. The defendant offered to help her and invited her back to his house.686 There 
he gave her crack cocaine and asked her to engage in sexual activity with him and she did 
so.687 The complainant’s evidence was that she ‘felt unable to escape’688 and said to herself 
 
680 Tracey Elliot, ‘Cases in detail: R v C case comment’ [2008] Arcbold News 5 
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‘these crack heads can do worse to you’ so she participated as she did not want to die.689 At 
first instance, the defendant was convicted where the jury were directed that the words ‘for 
any other reason’ could encompass ‘an irrational fear arising from her mental disorder.’690 
The defendant’s appeal was allowed on the basis that the judge had incorrectly concluded 
that an irrational fear was capable of amounting to the inability to communicate her 
choice.691 The Court of Appeal followed the civil law approach in delivering their 
judgment692 that ‘irrational fear that prevents the exercise of choice cannot be equated with 
lack of capacity to choose.’693 The Court of Appeal also concluded that capacity to consent 
to sexual relations was neither person nor situation specific.694 It was stated that a jury 
should consider whether a complainant had the capacity to consent to sex, referring to the 
civil law issue specific test.695 
 
The Crown successfully appealed to the House of Lords where it was determined that the 
Court of Appeal was wrong to limit the scope of s30(2)(b) to a physical inability to 
communicate their choice.696 In Baroness Hale’s leading judgment, she set out ‘the 
revolution in the attitude of the law’697 by explaining the correct approach under section 
30. She stated that the words ‘for any other reason’ were ‘capable of encompassing a wide 
range of circumstances in which a persons’ mental disorder might rob him of the ability to 
make an autonomous choice, even though he might have sufficient understanding of the 
information relevant to making it.’698 This rightly recognises that there may be situations 
where someone with a disorder may not be able to recognise their inability to refuse and or 
understand their option to refuse. Baroness Hale accurately noted that so long as the other 
ingredients of the offence were met, and the reason stemmed from the mental disorder, the 
perpetrator would be guilty of section 30.699 As she stated ‘clearly the ‘irrational’ fear 
prevented [her] from being able to weigh the information… as she believed she had no 
choice.’700  
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This interpretation appears to be in line with the intentions of the legislator by 
encompassing a wide range of scenarios. On the contrary, the Court of Appeal wrongly 
focused on the fact that she understood the mechanics of the act in question. As Powell 
argues, the Court of Appeal failed to acknowledge that her irrational fear prevented her 
from weighing and using that information,701 which therefore equated with an inability to 
communicate her decision. It would appear to follow that an irrational fear alone could not 
equate with the inability to refuse. However, if that irrationality stems from a mental 
disorder and prevents the free exercise of choice, it must follow that that person was unable 
to refuse within the meaning of section 30. The terminology ‘for any other reason’ allows 
for a wide scope of circumstances that could fall within the definition. 
 
The unanimous decision ruled the Court of Appeal was incorrect in limiting the inability to 
communicate to a physical inability.702 The Court of Appeal had interpreted s30(1)(c) to 
mean incapable of communicating their refusal because of a physical inability to do so. 
Lord Rodger also referred to this incorrect interpretation of s30(1)(c) in his brief 
concurring judgment.703 Inability to communicate could be for physical, emotional or 
psychological reasons.704 Similarly, Lord Roger of Earlsferry agreed with this reasoning. 
He rightly stated that limiting s 30 to a physically inability to communicate would be an 
‘unsound’705 interpretation. Moreover, section 75 of the Sexual Offences Act contains 
evidential presumption concerning consent. In particular section 75(2)(e) lists ‘physical 
disability’ as a reason why the complainant would not have been able to communicate her 
consent to the defendant.  Therefore, it would seem pointless if s30 excluded reasons other 
than an inability to refuse because of physical disability. Hence it could be argued section 
30 has met one of its primary aims by extending its definition to encompass circumstances 
other than a physical disability and others that may not be diagnosed as ‘severe’. The 
definition now has a far wider ambit in that it extends to those with mild learning 
difficulties, and those whose disabilities may not permanently affect their decision making 
but may be transient and ever fluctuating. 
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703 David Ormerod, ‘R v C: sexual offences: Sexual Offences Act 2003 s30(2)- sexual touching- complainant 
suffering from mental disorder’ [2010] Criminal Law Review 75-79, 78 
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The interpretation of s30 in the Supreme Court decision of R v C is a welcomed 
clarification of the legal position. As Clough suggests, ‘this is a significant step away from 
viewing the question of capacity as a matter of setting the level of information required, in 
a resounding dismissal of a narrow, act-specific approach.’706 As Rook and Ward rightly 
contend, the decision in R v C is welcome as ‘it recognises the complexity of mental 
disorder, which is not always static.’707 Considering these apparent progressive steps, it 
must now be considered whether in totality, section 30 has been a success.  
 
 
3.2 SECTION 30- A SUCCESS? 
 
On examining the facts of R v C, it could be argued that the complainant would not have 
fallen within the definition of ‘defective’ within the 1959 Act. She had suffered from an 
‘emotionally unstable personality’ which would unlikely fall within the definition of severe 
in the 1959 Act. As in the earlier mentioned R v Kimber,708 the complainant had a serious 
mental disorder and did not benefit from any extra protection from the law as she did not 
meet the threshold of the definition. Baroness Hale observed that s 30 of the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003 would be an easier alternative to a rape charge under section 1 of that 
Act.709  
The first advantage of a s30 charge rather than s1 would be the difference in defendant’s 
required mens rea.710 Section 1 states that the defendant must reasonably believe that the 
complainant is consenting; all reasonable steps taken by the defendant to ascertain that 
belief are considered to determine the reasonableness of that belief.711 The test is both 
objective and subjective. The test in section 30 is if the defendant could reasonably be 
expected to know of the complainant’s mental disorder and that she would be likely to be 
unable to refuse. 
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Although it is submitted that the test is not wholly objective,712 it would arguably be easier 
to prove the defendant’s knowledge where a complainant was obviously disordered.  As 
Baroness Hale noted, the mens rea of s.30 puts a greater burden upon the defendant who 
ought to have known that the complainant was suffering from a mental disorder thereby 
making it easier to prove than s1. As Scott argues the subjective element of the defendant’s 
awareness as to a complainant’s condition offers a high level of protection, and in 
comparison to reasonable belief, is less stringent.’713 This approach could therefore be 
similarly adopted for all individuals. The shifting of our perspective away from the 
complainant provides an opportunity to scrutinize the actions of the defendant. This in 
turn, may sway juror’s minds away from stereotypical attitudes and myths regarding 
complainant’s behaviour and instead demand that a defendant be aware of other’s 
vulnerability. Arguably, this is the most progressive aspect of the s30 offence which could 
possibly be extracted and moulded to fit within a new offence through a vulnerability lens.   
  
Despite the apparent appeal of using s30, as Saunders notes there are many downfalls too. 
She stated that initially ‘the criminal justice professionals need to be aware of these 
offences. Secondly, those same professionals need to know that a complainant has a mental 
disorder and, for the purposes of sections 30–33, one which impedes choice. The third pre-
requisite is that it is considered appropriate to so charge the offence in the instant case.’714 
Equally as Curtice and Kelson argue ‘it may be difficult to establish that the defendant 
could reasonably be expected to have relevant knowledge, especially in cases where there 
are no external distinguishing features that might indicate mental disorder and the 
defendant had no pre-existing knowledge of the alleged victim.’715 Therefore s30 may not 
always be the most appropriate route. 
 
As noted, the focus for an ordinary rape charge is consent whereas s30 looks at the 
inability to consent. It could be argued that an inability to consent would be ‘more readily 
established’716 by reference to her disorder and furthermore testimony from the 
complainant is less likely to be needed.717 It is worth noting that in R v C the defendants 
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were originally charged with rape but the charges were later substituted. Baroness Hale 
suggested that s30 is somewhat ‘easier to prove.’718 Arguably though, there is a noteworthy 
evidential limitation to the actus reus of section 30. As Saunders suggests, the prosecution 
must show that sexual activity took place. Whilst possible in cases concerning other sexual 
assaults, if a complainant cannot testify that sexual activity took place and the defendant 
denies the event, without further evidence, it is likely that there would be evidential 
difficulties for a prosecution under either section 1 or section 30. As suggested by 
Saunders, the relevant provisions of the SOA 2003 have done little to increase the 
protection afforded to mentally disordered complainants in sex cases.719 Equally though, it 
could be argued that a jury may feel more comfortable making a finding of guilt under s30 
rather than section 1 because of the stigma connected with the term ‘rape’. It could be 
suggested that jurors are less likely to find a defendant guilty of rape because of the myths 
and stereotypes that surround this offence.720 Arguably though, these myths and 
expectations may similarly affect s30 prosecutions.   
The question must therefore be asked, why do we have a separate section? Is there a 
purpose to section 30? Moreover, section 30 has not enjoyed much usage. In 2018 on 
indictment only, sexual activity with a person with a mental disorder was proceeded 
against on 15 times in 2018, resulting in just 10 convictions.721 Over the past 10 years, on 
average 23 cases were brought every year resulting in on average 12 convictions.722 
Including those cases that are triable either way the figures slightly increases to on average 
43 cases a year with on average 26 convictions.723  
 
This represents a welcomed increase in convictions yet a very low number of prosecutions. 
As Saunders articulates those who cannot consent for the purposes of section 30, 
presumably, cannot consent for the purposes of sections 1 through 4 either.724 Arguably, in 
all of the aforementioned cases, convictions could have been secured under s1 rape charge 
through arguing the complainant merely did not have the capacity to consent. As Saunders 
argues, ‘the conduct elements of the section 30 and the corresponding non-consensual 
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offence are also indistinguishable.’725 However, there is merit to s30 that should be 
acknowledged. The wording, including inability to refuse and awareness of the defendant 
as to the complainant’s disorder, allows us to refocus on the defendant’s actions. This is a 
positive step away from scrutinizing the behaviour of the complainant and might be a 
contributory reason as to why the percentage rate of convictions appears so high. However, 
as aforementioned, the symbolic nature of the wording of the legislation is quite 
problematic. Equally, perhaps, the rate of convictions merely reflects the stereotypical 
attitude that this with a mental disorder are ‘childlike’ and need protection. It is therefore 
not overly convincing that such an approach in isolation would adequately address the 
problematic issues of securing convictions for rape. 
 
Moreover, as Clough suggests ‘it is still problematic in that section 30 relies on proving the 
mental disorder, rather than external factors’;726 instead we should be looking to the 
exploitation of that vulnerability and indeed asking questions concerning the source of that 
vulnerability. Perhaps there is more harm done through the symbolic segregation of those 
with a mental disorder. This reinforces the idea that those with some form of a mental 
disability are different- they are othered. Through this othering, they do not receive equal 
treatment and instead are perceived as less than merely because of the existence of an 
underlying condition. This is something that the vulnerability theory seeks to challenge.  
As stated in R v C ‘people with mental disorders and disabilities should be integrated into 
society, treated as much like anyone else as it was possible to do and enjoying the same 
rights.’727 To achieve this perhaps we need to break down the boundaries that segregate 
those with a disability and remove our focus from the autonomy/protection binary. As 
Arstein-Kerslake has argued, although this section criminalises abuse of individuals with 
intellectual disabilities, ‘the approach also forces the courts to treat that individual 
differently than it would treat an individual who does not have the label of disability.’728 
Moreover, she argues that it places such individuals in a separate category of ‘person’ 
where the law does not apply to her in the same way as it does to others.729 This acts to 
justify legal intrusion into the lives of those with a mental disability, by categorising them 
as incapable or in need of protection. Moreover, it acts to support the notion that there is 
 
725 Ibid.  
726 Clough (n 174) 380. 
727 Cooper (n 682) 8. 
728 Arstein-Kerslake (n 639) 1467. 
729 Ibid. 
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some form of ideal person who can make autonomous independent choices. Thereby either 
placing responsibility on those who fail to conform to such norms,730 or denying legal 
capacity when the Court deem fit. As Saunders rightly suggests the interpretation of s30 
has been generous and has arguably secured convictions of defendants who might 
otherwise have escaped conviction. In her study she analysed cases analysed which relied 
on section 30 and noted it may be used by the prosecution as ‘a device for manipulating 
and effectively bolstering the evidential strength of a case.’731 Arguably, considering the 
difficulties in prosecuting rape contrary to section 1, it is understandable and perhaps even 
justified that section 30 is used to secure conviction.  
 
Saunders further notes however that this ‘expansive and inclusive approach’ is 
objectionable as ‘the threshold for the applicability of section 30 is virtually non-existent: a 
complainant’s mental disorder impedes choice when factfinders say it does.’732 Therefore, 
section 30 arguably treads a dangerous path. Although the rise in convictions is welcomed 
and the recognition of autonomy of individuals with a mental disorder is commendable, the 
reality is that the scope for determining capacity is open to interpretation. The approach 
still reinstates that those with a mental disorder are somehow different and in need of 
protection by segregating them in a separate section of the legislation. Instead we require a 
far more holistic approach which recognises the universal and fluctuating vulnerabilities of 
individuals, whilst acknowledging the source of vulnerability and exploitation and 
demanding State intervention.  
 
As above, arguably the legal response to sexual offences concerning those with a mental 
disorder, has faced a difficult balancing act. The legal response has been torn between 
upholding the sexual rights of such particularly vulnerable individuals and denying their 
sexual freedom to prevent harm and exploitation. As outlined above, we have seen a move 
towards an acceptance of the sexual autonomy of those with a mental disorder. Yet the 
legal response still battles to acknowledge and support freedom whilst attempting to retain 
some form of protection. It would appear that in an effort to achieve this, the legislators 
have continued to afford those with a mental disorder as a special category of person. This 
placing of such individuals into a different group or category is apparently a means 
 
730 As we have seen in the previous chapter. 
731 Saunders (n 660) 199. 
732 Saunders (n 660) 189. 
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achieving this balancing act. However, as outlined above the affording of rights or 
categories to certain individuals does little if anything to ensure protection, and may in fact 
lead to myths, responsibilisation and a hierarchy of protections. We must therefore look to 
the Civil law, which has also faced this integral battle of balancing the autonomy and 
protection of those with a mental disorder.  Although the test for capacity in civil law is not 
directly applicable to criminal law cases as seen in R v A,733 we must look to the 
interpretation of capacity to determine whether any lessons can be learned moving 
forward. In particular, we can determine whether an approach with the underpinnings of 
the autonomy/protection binary can be effective.  
 
4. THE CIVIL LAW APPROACH- LESSONS TO LEARN? 
There is an abundance of literature of the rights to consent to sex at civil law.734 However, 
the determination of capacity to consent is fraught with difficulties. As Series has rightly 
argued, the concept of ‘mental incapacity’ ‘plays a twofold gatekeeping role in relation to 
sex.’735 She continues ‘it invalidates a person’s consent, rendering sexual activity with 
them a criminal act, and it also renders lawful restrictions on their liberty and invasions of 
their privacy to prevent them from engaging in sexual activity.’736  Likewise, Craig argues 
‘in delineating the legal boundaries of capacity to consent to sexual touching, law makers 
and jurists in every jurisdiction grapple with the tensions between sexual liberty, morality, 
sexual minority equality interests, and public safety.’737 The question is whether the civil 
law has addressed this and found a balance between competing aims. This section seeks to 
briefly outline the introduction of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 to determine whether the 
tests formulated have indeed protected those with a disorder whilst promoting autonomy. 
Through this analysis it will be determined whether this thesis can adopt any measures that 
mirror that of the civil law approach when suggesting legal reforms through a vulnerability 
theory.  
 
733 [2014] EWCA Crim 299; where the trial judge directed the jury as to the civil law standard for capacity 
which was overturned on appeal and held the adjudication of the Court of Protection would generally look to 
the future; the criminal law looked retrospectively to specific acts of the past.  
734 Some of the main academic commentators include Beverley Clough, Jonathan Herring, Jesse Wall, Lucy 
Series, Kirsty Keywood, Martin Lyden; see for eg. Clough (n 174); Jonathan Herring & Jesse Wall, 
‘Autonomy, Capacity and Vulnerable Adults: Filling in the gaps in the Mental Capacity Act’ [2015] 
35(4)Legal Studies 698-719; Series (n 640); Arstein-Kerslake (n 639); Hall (n 172) 61-94; Jonathan Herring 
& Jesse Wall, ‘Capacity to consent to Sex’ [2014] 22(4) Medical Law Review 620-630; Martin Lyden, 
‘Assessment of Sexual Consent Capacity’ [2007]25(1) Sexuality and Disability 3-20.  
735 Series (n 640). 
736 Ibid.  
737 Elaine Craig, ‘Capacity to consent to Sexual Risk’ [2014] 17(1) New Criminal Law Review 103-134, 105 
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The Mental Capacity Act 2005 was introduced at civil law to provide a universal 
understanding as to how to determine ’capacity’. Section 2 refers to those who fall within 
the remit of the Act. It explicitly states that ‘lack of capacity cannot be established merely 
by [his] age or appearance… or a condition of his... or an aspect of his behaviour ‘which 
may lead to assumptions as to his capacity.’738 This test has been praised ‘for moving away 
from a generalized assessment of a person generally having or not having capacity towards 
an approach where a person has capacity to consider the particular issue at hand.’739 
Although the Act has been interpreted as a ‘codification of the common law’,740 the 
reforms show a significant step away from the ‘status’ based approach of the previous law; 
it now appears that incapacity will no longer be assumed because of a disorder. The Act 
also recognises the fluctuating effects of disorders and includes those who suffer both 
‘permanent’ and ‘temporary’ defects. This subsection extends the remit of the previous law 
that only covered ‘severe’ disorders. Arguably this is a positive step towards recognition 
that people other than those who have a permeant defect are vulnerable to exploitation. Yet 
its limitation still lies in the failure to acknowledge the universality of vulnerability, rather 
it’s aims still focus on an autonomy-based approach.  
 
As Herring and Wall have noted the courts have acknowledged the importance of the role 
of the MCA in protecting and promoting the autonomy741 of individuals with a mental 
disability.742 Yet as Series notes the MCA merely ‘sets out the circumstances where a 
person’s ordinary legal rights to make decisions may be denied, on grounds connected with 
their disability.’743  Similarly as Arstein-Kerslake has argued the MCA provides significant 
opportunity ‘to legally deny the decision-making of people with intellectual disabilities.’744 
The test for determining whether a person has the capacity to consent is contained in 
section 3(1) which states: 
 
‘For the purposes of section 2, a person is unable to make a decision for himself if 
he is unable— (a) to understand the information relevant to the decision, (b) to 
retain that information, (c) to use or weigh that information as part of the process 
 
738 Mental Capacity Act (2005) s2 
739 Jonathan Herring & Jesse Wall, ‘Capacity to Consent to Sex’ [2014] 22(4) Medical Law Review 620, 635.  
740 MB [2006] EWHC 168 (Fam) Munby J 
741 Mental Capacity Act 2005: Code of Practice, issued by Lord Chancellor on 23rd April 2007 (London: 
TSO) foreword 
742 Jonathan Herring & Jesse Wall, ‘Autonomy, Capacity and Vulnerable Adults: Filling in the gaps in the 
Mental Capacity Act’ [2015] 35(4) Legal Studies 698-719, 699 
743 Series (n 640).  
744 Arstein-Kerslake (n 639) 1467. 
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of making the decision, or (d) to communicate his decision (whether by talking, 
using sign language or any other means).’ 
 
Section 3 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 has introduced the first ever test for capacity. It 
details a step by step process that a court must follow when determining whether a person 
has capacity to make a certain choice. The Act primarily considers situations such where a 
Local Authority may question a person’s ability to make decisions for themselves. These 
include question such as the right to choose living accommodation, the right to marry and 
the right to consent to sexual relationships. Firstly, that person must be able to understand 
information relevant to the decision concerned. This may relate to the ability to understand 
the act in question and the potential risks of making that decision. That information must 
not only be understood but be used and ‘balanced to arrive at a choice.’745 As Clough 
states, this test focuses on ‘the mechanistic aspects of sexual relations, primarily on 
whether the individual has a basic understanding of sex.’746 As Series rightly notes, ‘this 
may afford some people greater autonomy than status-based approaches to capacity.’747 
However, it may  mean ‘that decisions could be called into question in any area of their 
decision making, and repeatedly over time.’748 
 
There is extensive case law749 concerning the standard needed for capacity to consent to 
sexual relations at common law. This has provided for much interpretation and debate as to 
the test of capacity. The leading authority is the case of Re M.750 In this case, the court was 
concerned with a complainant who had suffered an ‘hypoxic brain injury, casing 
significant amnesia with moments of lucid thoughts, as a result of a cardiac arrest during 
surgery’. The complainant had previously cohabited with B. M’s mother appealed denying 
Ms ability to consent to sexual relations. Her claim was dismissed because of their 
interpretation of s3 the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The Court of Appeal found that the 
judge was right to focus on the ‘reasonably foreseeable consequences’ test. It was found 
that because she had the capacity before her surgery and understood the risks associated 
with sexual relations, she fulfilled the test for capacity. This judgment therefore reveals the 
flexibility of the capacity test when it comes to sexual relations. There are many 
 
745 Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290 
746 Clough (n 174) 372. 
747 Series (n 640) 153.  
748 Ibid.  
749 Which is outside the scope of this section of this chapter to explore.  
750 Re M (An Adult) (Capacity to consent to sexual relations) [2014] EWCA Civ 37 Court of Appeal.  
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implications of this interpretation, arguably M’s sexual autonomy has been promoted and 
protected. This is a recognised aim of the MCA. Alternatively, this could be interpreted as 
a failure to recognise the vulnerability of M leaving her open to potential exploitation. 
Moreover, the determination of her capacity may cause future evidential complexities if a 
criminal case was ever necessitated.  
 
In the case of Derbyshire CC v AC, EC & LC751 capacity to consent to sexual relations was 
also tested. In that particular case, 22-year-old AC had a significant learning disability and 
suffered from depression. She lived with her parents during the week and spent the 
weekend with her new boyfriend who was described by the police as a ‘serial criminal.’ 
She became pregnant and her child was removed from her care. An expert psychiatrist 
reported that AC was able to discuss the basic mechanics of sexual intercourse, understood 
the risk of pregnancy and STI’s but was unable to demonstrate that she would be able to 
refuse to have sexual relations; he therefore concluded that her capacity was probably 
fluctuating but she had capacity to consent to sexual relations. The Local Authority made 
an application to the court as they felt that she required the necessary level of protection 
which could only be achieved by depriving her of her liberty in residential care. The Court 
found that she did have the capacity to consent to sexual relations but did not have capacity 
to make choices about future care and contact. This was determined on the basis she had a 
limited understanding of time and was ‘clearly unable to judge the intentions of people 
with who, she comes into contact with which has led to her being repeatedly exploited and 
placed in potentially dangerous situations.’752 It would therefore seem that in this particular 
case the bar was again set quite low in relation to capacity to consent to sexual relations. It 
seems quite bizarre that the court found she had capacity to engage in sexual relations but 
not as to other, arguably, less significant decisions. It would seem that the Court here 
determined AC had the capacity to engage in sexual relations without fulfilling the entire 
test of s3 namely- the ability to weigh and use that information. This may be because the 
common law aims to protect those future decisions rather than on specific occasions. It 
could be suggested that this approach together with the relatively low standard of 
understanding required for capacity to consent to sex may be seen as an effort of the courts 
to protect the positive sexual autonomy of such persons. This approach rightly recognises 
 
751 Derbyshire CC v AC, EC &LC [2014] EWCOP 38 
752 Ibid. 
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that mentally disordered persons do and should be able to engage in consensual sexual 
activity; the problem is determining how to afford that right whilst recognising their 
inherent vulnerability to exploitation. As Herring rightly argues ‘the legal notion of 
capacity is typically taken as an all-or-nothing concept.’753 Likewise, as Clough suggests 
this all or nothing approach in these cases ‘constrains the ability to recognise or speak for 
broader issues.’754  
 
Baroness Hale’s judgment in R v C referred to the inadequacy of the civil law 
interpretation of capacity stating: 
‘the fact that a person either does or does not consent to sexual activity with a 
particular person at a fixed point in time, or does or does not have capacity to give 
such consent, does not mean that it is impossible, or legally impermissible for a 
court assessing capacity to make a general evaluation which is not tied down to a 
particular partner, time and place.’755  
 
The civil law must strike a delicate balance in protecting the vulnerable from future 
exploitation whilst recognising and promoting self-determination. To do this, external 
situation specific factors could not be interpreted when determining a person’s capacity to 
consent to future sexual relations.756 This determination was made on a pragmatic basis. As 
the court of appeal held it would be ‘totally unworkable’757 to expect a Local Authority to 
conduct an assessment ‘every time an individual over whom there was a doubt about his or 
her capacity to consent to sexual relations’758 where there were signs of them experiencing 
a sexual encounter.  
 
It has been argued that there should be one universal definition of capacity that is 
applicable in both criminal and civil law. There are many examples of this including as 
Roderic Wood J expressed in D County Council v LS759 ‘there should be a significant 
degree of conformity in the tests relevant to establishing capacity in both civil and criminal 
courts’;760 and in Regina v A the Court recognised the ‘obvious desirability that civil and 
 
753 Herring & Wall (n 742) 713. 
754 Beverley Clough, ‘New legal landscapes: (Re)Constructing the Boundaries of Mental Capacity Law’ 
[2018] 26(2) Medical Law Review 246-275, 260 
755 Re M (An Adult) (Capacity to consent to sexual relations) [2014] EWCA Civ 37 Court of Appeal. 
756 Ibid [45]. 
757 Ibid. 
758 Ibid. 
759 D County Council v LS [2010] Medical Law Reports 499 
760 Ibid. 
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criminal jurisdictions should adopt the same test for capacity to consent to sexual 
relations.’761 Yet, as Series notes, the consequences the civil and criminal law are 
profound, ‘rather than resulting in the punishment of sex offenders, the result may be the 
expansion of control and supervision over the potential victims, with far reaching 
consequences for their rights to privacy, relationships and – ultimately – liberty.’762  
 
Yet, in a more recent decision determining capacity to consent to sex the grounds of appeal 
cited the ‘failure to strike an appropriate balance between protecting incapacitous 
individuals, and protecting their personal autonomy.’763 The focus was on awareness of the 
ability to consent to or refuse sexual relations is more than just an item of relevant 
information.764 Despite apparent progressiveness of this decision it could be argued that in 
that instance the test was manipulated to ensure that incapacity was found. As Clough has 
argued, the presumption of capacity supports non-intervention which may lead ‘vulnerable 
adults to be exposed to the risk of harm.’765 In some instances, this may be because of 
professional misunderstanding or ‘evidence suggests the principle has been deliberately 
misappropriated to avoid taking responsibility for a vulnerable adult.’766 Either reasoning is 
concerning. It could be argued that the legal response has been framed and interpreted to 
favour capacity. This may be seen by many as a successful promotion and protection of the 
autonomous rights of individuals with a mental disorder. However, it may also be 
interpreted as a failure by the state to take adequate steps to prevent the exploitation of 
such individuals. Through this guise of the promotion of autonomous choice, non- 
intervention is encouraged, risking potential exploitation. In earlier chapters it was noted 
that the allocation of autonomy led to the responsibilisation of individuals and the denial of 
responsibility by the state. This autonomy-based approach to mental capacity may be as 
problematic and should therefore be cautiously applied in civil law and will not be used to 
inform potential legal reforms.  
As Herring rightly states, the circumstances in which a person may have sex with someone 
is so varied that one cannot sensibly ask whether a person has capacity to consent to sex in 
 
761 Regina v A [2014] EWCA Crim 299 (Court of Appeal) 
762 Series (n 640) 160. 
763 B v A Local Authority [2019] EWCA Civ 913 at 33 
764 Ibid [51]. 
765 Clough (n 754) 258. 
766 House of Lords Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005, Report of Session 2013-14: Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 Post Legislative Scrutiny (TSO 2014) [3] in Clough ibid. 
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the abstract.767 Arguably, it follows that rendering someone incapable of consenting merely 
due to the existence of a disorder is itself ineffective. It seeks to answer a question in the 
abstract with no application or appreciation of other factors that may influence a decision. 
The grouping of such individuals does not afford them further rights but merely sends a 
message that these people are different and deserving of protection in comparison to others 
who brought their vulnerability upon themselves. This is the approach of both the civil law 
and the criminal law despite how the legislation might be framed. Therefore, we must look 
elsewhere to determine whether alternative approaches have addressed these inadequacies.  
 
 
 
5. MOVING FORWARD- WHAT (NOT) TO DO 
From the above analysis, it would appear that the law has made significant changes to the 
archaic discriminatory laws regarding mentally disordered individuals and sexual offences. 
The law no longer automatically criminalizes sexual activity with a mentally disordered 
individual. Although it has been argued that the legal response to mental disordered 
individuals is inadequate, mainly because the autonomy approach, there are still lessons to 
be learned from the legislation. 
 
In particular, section 30 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 appears to be progressive and a 
genuine effort to afford control to and protect individuals from harm. One key aspect of 
section 30 is that it refocuses our attention away from the complainant and onto the 
defendant. As Series rightly suggests, the legal response has moved away from ‘control 
over the sexuality of people with intellectual disabilities’ rather it is now ‘framed in terms 
of their vulnerability to sexual exploitation, or to harmful social and emotional 
consequences arising from relationships, pregnancy, or health risks connected with sex.’768 
As Maher rightly notes ‘if someone does not consent to it [sex] is wrong, no matter the 
cause of the lack of consent, and whether or not the lack of consent is due to a mental 
disorder.’769 Yet the reality is we are vulnerable to sexual exploitation and the legal 
response should instead reflect the universality of vulnerability rather than segregating 
individuals which arguably may heighten their experience of their vulnerability.  This 
 
767 Herring (n 598). 
768 Series (n 640) 150.  
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change of focus may help to emphasise the defendants potentially exploitative actions in 
all sexual assaults. This is a useful starting position to help inform our suggested reforms.  
 
Moreover, as Baroness Hale states, the correct interpretation of s30 is that such individuals 
should be treated as having capacity.770 As abovementioned, the presumption of capacity is 
arguably a positive step towards the recognition of autonomy of individuals with a mental 
disorder. Yet as Herring rightly notes ‘it is a terrible thing to be said to have capacity when 
you do not – to be left to cause yourself and those you love great harm on the basis that 
you know what you are doing and you are making your own choices, when in fact your 
decisions are not really yours.’771 As Clough argues, the current response does not 
facilitate resilience and promote autonomy as it claims to do.772 There are many dangers 
within this approach to capacity. By promoting non-interference, individuals are left 
responsible to avoid harm themselves. Herring also rightly recognised that the presumption 
of capacity ‘denies the special obligations on the state to protect its most vulnerable 
members.’773 Through a vulnerability theory we can challenge this autonomy approach 
which leads to othering. Through a vulnerability perspective we can demand protection 
equally for all rather than stigmatizing interventions and segregating groups of individuals.   
 
This chapter has further strengthened the argument that the autonomy approach is at the 
core of the problematic response to sexual offences. It has revealed that those with a 
mental disorder were historically and currently are segregated in the legislation. The 
question must therefore be asked, why do we have a different section for those with a 
mental disorder? This has been identified as problematic as it assigns those with a mental 
disability as somehow different or unequal to other individuals. The autonomy approach 
has acted to justify intrusion onto the rights of those with a mental disorder through a guise 
of protection.  
Until we realise the problems with an autonomy approach and acknowledge that all 
individuals are vulnerable, people will be treated differently depending on characteristics. 
Arguably, both the civil and criminal law approaches fail because they excessively focus 
on attempting to balance the tensions between sexual autonomy and protection. Therefore, 
 
770 Cooper (n 682). 
771 Herring & Wall (n 742) 698. 
772 Clough (n 174) 371. 
773 Herring & Wall (n 742) 698. 
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we require a shift in the foundations and aims of our legal response to those with a mental 
disorder. Rather than categorising those with a mental disorder as a different type of 
person, we must we must recognize our susceptibility to harm, and that such groupings 
distort the reality of our existence. We must ask difficult questions about the source of and 
experience of our vulnerabilities, rather than affording rights to those who we deem to be 
different based on characteristics. Arguably a potential source of these failures rests with 
the tension between autonomy and protection. These lessons can help inform our suggested 
reforms as we can realise that segregating or isolating individuals as vulnerable because of 
a characteristic is not a rights-baring exercise. It pits individuals against each other, 
fighting for rights, encouraging stereotypical attitudes and blame to determine who is most 
deserved of protection. We can therefore learn that we should not segregate individuals on 
the basis of apparent capacities, and instead we need a legal response that is holistic and 
universal and not a right baring exercise.  
Overall, we can learn from this analysis that derogatory language, othering and the 
segregation of individuals should be avoided. We can also learn that shifting our focal 
point from the complainant onto the defendant may help to challenge stereotypes and 
myths and therefore could be used to shape our legal reforms. Most importantly, we can 
also learn that a legislative response, whether criminal or civil, cannot be effective where 
protection and autonomy are underpinning aims. It appears impossible to balance these 
competing aims, arguably the perfect balance is not achievable. Instead we need a 
completely different foundation that questions the source and experience of our 
vulnerability. Although this and previous chapters have argued that autonomy is at the core 
of the problem, all avenues must be explored. Therefore, we look to Canada to determine 
whether their ‘progressive’ legalisation with an autonomy lens has been effective. 
Therefore, the next chapter will look to Canadian law where an umbrella approach has 
been implemented. The legal response is not based on categories such as s75.s76 and s30 
rather they have adopted a capacity umbrella approach. The following chapter will analyse 
this and other reforms that have been adopted in Canada to determine whether removing 
the boundaries of categorisation has in fact effectively changed the legal response.  
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Chapter 5 
 
THE CANADIAN APPROACH TO CONSENT AND CAPACITY- AUTONOMY 
BASED REFORMS. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The previous two chapters have clearly identified that there are several issues within the 
current legal response to sexual assault complainants. In particular, it has been argued that 
the definition and interpretation of consent lends itself to focus on the complainant’s 
behaviour, thereby commonly invoking stereotypical attitudes and myths. Moreover, the 
determination of capacity has also been revealed as troublesome. The law in England and 
Wales wrongfully segregates individuals who share similar characteristics. Moreover, 
depending on how blameworthy the individual is deemed to be for their incapacity, 
protections vary accordingly. As we have seen in the previous chapters, this has led to 
‘othering’, segregation of groups from society, unequal distribution of resilience and 
responsibilisation. It has been argued in the previous chapters that these failures stem from 
the underpinning concept of the liberal legal autonomous subject. It has also been argued 
that as autonomy is at the core of the legal response, the legislation is failing individuals 
and placing far too much responsibility on them to avoid harm.  The potential of the theory 
of vulnerability to challenge these assumptions and reformulate our response to sexual 
offences has been alluded to previously. However, before we suggest a complete overhaul 
to the theoretical foundations, we must explore whether other reforms, with autonomy at 
their core, can address these issues without such a reformulation. Considering the 
identified issues, we must look to alternative reforms that might rectify the consent and 
capacity issues of English law. As Canadian sexual assault law has introduced models to 
address consent issues and remove capacity groupings, we must explore their approach to 
determine whether any lessons can be learned.  
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Canada has been hailed as a progressive State since it introduced many different reforms to 
the then ‘rape laws’ in 1982. Most noteworthy of these include the removal of the term 
‘rape’ from legislation and replacing it with a gender-neutral definition of ‘sexual 
assault.’774 Many academics have discussed the pitfalls in English law that could possibly 
be addressed by reforming the law in light of the Canadian approach.775 This chapter will 
examine the provisions of Canadian law and ask whether their approach more aptly 
protects all victims of sexual assault.  
Firstly, the affirmative consent model as implemented by Canada will be analysed. 
Currently, in England and Wales, the definition of consent is somewhat vague and open to 
interpretation.776 There is also arguably too much successful reliance on the defence of 
mistaken belief in consent where the both the defendant and complainant were intoxicated. 
It will therefore be asked whether this model of affirmative consent has successfully 
addressed the issues with communication of consent and reliance on the defence of 
mistaken belief in Canada, and whether anything could be learnt from such an approach. 
Next, section 3 regarding ‘incapacity’ will be explored. In English law, those complainants 
who are incapacitated at the time of the assault are protected under different subsections of 
the legislation depending on the nature of their incapacity. As discussed in detail in 
chapters 3 and 4, the law provides different measures for those victims who were 
voluntarily intoxicated, involuntarily intoxicated or whose mental disorder rendered them 
incapable of refusing unwanted sexual advances.777 Despite all being incapacitated at the 
time of the assault, these victims are unfairly offered unequal protection from exploitation. 
Hence, we look to Canada who have adopted an ‘incapacity’ section that acts as an 
umbrella term to encapsulate all forms of incapacitation. It will be asked whether such an 
approach can disperse ingrained stereotypes regarding complainant’s behaviours and 
instead shift the focus onto the exploitative actions of the defendant.  
In section 273.1(2) of the Canadian Criminal code, there is an intriguing presumption of 
non-consent where the defendant was in a position of trust, power or authority over the 
complainant. Although in English law there is a non-exhaustive list of presumptions under 
 
774 Elizabeth J. Shilton & Anne S. Derrick, ‘Sex Equality and Sexual Assault’ [1991] 11 Windsor Yearbook 
of Access to Justice 108-124, 119 
775 Gender neutrality of rape laws see Phillip S. Rumney, ‘In defence of Gender Neutrality within Rape’ 
[2007] 6(1) Seattle Journal for Social Justice 481-526.  
776 Ashworth (n 422) 902. 
777 Sexual Offences Act 2003 s. 30 
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section 75, no such explicit category exists.778 It must therefore be asked whether this 
subsection has had much use in Canada and whether it in fact offers more protection to 
victims who are susceptible to exploitation.  In light of the aforementioned analysis, it will 
be determined whether any lessons can be learned from the Canadian approach, and 
furthermore what should be avoided in future reforms in England and Wales.  
 
2. THE AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT MODEL- ‘A RADICAL SHIFT IN LEGAL 
THEORY’?779 
 
2.1 THE REFORMS OF CONSENT 
Since the introduction of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 in England and Wales, the 
definition of consent lies within section 74, which states that consent is ‘if he agrees by 
choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice.’780 As discussed in depth in 
chapter 3, this definition has proved to be quite difficult to apply and interpret.781 Moreover 
the legislation does not contain an definition of ‘freedom’, ‘choice’ or ‘capacity’ leaving 
the definition fraught by ‘deep philosophical issues.’782  Considering the issue of consent is 
at the core of a charge of rape and other forms of sexual assault, it is wholly unacceptable 
that its meaning remains unclear and open to interpretation.  
In Canada, the law remained essentially unchanged from its first enactment in 1892 until 
key reforms made 90 years later. The year of 1982 saw a complete overhaul to the face and 
substance of the Canadian Criminal Code. Rape and indecent assault as earlier defined, 
were redefined. Instead, they were replaced with a single, gender neutral offence of ‘sexual 
assault.’783 The apparent purpose of this was to introduce one single offence of sexual 
 
778 Although specific and separate sections contain similar protections eg. sections 16-20 of Sexual Offences 
Act 2003 for children under 18 & sections 38-41 contain offences by care workers against those with a 
mental disorder.  
779 Nicholas J Little, ‘From no means no to only yes means yes, the rational results of an Affirmative consent 
standard in Rape Law’ [2008] 58 (4) Vanderbilt Law Review 1321-1364, 1350 
780 Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.74 
781 Finch & Munro (n 540) 315. 
782 As discussed in detail in chapter 3. Also see Ashworth (n 422) 902; Moreover, unclear definitions often 
leads to defendants successfully relying on their mistaken belief in consent even where they are intoxicated; 
such a belief is determined by its ‘reasonableness’ and according to the Judicial studies Board a defendant’s 
belief is to be judged ‘as if he were sober’. 
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assault and replace the several different categories that existed.784 Arguably, the term 
‘rape’ carries a burden of stereotypical understandings of its meaning.785 When such a term 
is used many people relate it to a violent stranger attack, thereby dismissing marital rape 
cases and only believing cases where the victim had visible injuries.786 
The Canadian law now states that ‘everyone who commits a sexual assault… is liable to 
imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.’787 Sexual assault is not offered a 
separate definition, however ‘assault’ is defined in section 265 of the code788 and refers to 
its application to sexual assault. ‘Assault’ is essentially defined as applying, attempting or 
threatening to apply physical force directly or indirectly to someone.789  
Consent to basic sexual assault and mistaken belief in consent to sexual assault were 
undefined until 1992. The new definition contained in section 273 of the Criminal code 
states it is ‘voluntary agreement of  the complainant to engage in the sexual activity in 
question’790 which is determined by her subjective state of mind at the time of the alleged 
assault.791 Through its wording, the definition appears to attempt to affirm sexual 
autonomy and self-determination.792 As Vandevrot rightly notes, the change in definition 
of consent is like changing the focal point of a lens.793 Considering its central importance 
to the offence, different definitions may lead to different outcomes, for example some facts 
that might be considered probative under one definition may be deemed irrelevant under 
 
784 Janine Benedet & Isabel Grant, ‘A Situational Approach to Incapacity and Mental Disability in Sexual 
Assault Law’ [2011-2013] 43(1) Ottawa Law Review, 3-26, 5 
785 See chapter 2 on rape myths for an in-depth discussion.  
786 Susan Caringella-Mac Donald, ‘Parallels and Pitfalls: The aftermath of Legal Reform for Sexual Assault, 
Marital Rape and Domestic Violence Victims’ [1988] 3(2) Journal of Interpersonal Violence 174-189, 175.  
787 Criminal Code, S.C. 1953-54, c. 51, s. 140. 
788 265(1) Assault - A person commits an assault when (a) without the consent of the other person, he applies 
force intentionally to that other person, directly or indirectly; (b) he attempts or threatens, by an act or 
gesture, to apply force to another person, if he has, or causes that other person to believe on reasonable 
grounds that he has, present ability to effect his purpose; or (c) while openly wearing or carrying a weapon or 
an imitation thereof, he accosts or impedes another person or begs. 
789 See above. Although the aim was to create one offence of sexual assault, the law instead created a three-
tiered offence. Contained within s272 and s273, the first is the abovementioned basic sexual assault, the 
second is sexual assault with a weapon (which is punishable by up to 14 years imprisonment) and the third is 
aggravated sexual assault (which carries a sentence of up to life imprisonment). Therefore, although there 
may have been benefits to removing the term rape from legislation, it seems that the degradation of offences 
based on violence has reinforced those notions. Moreover, in an attempt to convey the seriousness of violent 
rapes by attributing them separate offences, and longer maximum sentences, the law has, perhaps 
inadvertently, reduced the seriousness of rapes that do not contain violence 
790 An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault) SC 1992, c38, s273 
791 R v Ewanchuk [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 
792 Lucinda Vandervort, ‘Affirmative Sexual Consent in Canadian Law, Jurisprudence and Legal Theory’ 
[2012] 23 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 395-442, 401 
793 Ibid 402.  
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another.794 Therefore, although a seemingly simple introduction of a definition of consent, 
it has actually had a major impact on how the actus reus and mens rea are determined in 
practice. For example ‘voluntariness’ connotes that the agreement is not coerced,795  and 
‘agreement’ suggests to something ‘in particular’,796 and while agreements can be 
terminated, so too can consent suggesting consent must be ongoing throughout the 
encounter.797  Although very few cases discuss the meaning of voluntariness,798 through an 
analysis of the case law below, the consensus appears to be that mere agreement alone is 
not sufficient and that agreement should be as a result of free choice.799 It would appear 
that like the aims of the law in England and Wales, an autonomy based approach is at the 
core of the legislation. It must therefore be analysed whether, whilst retaining this 
protection of autonomy, but through a different model, the legal response can adequately 
and equally protect individuals from sexual assault.  As will be discussed below, the 
interpretation of the reforms suggests that any consent given must be communicated 
clearly and throughout a sexual encounter, which has led to an implied standard of what 
has been referred to as ‘affirmative consent’.   
 
2.2 THE AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT MODEL 
Canada appears to have advanced further towards a standard of affirmative consent than 
most other Anglo-American jurisdictions.800 Its introduction reflected an ‘effort in 
strengthening women’s rights.’801 Coined as the ‘affirmative consent model’, through its 
interpretation and application it seems positive and expressed agreement is the required 
standard. Moreover, this in turn has limited the reliance on the defence of honest but 
mistaken belief where ‘reasonable steps’802 were not taken to establish consent.803 
Although these legislative amendments apparently established statutory affirmative 
consent requirements, as will be discussed below, it was the ‘judicial interpretations of 
 
794 Ibid. 
795 Ibid. 
796 Ibid and Kyla Barranco, ‘Canadian Sexual Assault laws: A model for Affirmative consent on college 
campuses?’ [2015-2016] 24(3) Michigan State International Law Review 801-840, 822 
797 Ibid.  
798 Isabel Grant, ‘The Normal ones take time: Civil Commitment and Sexual Assault in R v Alsadi’ [2012] 
24(2) Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 439-457, 449 
799 R v Stender, [2005] 1 SCR 914, 2005 SCC 36 in ibid. 
800 Gotell (n 391) 871. 
801 Barranco (n 796) 821.  
802 Ibid. 
803 Ibid 824. 
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these provisions [that] proved critical in explaining the affirmative consent standard for 
sexual assault cases.’804 This change moves the definition away from a forced-centred 
model to a consent based one.805 In essence, this approach aims to shift the understanding 
from simply  ‘no means no’ to ‘only yes means yes’;806 hence reducing the circumstances 
upon which a defendant may rely on consent where the complainant may not have directly 
expressed voluntary agreement. 
The model challenges understandings of sexual encounters, as Gotell states, ‘normative 
heterosexuality founded on feminine acquiescence to seduction.’807 Likewise, as 
Vandervort rightly suggests, Parliament was aware of the potential implications of the 
interpretation of the legislation.808 Arguably, Parliament intended that judicial 
interpretation would shift the focus from express opposition to express willingness to 
participate in the sexual activity,809 reflecting an effort to overcome ‘the historical 
tendency by some judges to treat a complainant's silence or non-resistance as implied 
consent.’810 Moreover, this sets an apparently higher bar811 for those claiming the 
defence,812 and puts more emphasis on the steps taken by the defendant in the 
circumstances to ascertain consent. This is an area which requires significant improvement 
in English and Welsh law as it appears from the analysis in chapters 3 and 4, there still 
remains an excessive focus upon the complainant’s actions. Moreover, it has been argued 
that an affirmative standard would provide a more nuanced approach to understanding 
sexual consent; scholars have suggested that its introduction, hypothetically, marks women 
‘as full partners in a sexual encounter and their wishes given equal weight’,813 whilst 
affirming their ‘right to bodily integrity.’814 This promotion of the right to communicate a 
yes or no is a key element of this autonomy-based approach.  
It could be argued that an affirmative consent model attempts to reinvigorate sexual 
encounters and tries to redistribute sexual power. The strongest arguments in support of the 
 
804 Ibid 825. 
805 Dan Subotnik, ‘Copulemus in Pace: A Meditation on Rape, Affirmative Consent to Sex and Sexual 
Autonomy’ [2008] 41 Akron Law Review 847-864, 848 
806 R v Park [1995] 2 S.C.R 836 (para 44).’ ‘Not saying ‘yes’ is equivalent to saying ‘no’.’ 
807 Gotell (n 391) 868. 
808 Vandervort (n 792) 435. 
809 Ibid. 
810 Ibid.  
811 As discussed in section 3. 
812 Barranco (n 796) 825. 
813 Little (n 779) 1355. 
814 Vandervort (n 792) 405.  
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affirmative consent model, as suggested by Little, is that its introduction changes 
behaviour in men and women particularly in dating situations. 815 The standard, in essence, 
provides a tangible and clear standard816 while promoting ‘rational behaviour in seeking 
and providing clear consent;817 and is allegedly a ‘growing trend’ in US College 
campuses.818 Moreover, the model has established that consent must be ‘an active on-
going’ process throughout a sexual encounter.819  This creates a standard close to ‘a 
communicative one’ that requires an expression of affirmative ‘consent and active steps to 
ensure agreement, when activities shift from one form of activity to another.’820 Such a 
standard may empower victims to come forward where they may have initially agreed to 
sexual contact but as it progressed and changed they revoked their original consent. It also 
asserts to initiators that they cannot rely on initial consent for the duration and must be 
satisfied that the consent is continuous throughout. It is important to consider whether an 
autonomy-based approach is workable. It must be critically analysed whether the 
introduction of this ‘affirmative consent’ model has in fact successfully addressed these 
shortcomings, and whether there are any lessons to be learned for future reforms in 
England and Wales. 
 
3. THE APPLICATION OF THE AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT MODEL 
This section will explore the interpretation of the affirmative consent model to determine 
its success. It will be analysed whether the application of the affirmative consent model has 
been successful despite its foundations in the principles of autonomy, and whether it has 
successfully challenged the reponsibilisation that is linked with such a focus. It is 
important to explore how the legislative reforms have been interpreted in case law.                                  
In R v M (M.L.,)821 consent was distinguished from ‘submission’ where the Supreme Court 
held that the Court of Appeal ‘acted in error in holding that a victim is required to offer 
some minimal word or gesture of objection and that lack of resistance must be equated 
 
815 Little (n 779) 1351. 
816 Barranco (n 796) 840. 
817 Little (n 779) 1351. 
818 Barranco (n 796) 832. 
819 Gotell (n 391) 875. 
820 Ibid 871. 
821 [1994] 2 SCR 3 
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with consent.’822 It was also established that mens rea is not only satisfied when he knew 
she was saying no, but also when he knew she wasn’t saying yes.823 
There has been varied judicial interpretations of the legislative reforms, but it was 
Ewanchuk that was the first case to address the apparent affirmative standard of consent. 
Before this case, decisions on consent were ‘unpredictable and inconsistent.’824 The 
Ewanchuk decision found that ‘implied consent is not consent’ and that ‘voluntary 
agreement’ is to be expressed through words or conduct.825  In that case the complainant 
initially verbally resisted his advances, but because she was afraid she did not take any 
further action to stop him.826 The defence relied on her ‘implied’ consent considering she 
had failed to object further throughout the activity.827 The defendant was not allowed to 
rely on his ‘mistaken belief’ as to her consent when there was no evidence of words or 
conduct that could have led him to believe in consent.828  The decision brings the element 
of consent to the forefront both with respect to the actus reus and the mens rea 
requirements of the offence of sexual assault.829 
The Supreme Court held that ‘a belief that silence, passivity or ambiguous conduct 
constitutes consent is a mistake of law, and provides no defence’830 and went on to confirm 
that an ‘accused cannot say that he thought ‘no meant yes.’’831  In criticising the Trial 
Judges’ earlier decision, the Supreme Court stated:  
‘This error does not derive from the findings of fact but from mythical assumptions 
that when a woman says ‘no’ she is really saying ‘yes’, ‘try again’, or ‘persuade 
me’… women’s sexual autonomy and implies that women are ‘walking around this 
country in a state of constant consent to sexual activity.’832 
 
822 R v M (M.L.) 2 S.C.R.3 Sopinka J 
823 R v Park [1995] 2 S.C.R 836 [39] 
824 Rakhi Ruparelia, ‘Does ‘No’ Mean No Reasonable doubt? Assessing the Impact of Ewanchuck on 
Determinations of Consent’ [2006] 25(1-2) Canadian Women Studies 167-171, 167 
825 R v Ewanchuk [1999] 1 SCR 330 at para 50 
826 Ibid [7]. 
827 Ibid [31]. 
828 Ibid [87].  
829 Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, ‘The Failure of Consent: Re-Conceptualizing Rape as Sexual Abuse of 
Power’ [2011] 18(1) Michigan Journal of Gender and the Law 147-228, 171 
830 R v Ewanchuk [1999] 1 SCR 330 at para 51 
831 Ibid 
832 Ibid [87]. 
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Hence, the Supreme Court asserted that this affirmative standard of consent must be 
express, clear and continuous833 at every stage of the sexual encounter.834 Raising the 
standard to ‘only yes means yes,’ consent is understood ‘as an active and on-going process 
that can be withdrawn at any time.’835 As rightly observed by Ruparelia, Ewanchuk ‘has 
brought us a long way in protecting a woman’s right to be free of unwanted sexual 
intrusions.’836  
However, there appears to have been much difficulty in applying and interpreting the 
Ewanchuk decision.837 Even where decisions have followed that of Ewanchuk, it appears 
that some judges and juries continue to rely on such stereotypes to inform discussions and 
decisions.838 Vandervort’s study analysed transcripts of judicial proceedings in the 
Canadian lower Courts which revealed ‘erroneous interpretations and applications of the 
law of consent.’839 It was also revealed that few of these cases of acquittal are appealed, 
noting ‘traditional generalisations and misconceptions continues to ensure that the law of 
sexual consent is sometimes ignored [and] misinterpreted…’840 Arguably this may be 
because the affirmative consent model fails to challenge the preconceptions of sexual 
activity, due to the conceptual underpinnings of autonomy. It might therefore be argued 
that if an affirmative consent model was introduced in England and Wales, it would 
unlikely challenge stereotypical attitudes towards complainants of sexual assault. Further 
analysis of the interpretation of the model below reveals its shortcomings in addressing 
myths and stereotypes.  
For example, the initial ruling in Flaviano841 is concerning. There the trial judge’s original 
decision held that reasonable steps were taken to ascertain consent following the 
complainant’s initial rejection of the defendant’s advances,842 despite his own claim that 
she said yes;843 suggesting the defendant may have believed her to be consenting because 
 
833 It has since been confirmed in R. v. J.A. 2011 SCC 28 that a person can only consent when they are 
conscious throughout the activity 
834 Gotell (n 391) 871. 
835 Ibid 875. 
836 Ruparelia (n 824). 
837Ibid 169 citing R v S.D.P [2004] N.J. No. 371 & R v O (M) [1999] 138 CCC 476 
838 Ruparelia (n 824) 170.  
839 Vandervort (n 792) 438. 
840 Ibid.  
841 R v Flaviano [2013] ABCA 219 
842 [2013] ABCA 219 Moldaver J 
843 Thereby not requiring reasonable steps to be taken to ascertain consent- Janine Benedet, ‘Sexual Assault 
Cases at the Alberta Court of Appeal: The roots of Ewanchuk and the Unfinished Revolution’ [2014] 52(1) 
Alberta Law Review 127-144, 143 
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‘she was not a very verbal person.’ The facts were ‘strikingly similar’844 to Ewanchuk with 
‘pronounced inequalities’845 between the individuals. Unsurprisingly his defence attempted 
to discredit the complainant by suggesting she was a ‘scheming prostitute’ rather than a 
scared young girl. Although the court of first instance’s decision was concerning, 
fortunately, the Court of Appeal overturned the decision and substituted a conviction 
which was later confirmed by the Supreme Court.  
Similarly, in R. v. Adepoju,846 the decision appeared to be informed by stereotypical myths. 
Here, despite the complainant’s repeated struggle to reject the defendant’s advances, the 
complainant eventually submitted to the accused ‘to get it over with.’847 Based on the fact 
the complainant had ‘stopped saying no’ and her ‘body language said yes’ the defendant 
was acquitted.848 As Benedet rightly noted, the trial judge ‘had erred in both ignoring all of 
the sexually assaultive behaviour that took place prior to the sexual intercourse, and in 
inferring that submission to sexual intercourse was consent.’849 The trial judge’s erroneous 
decision came just two weeks after the Supreme Court in R. v. Hutchinson,850 where it 
ruled that ‘[c]onsent cannot be implied, must coincide with the sexual activity, and may be 
withdrawn at any time.’851 The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal and substituted a 
conviction finding several errors within the trial judge’s decision, not least the equation of 
submission with consent.852 Though overturned on appeal, the initial decisions of these 
recent cases highlight the fact that despite apparently progressive legislation, judicial 
interpretation appears to still be informed by stereotypical myths including ‘no’ means ‘try 
harder’. Perhaps this may be to do with the expectations the requirement that promotes 
‘rational behaviour’853 sets a standard expected response from individuals. This 
expectation to respond rationally promotes the idea of autonomous subjects who 
should/can react in a particular way. This approach fails to acknowledge the wider social 
and environmental facts that may impact on a person’s ability to communicate consent or 
 
844 Ibid 142. 
845 Ibid 143. 
846 [2014] ABCA 100 
847 R. v. Adepoju [2014] ABCA 100 
848 Benedet (n 843) 143. 
849 Ibid. 
850 2014 SCC 19 
851 R. v. Hutchinson, 2014 SCC 19 
852 [2014] ABCA 100 para 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 
853 Little (n 779) 1351. 
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lack thereof. We must therefore determine whether there is any merit in adopting a similar 
approach in England and Wales. 
 
4. DOES YES REALLY MEAN YES? 
At a glance, it could be argued that the affirmative consent model does appear to be 
somewhat progressive in that it attempts to shift the focus from the complainant to the 
defendant and tries to limit circumstances in which the ‘honest but mistaken belief’ in 
consent is relied upon. Despite some critiques that its introduction is an attack on 
intimacy’854 and ‘an onerous task’,855 the shift from ‘no means no’ to ‘only yes means yes’, 
can potentially offer an extra level of protection.856 An apparently higher burden is placed 
on the initiator to take reasonable steps to ensure consent is freely given. As Gotell 
suggests ‘the masculine gaze that has long defined the consent/coercion dichotomy is 
surely diluted.’857  
 
However, as Little rightly suggests, it is ‘not a radical shift in legal theory’858  as the failure 
to ascertain consent does not per se equate to lack of consent.859 Hence, the burden still lies 
on the prosecution to prove consent was not otherwise expressed, and nothing prevents a 
defendant from claiming a voluntary consent was clearly communicated.860 Ultimately 
returning to a ‘he said she said’ debate where the complainant’s credibility is open to 
scrutiny. Moreover, the burden would therefore still lie with the complainant to 
demonstrate non-consent.  
Although Barranco suggests the standard establishes a platform for ‘procedural 
fairness’,861 the reality is quite different, as despite its potential, many judicial decisions 
remain informed by stereotypical rape myths. This may be because the affirmative consent 
model is still based on the concept of autonomy. It (wrongly) presumes that individuals 
will be equal and capable of demonstrating their consent. Moreover, it responsibilises 
complainants to ensure a defendant does not perceive their actions as permission. 
 
854 Ibid 1359. 
855 Ruparelia (n 824) 167. 
856 Vandervort (n 792) 405.  
857 Gotell (n 391) 872. 
858 Little (n 779).  
859 Ibid. 
860 Ibid. 
861 Barranco (n 796) 840. 
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Moreover, it does little to adequately shift our perspective from the complainant onto the 
defendant as there is still a substantial focus upon what the complainant has said or done. 
As Ruparelia has suggested, despite progress, ‘ingrained stereotypes about complainants 
will be slow to disappear altogether.’862 These stereotypes are ingrained in our 
understanding of sexual activity and our expectations on complainants because of this 
promotion of autonomy.  
As suggested by Subotnik, a major goal of affirmative consent was to limit men's ability to 
exploit ambiguity in sexual matters,863 one which it has arguably failed to holistically 
achieve. Forming judicial decisions based on stereotypes and myths rather than decisions 
that accurately reflect legislative requirements is problematic.864 Any amendments, like 
this ‘progressive’ requirement for affirmative consent, will not be as effective if ill-
informed judicial decisions continue. Unfortunately, the model does not go far enough in 
tackling the prevalence of these stereotypes and myths. It could in fact be suggested that 
the requirement of affirmative consent instead ‘responsibilises’ the subjects.865 In effect, 
the presumption behind this model is that the individuals are fully autonomous ‘rational 
calculating creatures’866 who bear the full responsibility for their actions.867 Indeed the 
language of consent ‘both resumes and sustains the idea of an autonomous, knowing 
subject free from social norms and socialisation.’868 This expectation of a particular 
response and communication placed on a complainant supports the picture of a rationale 
ideal autonomous subject. 
Moreover, we must be challenge whether yes does always mean yes. Defining a standard 
that suggests ‘yes means yes’ appears to distort situations where the agreement has been 
otherwise obtained. Consent can arise in many circumstances i.e. from necessity,869 fear or 
fraud. Although there are legislative provisions to account for circumstances upon which 
consent cannot be freely obtained, it must be asked whether a more careful approach would 
be only a free yes means yes. In other words, this would have to take into consideration the 
 
862 Ruparelia (n 824) 170. 
863 Subotnik (n 805) 858. 
864 Vandervort (n 792) 441. 
865 Gotell (n 391) 897. 
866 Ibid 874. 
867 Ibid. 
868 Hedda Hakvag, ‘Does Yes Mean Yes? Exploring Sexual Coercion in Normative Heterosexuality’ [2010] 
28(1) Canadian Women Studies 121-126, 121 
869 Jane Campbell Moriarty, ’Rape, Affirmative consent and Sexual Autonomy: Introduction to the 
Symposium’ [2008] 41 Akron Law Review 839- 846, 845 
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situational circumstances and the environment upon which choice is exercised. From a 
vulnerability perspective then we would look to the distribution of resilience, we would ask 
whether someone’s vulnerability was being exploited in the circumstances.  
The law therefore still appears to be based on this ‘ideal victim’,870 now instead seen as 
responsible for managing her behaviour to minimise and avoid the risk of sexual 
violence.871  This ‘responsibilisation’ is a dual sword, that acts both as a scrutiny of female 
behaviour and as a distraction from male predatory actions. There is an excessive focus on 
autonomy without the corresponding protection from exploitation which can distract from 
the particular situational circumstances. Unfortunately, the affirmative consent model 
merely reiterates our supposed free choice to engage, reject or indeed avoid sexual 
advances, whilst failing to acknowledge the unequal circumstances in which consent is 
apparently freely given. An alternative to this model would be to change the theoretical 
foundations upon which legislative reforms are based. It appears that most reforms are 
autonomy focussed, essentially leading to very similar outcomes. However, if we were to 
reimagine our understanding of our existence through a vulnerability lens, we could shift 
our focus away from a complainant. If we challenge our understanding of individuals as 
capable rational and independent, we can adopt our response accordingly. This model 
does, however, challenge the stereotype that suggest men are entitled to pursue sex until a 
woman physically resists872 which is undoubtedly a positive step forward.  
Indeed, we should look to the theory of vulnerability which offers a unique opportunity to 
reimagine legislative reforms. Rather than focus on how all subjects are independent and 
free agents, we should acknowledge our shared and inherent vulnerability to harm.873 Once 
this is done, legislation can be drafted to reflect the potential for exploitation and shift 
focus from the complainant’s actions onto the defendant, thereby focussing on the 
situational circumstances upon which consent was apparently given. Such an approach 
would arguably address these concerns and simultaneously reduce successful reliance on a 
mistaken belief in vague ‘implied’ consent circumstances.  
Although appealing in principle, the affirmative consent model does little to address the 
ingrained stereotypical attitudes towards sexual relations and the expectations placed on 
 
870 Once seen as the gatekeepers of sexuality. Ibid 843. 
871 Gotell (n 391) 879. 
872 Moriarty (n 869) 843.  
873 Fineman & Grear (n 58) 16. 
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complainants. Considering this, it therefore appears that despite the apparent 
progressiveness of the model, its implementation has fallen short. It appears to reflect the 
approach of England and Wales despite the apparent differences. Because of the continued 
focus on complainant’s behaviour and the complications with an only yes means yes 
model, it is unlikely that affirmative consent would be an appropriate route for reform in 
England and Wales. Yet, Canadian sexual assault law has been progressive in other ways. 
In particular, the Canadian legislation has avoided the segregation of ‘incapacitated’ 
individuals and has instead opted for a more inclusive approach. We must now analyse this 
approach to determine whether this umbrella approach has been progressive enough to 
challenge the stereotypical attitudes towards complainants and to shift away from 
responsibilising individuals.  
 
5. THE ‘INCAPACITY’ UMBRELLA 
As examined above, the affirmative consent model strives to place partners in equal 
positions of power to ensure voluntary and free consent is communicated between sexual 
agents; thereby placing both individuals on par with each other. Arguably though, this 
model fails to recognise the imbalance of power that often exists within sexual 
relationships that cannot be addressed merely by requiring consent to be clearly 
communicated. Although circumstances are more limited,874 and a defendant cannot rely 
on his own self-induced intoxication, the defence of honest mistaken belief in consent is 
still open to a defendant875 allowing for a claim that consent was indeed communicated.  
However, we must explore the complications that arise when a complainant is 
incapacitated at the time of the offence.  
 
874 R. v. Cornejo, 2003 CanLII 26893 (ON CA) para 15 Judge held that ‘moving her pelvis’ ‘was simply an 
insufficient basis to allow the defence [of mistaken belief] to go the jury.’  The Judge also noted that the 
accused’s ‘giant leap of imagination ‘did not have an ‘air of reality’  hence finding that he could not rely on 
less his own wilful blindness as to her consent.874 The requirement that a mistaken belief must have ‘an air of 
reality’ was first alluded to in 1997 in R. v. Esau 2 S.C.R. 777 where MacLachlin J noted ‘passivity without 
more is insufficient to provide a basis for the defence’.  
875 A defendant cannot rely on their mistaken belief if it arose from their self-induced intoxication see R. v. 
Cornejo (2003] CanLII 26893 (ON CA) & aftermath of R v Daviault [1994] 3 S.C.R 63. After national outcry 
through ‘the feminist movement’ concerns were raised about equality and violence against women, the 
Canadian Parliament had a ‘quick legislative response’ and imposed a legislative ban on the defence of 
intoxication via Bill C-72.  Section 33.1 of the Code denies the intoxication defence if (a) the offence 
‘includes as an element an assault or any other interference or threat of interference by a person with the 
bodily integrity of another person;’ and (b) the intoxication was self-induced…’ See also Christopher P 
Manfreidi & Scott Lemieux, ‘Judicial Discretion and Fundamental Justice: Sexual Assault in the Supreme 
Court of Canada’ [1999] 47 American Journal of Comparative Law 489-513, 489.  
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To perhaps reflect that we are all not always ‘free and independent’ agents, the Canadian 
Code included section 273.1(2)876 alongside the definition of consent that somewhat 
mirrors that of section 75 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. One noteworthy distinction lies 
in the segregation of ‘incapacities’ within English law. Section 75(f) contains an evidential 
presumption for those who have been drugged or otherwise involuntarily intoxicated, 
whereas voluntarily intoxicated victims receive no such protections where they remain 
conscious; and in section 30, those with a mental disorder are offered separate 
protection.877 As has been argued, the law is therefore distinguishing between groups of 
individuals by the means of their incapacitation, rather than their ability to engage freely in 
sexual activity at the particular time concerned.878 As a result, incapacitated complainants 
are not offered proper protection from exploitation. It must therefore be asked whether the 
Canadian approach addresses inequality by avoiding this segregation and thereby 
encouraging an equal platform of protection through the umbrella of section 273.1(2)(b) 
which states consent is not obtained when ‘the complainant is incapable of consenting to 
the activity’. Perhaps when we do not focus on the inherent nature of incapacity, we can 
look to the source of exploitation and shift our thinking away from grouping individuals as 
incapable. The determination of this incapacity approach must now be considered.  
 
5.1 THE THRESHOLD OF ‘INCAPACITY’ IN PRACTICE 
As aforementioned, the Code contains a very brief definition of consent as ‘voluntary’ but 
also lists circumstances where consent is vitiated. These provide an apparent safety net to 
instruct both judges and juries to tread carefully when determining the existence of 
capacity. Particularly, subsection (b) details that consent cannot be obtained when the 
complainant is ‘incapable’ of consenting. At a glance, such a statement seems 
uncomplicated and a logical deduction. Yet in practice, considering the legislation lacks 
any definitive guidelines, the meaning of incapacity and its threshold has caused 
insurmountable confusion and inconsistencies. We can therefore speculate that the 
 
876 Which states: (a) the agreement is expressed by the words or conduct of a person other than the 
complainant; (b) the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity; (c) the accused induces the 
complainant to engage in the activity by abusing a position of trust, power or authority; (d) the complainant 
expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to engage in the activity; or (e) the complainant, having 
consented to engage in sexual activity, expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to continue to 
engage in the activity. 
877 As explored in detail in chapter 4 
878 For a full discussion see chapter 3 and 4 
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Canadian approach is likely to encounter similar difficulties to that of England and Wales. 
Yet we may reveal some lessons to be learned through the capacity umbrella approach.  
Case law has shown that ‘incapacity’ can be brought about through intoxication or mental 
disabilities.879 Although not prescribed in the code, incapacity due to voluntary intoxication 
is included within this somewhat broad definition. In fact, in the bill leading to the reforms, 
the section stated, ‘by reason of intoxication or other condition.’880 After ‘other condition’ 
was criticised as being too vague, Canadian Parliament instead left it to judges to determine 
incapacity on a case by case basis. 881  
 
Like the English approach, incapacity has been described as an all or nothing concept in 
Canadian law.882  However, in R v JR,883  the judge suggested that lack of memory can 
evidence a lack of capacity. Although it was submitted that such submissions would be 
considered as indirect ‘circumstantial evidence’884 that may ‘permit inferences’885 relating 
to capacity to consent.886 Yet in England and Wales, the courts fail to acknowledge this as 
evidence of severe intoxication and potential incapacitation; instead suggesting lack of 
memory and the existence of consent are two separate issues.887  In JR, the complainant 
suffered an ‘alcohol blackout’ consequently leaving no memory of the incident. 888 
Moreover, it was also submitted, and accepted as evidence, that the complainant would not 
have consented as the accused was her second cousin.889 As the defendant did not testify, 
there was no evidence to give an ‘air of reality’ to any claim as to mistaken belief,890 the 
conviction was upheld on appeal.891 Such an approach would be favourably welcomed in 
 
879 Discussion of mental disabilities below. 
880 Don Stuart, ‘Sexual Assault: substantive issues before and after Bill c-49’ [1992-1993] 35 Criminal Law 
Quarterly 250-263, 250 
881 Ibid.  
882 Benedet & Grant (n 784) 10. 
883 R. v J.R. [2006] CanLII 22658 (ON SC) 
884 Ibid [20]. 
885 Ibid. 
886 R. v. B.S.B [2008] BCSC 917  
887 See R v Bree [2007] EWCA Crim 804 where the Judge failed to direct as to the effect alcohol would have 
on the complainant’s capacity, instead referring to the effect of intoxication on her credibility. See also R v 
Hysa [2007] EWCA 2046 where the Court found lack of memory does not mean the case should be 
dismissed as no case to answer.  
888 R. v. J.R, [2006] CanLII 22658 (ON SC) para 1.II (4) 
889 Ibid [59].  
890 Sheehy, E.A., ‘Judges and the Reasonable Steps Requirement: The Judicial Stance on Perpetration 
Against Unconscious women’ in Sexual Assault in Canada: Law, Legal Practice and Women’s Activism, 
Sheehy (ed.) (University of Ottawa Press, June 2012) 512 available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2265526 
891 Ibid.  
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England and Wales considering the current application of capacity to consent. The 
interpretation in this instance arguably reduced the focus on the complainant’s ‘behaviour’ 
and increased the attention on the defendant’s awareness of her potential incapacity and 
focused on the potentially exploitative nature of their actions.  
 
However, in most circumstances, ‘short of unconsciousness’,892  it appears that judges are 
not likely to find incapacity when the complainant has been voluntarily intoxicated. This is 
evidenced by a survey of case law relating to incapacity through voluntary intoxication, as 
conducted by Benedet.893 For example in R v Jensen894 where the complainant was 
voluntarily intoxicated and testified to saying ‘no’, the Court of Appeal overturned the trial 
judge’s decision and held that her intoxication was not so severe as to leave her 
unconscious or not in control of her body.895 The Court found that capacity to consent896 
was a ‘minimal state.’897 This disappointing judgment shows the reluctance of judges to 
find incapacity as a result of voluntary intoxication. Moreover, as Benedet similarly 
argues, this case also highlights the difficulty of establishing a threshold for capacity to 
consent where the complainant remains conscious.898  
Where the incapacity is as a result of involuntary intoxication, it appears that the judiciary 
are more comfortable with applying a capacity threshold short of unconsciousness. In R v 
Daigle899 the acquittal of the defendants was overturned and replaced with a conviction 
where the 15-year-old complainant had involuntarily consumed PCP. Yet the trial judge’s 
original decision is noteworthy considering it focused on the behaviour of the complainant 
leading up to the involuntary intoxication. The judge noted that she went alone to meet two 
stranger men, stating ‘at some point, as it is often said, everyone is responsible for his own 
actions.’900 It was found that the complainant could not have had capacity to consent where 
she was ‘unable to control her actions’. However, upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the 
conviction was upheld, rather it was found that the accused could not rely upon mistaken 
belief where he did not take reasonable steps to do so. This decision essentially ignores the 
 
892 Benedet (n 549) 442. 
893 Benedet (n 549) 443. 
894 [1996] 90 OAC 183, 47 C.R 
895 Benedet (n 549) 445. 
896 Ibid. 
897 [1996] 90 OAC 183, 47 C.R at para 13 
898 Benedet (n 549) 445. 
899  [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1220 
900 [1997] 127 CCC at 134 
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intentional drugging and potential incapacity of the complainant and as Sheehy states, 
‘greatly understates the criminality of deliberately drugging a woman to rape her.’901  
Like the approach in England and Wales, it appears that judges are far more willing to find 
incapacity where the complainant was unconscious or asleep during the assault, and 
especially if the complainant was asleep902 before the sexual activity commenced.903 For 
example, in R. v. H 904 the complainant blacked out from the voluntary consumption of 
alcohol and the accused raped her while she was unconscious. The judge had no hesitation 
in determining the complainant was ‘extremely intoxicated’ referring to the fact that she 
was ‘falling down… vomiting and had to be put to sleep because of her condition.’905 In 
light of her incapacity, it was held that ‘given her condition, it could hardly be said he had 
an honest belief that the complainant was consenting rather it is apparent that S.H. saw an 
opportunity to take advantage of the complainant.’906 It is important to note that the judge 
did not only refer to the fact she was unconscious, but her obvious incapacitated condition 
leading up to the assault was also detailed. Moreover, considering her state, it appears the 
judge disregarded the defendant’s claim that he had an honest belief in her consent, by 
referring to her obvious drunken state and instead alluding to the exploitative nature of his 
conduct suggesting ‘he saw an opportunity to take advantage of the complainant.’907 
Although this is not per se a higher standard of proof, it appears that the judge refused to 
entertain a reliance on an honest mistaken belief where the evidence suggested the 
complainant was so intoxicated that she could not have indicated consent; as such the 
judge successfully removed the focus from the complainant’s actions onto the 
opportunistic exploitative actions of the defendant. 
In contrast, in R v Millar908 the trial judge held that the defendant was not aware of the 
complainant’s intoxicated state909 despite accompanying her over the evening where she 
consumed a substantial quantity of alcohol.910 Moreover, the judge suggested that the 
complainant’s angry reaction to the defendant’s advances was fuelled through guilt for 
 
901 Elizabeth Sheehy, ‘From Women’s Duty to Resist’ 20(3) [2000] Canadian Women’s studies 98-104, 102 
902 R. v. Hernandez (1997), 209 A.R. 228 (C.A.); 
903 Benedet (n 549) 442. 
904 (S.L.), 2003 SKPC 148 
905 Ibid. 
906 Ibid. 
907 Ibid [27]. 
908 [2008] CANL II 28225 Ont.SC 
909 Ibid [21]. 
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cheating on her boyfriend. As Benedet noted,911 this statement relies and perpetuates myths 
and stereotypes regarding women’s tendency to cry rape, while simultaneously ignoring 
the exploitative actions of the defendant in taking advantage of an obviously intoxicated 
vulnerable woman.   
It is unsatisfactory that the test for when the threshold of capacity is met varies 
tremendously depending on whether the complainant was voluntarily or involuntarily 
intoxicated; it seems that often a complainant must be unconscious for the threshold to be 
fulfilled and, like England and Wales, there is some serious uncertainty concerning the 
point where a complainant is ‘incapacitated’ but remains conscious. Arguably, Canadian 
law has essentially a very similar approach to incapacitated complaints despite the apparent 
legislative differences. The capacity threshold remains uncertain and instead decisions are 
based on unfounded stereotypes rather than as Craig argues, focusing on ‘the particular’ as 
context is everything.912 Instead we should be examining the circumstantial and situational 
evidence of the sexual encounter that might suggest exploitation. Despite covering all 
‘incapacitated’ victims in one section, the application of the law appears to vary depending 
upon the circumstances upon which the incapacity arose. Therefore, although the section 
appeared to be initially encouraging, eg. by avoiding segregating groups based on shared 
characteristics, the law in practice has essentially undone this progression. As Benedet and 
Grant have rightly suggested, the challenge with this standard of incapacity is that those 
who do meet it are so intoxicated that they have no memory of the assault.913 It follows that 
‘this ‘catch-22’ is also present for women with mental disabilities in that those women 
incapable of consent may also be incapable of giving evidence in court’914 and moreover 
their accounts may be discredited and undermined due to inconsistent testimonies under 
pressured questioning. Therefore, the capacity umbrella approach would not address the 
concerns as outlined in the previous chapter. The othering and stereotypical expectations of 
individuals is still evident in its application despite the wording of the legislation. We must 
still look to the interpretation of capacity of those with a mental disorder to determine 
whether any lessons can be learned from the Canadian approach.  
 
 
911 Benedet (n 549) 451. 
912 Craig (n 737) 134. 
913 Benedet & Grant (n 526) 328.  
914 Ibid. 
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6. DRAWING THE LINE FOR THOSE WITH A ‘MENTAL DISABILITY’   
As aforementioned, Canadian courts have relied on the undefined incapacity provision for 
both intoxicated complainants and those with mental disabilities. In England and Wales, 
there is a separate provision under section 30 of the SOA 2003, which protects those with a 
mental disability or ‘disorder’ as the legislations states.915 This section provides extra 
protection for such complainants as the mens rea requirement states that a defendant must 
know or ought to know that the complainant was suffering from a disorder at the time of 
the assault which may have affected their ability to refuse sexual advances. Unfortunately, 
despite these welcomed reforms in English law, prosecutors have not utilised this section 
often. Moreover, the symbolic nature of the segregating of those with a mental disorder is 
concerning. Therefore, we must look to Canada to analyse whether their approach of 
combining all complainant’s lacking capacity resulted in equal and adequate protection 
from harm. 
As explored in the previous chapter, it is widely accepted that women with mental 
disabilities experience high rates of sexual assault916 and are noted as having particular 
difficulties in accessing the justice system.917 This may be for many reasons, including 
historical perceptions of women with mental disabilities ‘as childlike or asexual, or 
oversexed918 and’ indiscriminate in their choice of partner.’919 Conversely, equality 
campaigners seek to have the rights of persons with disabilities to sexual relationships 
recognised equally.920 Hence, there is a constant struggle between the desire to protect 
persons with disabilities from harm, whilst affording sexual autonomy. However, there 
appears to be a stronger focus upon rights of a person with a mental disability to engage 
freely in sexual activity. Although positive for autonomy and equality purposes, such an 
emphasis may disguise exploitative sexual encounters as voluntary ones. Perhaps placing 
 
915 ‘(1)A person (A) commits an offence if— 
(a)he intentionally touches another person (B), (b)the touching is sexual, (c)B is unable to refuse because of 
or for a reason related to a mental disorder, and (d)A knows or could reasonably be expected to know that B 
has a mental disorder and that because of it or for a reason related to it B is likely to be unable to refuse. 
(2)B is unable to refuse if— (a)he lacks the capacity to choose whether to agree to the touching (whether 
because he lacks sufficient understanding of the nature or reasonably foreseeable consequences of what is 
being done, or for any other reason), or (b)he is unable to communicate such a choice to A.’ 
916 Janine Benedet & Isabel Grant, ‘Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of Women with Mental 
Disabilities: Consent, Capacity and Mistaken belief’ [2007] 52 McGill Law Journal 243-289, 243; and 
Shilton & Derrick (n 796) 123. 
917 Benedet & Grant Ibid 515. 
918 For more on stereotypes associated with women with mental disabilities see chapter 2 & ibid. 
919 Ibid 517. 
920 See generally UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
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them under the legislative incapacity umbrella will recognise their fluctuating capacities 
instead of segregating by characteristics and relying on stereotypical presumptions 
regarding the sexuality of people with mental disabilities.  
 
6.1 THE ‘INCAPACITY’ THRESHOLD FOR PERSONS WITH A MENTAL 
DISABILITY 
It must therefore be asked whether this legislative wording has in practice afforded persons 
with mental disabilities sexual autonomy whilst simultaneously providing protection from 
exploitation. Unfortunately, the following analysis of the interpretation of capacity in 
Canada of those with a mental disability appears not to have achieved this aim. Instead, 
decisions appear to be informed by stereotypes, regarding such complainants as either 
over-sexed or childlike, hence undermining their credibility even where there appears to be 
evidence of exploitation.  
For instance, the Crown typically concedes capacity to consent even where the ‘mental 
age’ of the complainant is fixed by experts below that of statutory consent.921 In R v 
Parsons922 the complainant had a mental age of 7 but the Court held she maintained 
capacity to consent.923 Similarly, in the case of R v Prince,924 the complainant was said to 
have the intellectual functioning of a 6-8 year old.925 Although it was not clear whether the 
complainant explicitly said no, she was adamant in her testimony that she did not want the 
sexual activity to take place. In an interview with the police, the defendant admitted to 
‘using her’ and said that she may have said no.926 Despite this, the trial judge acquitted the 
defendant because of the complainant’s behaviour and suggested that the complainant 
merely regretted her decision after consenting. This worrying judgement, informed by 
myths and stereotypes regarding women with mental disabilities as suggestible and 
unreliable, is an example of where the court places an excessive focus upon the 
 
921 Benedet & Grant (n 526). 
922 (1999), 170 Nfld & P.E.I.R. 319 
923 R v Parsons [1999] 170 Nfld & PEIR 319 
924 R v Prince (2008) 232 Man R (2d) 281, 2008 Carswell Man 479 (MBQB) [Prince] as cited in Benedet & 
Grant (n 784) 7. 
925 Benedet & Grant (n 784) 7. 
926 Ibid 7-8.  
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complainant and their actions, rather than as Benedet and Grant rightly stated focussing on 
the accused’s behaviour in assessing her credibility.927  
There are very few cases in which the prosecution has relied upon the complainant’s 
incapacity to consent except where it is submitted that they have little or no knowledge of 
sexual mechanics,928 and no appreciation of the sexual activity.929  For example, the 
complainant had essentially no such understanding in R v Parrott930 where she had Down’s 
Syndrome and mental abilities similar to that of pre-school children. Similarly, incapacity 
has been relied upon in advanced Alzheimer’s cases.931 Even if incapacity is proved, there 
is a defence available to argue a mistaken belief as to capacity.932 Although this is invoked 
more when relied upon for intoxication cases,933 this may dissuade prosecutors from 
relying on this section. 
This apparent reluctance to rely on incapacity by the prosecution may also be due to fears 
that such labelling would undermine the complainant’s credibility; for example, this can 
lead to the introduction of evidence of sexual history and portraying her as ‘child-like, 
unreliable or easily confused.’934 Nevertheless, when considering a complainant with a 
mental disability, the common theme does appear to be a comparison with the intellectual 
abilities of a child, even where capacity is not in contention. For example, in R v Harper,935 
the complainant had Multiple Sclerosis which affected her mental and physical state. She 
lived in a care home, where she had incontinence problems and poor eyesight;936 she was 
described as having a terrible memory and as childlike.937 The defendant regularly attended 
the care home to visit his mother. Despite that incapacity was not discussed938 the 
comparison to a child was heavily referenced. This coupled with her contradictory and 
incomplete testimony,939 led the trial judge to find a reasonable doubt as to lack of consent. 
940 This is another example of an excessive focus on the actions and credibility of the 
 
927 Ibid 8. 
928 Benedet & Grant (n 526). 
929 Benedet & Grant (n 784) 11. 
930 [2001] 1 S.C.R 178 
931 Benedet & Grant (n 526).  
932 Ibid. 
933 Ibid. 
934 Ibid. 
935 R v Harper [2002] YKSC 18 
936 Ibid [5]. 
937 Ibid [7]. 
938 Ibid [59]. 
939 Ibid. 
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complainant, rather than examining the inherent imbalances between the parties and the 
possibility of exploitation. The problem with non-consent is within its subjectivity. The 
credibility of the complainant’s claim will be measured ‘against their words and 
actions’,941 as what happened in this particular case. This subjectivity can not only distort 
the facts of the case but can also leave a gaping hole for jurors to fill with preconceived 
notions regarding such women’s behaviour and sexuality. Despite the apparent 
requirements for affirmative and clear consent, it appears some courts still connect 
acquiescence with consent which causes serious problems for those with mental disabilities 
who, as Benedet and Grant suggest, may ’exhibit compliant behaviour’ for which they are 
often rewarded.942 Her testimony of non-consent may then be seen as inconsistent with her 
actions despite not wanting to engage in the sexual activity in question.  
Moreover, the determination of ‘capacity’ for such complainants is arguably archaic. As 
we have seen above, courts tend to rely on the complainant’s intellectual abilities which 
often leads to comparisons to children,943 thereby fuelling stereotypical beliefs that 
undermines their credibility and reliability. Instead they posited Greenspan’s suggestion 
which states that vulnerability to social and physical risks and ability to avoid harm should 
be used to determine whether someone with a mental disability has capacity to consent to 
sexual relations.944 Although there is much merit in this argument, i.e. as Benedet and 
Grant argue, instead of focussing on the complainant’s ability to do fractions we should 
look at their ability to avoid harm;945 we could possibly progress this even further. As will 
be explored in the next chapter, a more nuanced approach would be to incorporate a theory 
of vulnerability in analysing the vulnerability of all complainants. As we are all vulnerable 
to harm and our ability to avoid that harm depends on the resources we have available. Our 
vulnerability to harm and ability to avoid risk fluctuates constantly, and to say one might 
be capable of avoiding harm one day does not necessarily mean they will be so able on 
another. Instead of segregating groups based on particular characteristics, the law should 
instead acknowledge our shared and universal vulnerability to harm for which equal 
protection should be provided. Despite removing the legislative wording to segregate 
 
941 Benedet & Grant (n 784) 7. 
942 Ibid 8. 
943 Benedet & Grant (n 526). 
944 Gruenspan, S.,’Foolish Action in Adults with Intellectual Disabilities: The Forgotten Problem of Risk 
Unawareness’ (2008) 36 International Review of Research in Mental Retardation 147 at 187 cited in Benedet 
& Grant (n 784) 9.  
945 Benedet & Grant (n 784) 9. 
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groups of individuals, it appears that this othering and stereotypical attitudes still underpin 
the application and interpretation of the law. However, in an apparent effort to provide 
more protection to those ‘most vulnerable’ victims, Canadian legislation includes a 
presumption of non-consent where the defendant was in a position of power, trust or 
authority over the complainant.  
 
 
7. ABUSE OF TRUST OR AUTHORITY 
Within section 273.1(2) there is a presumption that consent will be vitiated where ‘the 
accused induces the complainant to engage in the activity by abusing a position of trust, 
power or authority.’946 Its inclusion was reflective of an effort to provide extra protection 
for those complainants who met the ‘capacity’ threshold’ but still warranted extra 
protection.947 At a glance therefore, this section appears to encapsulate a wide-ranging 
variety of circumstances upon which a person (including those with a mental disability) 
may be coerced into engaging in sexual activity, for example teacher-student, doctor-
patient etc. Section 75 of the Sexual Offences Act in England and Wales does not contain 
such a presumption. Instead there are separate sections elsewhere within the Act that 
protect children under 18 from adults in a position of power or trust as well as a different 
section protecting those with a ‘mental disorder’ from care workers. Considering the 
somewhat broad and vague language used in this section, the potential for protection of 
variable circumstances and coercive relationships is appealing. However, in determining its 
value, it must be explored as to whether this subsection has indeed enjoyed much use and 
if so to what extent its application reaches.  
 
7.1 OPPORTUNITY LOST- THE RESTRICTIVE SCOPE OF ‘POSITION OF 
POWER TRUST AND AUTHORITY’ 
In the case of R v Gagnon948  the complainant agreed to have sex with her bus driver as she 
feared she would lose access to her adapted bus services if she refused. The prosecution 
 
946 s 273.1 (2)(c) 
947 For example, see R v DT 2011 ONCJ 213,85 CR (6th) 195 [DT] & Benedet & Grant (n 784). 
948 [2000] CanLll 14683 (QCCQ) 
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relied on non-consent and abuse of power or authority as in 273.1 (2)(c). The defence 
contested this position of power or authority and the Court found that no such relationship 
existed. Arguably, for effective protection, this section should be interpreted in light of the 
complainant’s understanding of the meaning of power and their relationship with the 
defendant, rather than the subjective perspective of the court. Perhaps, it should have been 
interpreted that the complainant would not have engaged in the activity but for her 
subjective fear of losing her bus pass, which was of significant importance to her.  
Arguably such consent provided under these circumstances was not given voluntarily.949  
In the case of R v Alsadi,950 the Court again rejected the argument that a relationship of 
power and trust existed. In this case, the complainant had schizophrenia and bipolar 
disorder and was involuntarily committed to a psychiatric ward where the defendant was a 
uniformed security guard.951 The defence submitted that the complainant had initiated the 
sexual activity despite her submission that she vehemently refused. The trial judge found 
that the defendant was not in a position of power as he was not authorised to ‘restrain’ the 
complainant. In his decision, he relied on many stereotypes regarding women with mental 
disabilities as ‘impulsive’,952 and ‘hypersexual.’953 A retrial was ordered,954 where the 
court of appeal found that the trial judge had failed to adequately address whether the 
position of ‘trust held by the accused should preclude the accused from engaging in sexual 
contact with the complainant given her vulnerability to exploitation.’955 Instead, the 
accused was depicted as the victim of the complainant’s sexual aggression.956  
This is yet another example of a judgment, which was informed by misconceptions and 
stereotypical understandings of women with mental disabilities, where a retrial was 
ordered to consider the possibility of the security guard being in a position of trust. As 
Grant and Benedet suggest, a ‘more nuanced analysis’957 of the particular circumstance and 
the inherent imbalance of power would have shown that the complainant lacked the 
capacity to give free and meaningful consent.958 Specifically, the complainant was 
 
949 Benedet & Grant (n 784) 10. 
950 (27 July 2011), Vancouver 213734-2-C (BC Prov Ct). 
951 Janine Benedet & Isabel Grant, ‘Sexual Assault and the Meaning of Power and Authority for Women with 
Mental Disabilities’ [2014] 22 Feminist Legal Studies 131-154,145 
952 R v Alsadi (27 July 2011), Case no 213734-2-C, Vancouver (BC Prov Ct) in Grant (n 798) 442. 
953 Ibid.  
954 R v Alsadi, 2012 BCCA 183, 2012 Carswell BC 1202 (BCCA). 
955 Grant (n 798) 441. 
956 Ibid.  
957 Benedet & Grant (n 784) 25. 
958 Ibid.  
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involuntarily detained for psychiatric reasons,959 and the defendant held a powerful 
position as a security guard. Instead, the trial judge referred and relied on the 
complainant’s sexual relationship with her boyfriend, suggesting that her capacity to 
engage in sexual relations was constant and stable regardless of the particular situational 
circumstances; arguably inciting further myths and stereotypes.  
In a similar case of R v DT, the complainant used a wheelchair and had significant physical 
and mental disabilities, with vision and speech impairments.960 The defendant was her 
uncle who engaged in sexual activity with the complainant over many years despite alleged 
repeated requests for him to desist.961 The trial judge found that the defendant ‘exploited an 
overwhelming inequality to his own advantage, abused a position of trust and authority to 
influence and manipulate the complainant, thereby vitiating any consent the complainant 
may have given.’962 Yet this decision was overturned on appeal where the Court held that 
‘the Crown must prove both the existence of the relationship of trust, power or authority 
and ‘that the complainant’s free will was effectively overborne by the impact and abuse of 
that position.’963As Benedet and Grant suggest this ruling overlooks ‘the subtle nature of 
abuses of trust, which may develop over time.’964 It seems to be in contrast with the 
intentions of the legislation to presume that this complainant freely consented considering 
the overwhelming imbalance of power, instead of exploring the exploitative actions of the 
defendant in taking advantage of his disabled niece.  
Arguably section 273.1(2)(c) was drafted to protect vulnerable victims in circumstances 
which mirror that of the aforementioned cases; yet its interpretation has been ‘unacceptably 
narrow.’965 The courts have not listed relationships966 which are inherently imbalanced. 
Arguably the inducement can be inferred from the nature of the potentially coercive 
relationship.967 Benedet and Grant conducted an examination of the case law under this 
section which revealed an ‘overly rigid’ interpretation,968 with just 14 of 54 cases 
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960 2011 ONCJ 213,85 CR (6th) 195 [DT] see also Benedet & Grant (n 764).  
961 Benedet & Grant (n 784) 23.  
962 Ibid.  
963 2012 ONSC 2166 [25] 
964 Benedet & Grant (n 951).  
965 Shilton & Derrick (n 796) 122. 
966 Unlike USA where certain relationships are labelled as inherently coercive, i.e. in a psychiatric facility. 
Benedet & Grant (n 951) 149.  
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168 
 
successfully invoking the section to vitiate consent.969 Just four of those cases related to 
complainants with mental disabilities, two of which found consent was vitiated because of 
the nature of the relationship, and neither explored the section in detail.970 
There are several problems with the law of sexual offences for women with disabilities. 
Misunderstandings of social norms can lead to ‘consent’,971 or some complainants ‘may 
exhibit compliant behaviour’ for rewards.972 Hence, the difficulty with the subjective 
consent standard is amplified where a complainant with a mental disability fails to 
recognise an exploitative situation or where they have difficulty in recalling,973 or 
communicating974 the assault. Presumably section 273.1(2)(b) and (c) were drafted to 
address potential abusive or exploitative experiences. Yet these cases are still the hardest 
sexual assaults to prosecute,975 complainants are still expected to give robust testimonies 
and stand up to leading questioning.976 The focus remains excessively on the complainant’s 
actions and credibility. These are open to rigorous cross examination that may lead to 
inconsistencies which allow stereotypical preconceptions to distort the facts of the sexual 
assault. 
As alluded to at the beginning of this section, the law is in a constant battle to protect 
people with disabilities from harm whilst affording them with the autonomy to engage in 
sexual activity. The reluctance to invoke the ‘incapacity’ argument suggests that the focus 
is on the latter. Yet in light of the above analysis, it must be asked whether such a 
preference is as beneficial as it may initially seem. Indeed, persons with mental disabilities 
should be entitled to exercise their right to sexual autonomy, but it is undeniable that such 
individuals are at a higher risk of exploitation due to the current distribution of resilience. 
As Benedet and Grant argue, sexual autonomy ‘is a hollow value when there is no safe 
environment for it to be exercised.’977 Moreover as they rightly suggest, protection from 
 
969 Ibid 144. 
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exploitation should be a prerequisite for ‘any meaningful autonomy.’978 We should 
revolutionize our understanding of autonomy, by instead thinking of protection from harm 
as a ‘precondition’ rather than ‘contradiction’ to autonomous decision making.979  
Although there is potential scope for this section to be expanded to other complainants, it 
would unlikely be successful. If we were to reformulate our approach to general sexual 
offences to consider consent in the context of power imbalances, it is likely we would 
encounter difficulties. For example, if we were to consider this section with regards to 
sexual activity between a young capable woman and her employer, the actions and 
behaviour of the complainant would be scrutinized. Because this section is still 
underpinned by the liberal legal subject, arguably, expectations would be placed on the 
independent free woman to act in a certain way, disregarding the situational circumstances. 
Hence, the result would arguably be the same despite the change of wording.  As the 
Canadian approach is still based on the ‘ideal victim’ through an autonomy lens, we can 
argue that there are very few lessons to be learned for England and Wales.   
 
8. CONCLUSION- ANY LESSONS TO BE LEARNED? 
There are many positives to the Canadian legislative approach to sexual assault law. The 
progressiveness of their approaches to governing sexual relations can be commended. 
Unfortunately, their efforts appear to be piecemeal and not properly implemented. On 
paper, the introduction of the affirmative consent model, places women as equal partners in 
sexual relations. Affording the right to revoke consent at any time, and discouraging 
reliance on ‘implied consent’, is most definitely a welcome reform. However, as earlier 
discussed, these provisions have done little, if anything, to challenge stereotypes regarding 
sexual relations and ‘the ideal victim’. Moreover, the subjective nature of consent and the 
failure to define non-consent,980 places an excessive focus on the complainant rather than 
examining the behaviour of the accused; this allows for stereotypes to distort the 
situational circumstances of the alleged assault. Despite legal errors in many decisions, ‘the 
majority of sexual assault acquittals will not be appealed.’981 Moreover it appears that 
arrest, indictment and conviction rates remained unchanged in the years following the 
 
978 Ibid 245. 
979 Ibid. 
980 Benedet & Grant (n 784) 7.  
981 Ruparelia (n 824) 170. 
170 
 
reforms.982 The statistics published in 2017, revealed that between 2009 and 2014 
reporting, prosecutions and convictions have remained very low.983 Therefore it is unlikely 
that the affirmative consent model would address any of the issues in England and Wales 
as identified in the previous chapters.  
We should, however, commend the introduction of ‘incapacity’ as an umbrella term that 
encapsulates all forms of ‘incapacitation’. Using this term to capture a broad range of 
situations where one may be deemed incapable of consenting, carries a subliminal message 
of equality. Instead of segregating, and thereby isolating, groups of individuals based on 
common characteristics, the Canadian approach has instead acknowledged that there may 
be circumstances where any individual may lack capacity to freely engage in sexual 
activity and therefore deserve extra protection. In essence, the law is recognising that we 
are all free and capable agents, despite any pre-existing medical conditions, where 
autonomy can be exercised without restraint. However, as we have seen through its 
interpretation stereotypical attitudes and othering is still present despite removing the 
grouping of incapacities based on characteristics from the legislation. Therefore, the 
interpretation and application of the approach mirrors that of England and Wales revealing 
similar issues due to this promotion of autonomy. 
Yet, for autonomy to be meaningful,984 it must be exercised in a safe environment free 
from exploitation. Arguably this is what section 272(1)(2)(b) commendably intends to 
achieve. As earlier explored, it appears that because of the lack of a capacity threshold or 
definition, prosecutors have not relied on this subsection often. Moreover, judicial 
interpretation and application of the term has been extremely ‘rigid’, reserving its use for 
when a complainant is either ’unconscious’985 at the time of the assault or where they ‘have 
no knowledge or understanding of sexual mechanics’. Even if a capacity threshold was 
formally determined it is unlikely that the problems will be resolved. Within the 
requirement for voluntary affirmative consent, the law expects a complainant to be aware, 
capable and autonomous in both their decision making and risk avoidance. Hence it fails to 
 
982 Illene Sideman & Susan Vickers, ‘The Second Wave: An Agenda for the Next Thirty Years of Rape Law 
Reform’ [2005] 38 Suffolk University Law Review 467-491, 468 
983 ‘All sexual assaults reported to and substantiated by police from 2009 to 2014, less than half (43%) 
resulted in a criminal charge being laid by police, around one in five (21%) went to court, and slightly 
over 1 in 10 (12%) led to a criminal conviction over the six-year period’ available at 
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2017001/article/54870-eng.pdf 
984 Benedet & Grant (n 916) 245. 
985 Benedet (n 549) 442. 
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recognise our universal vulnerability to harm. It is likely that a threshold would be set too 
high, based on stereotypical notions and reinforcing myths and gender behaviour 
expectations. 
Although the sexual assault laws have been described as ‘quite adequate,’986 they are far 
from ideal. As will be argued in the next section, reframing and reforming the law based on 
the same concept of autonomy and the ideal ‘active subject’,987 will do little or nothing to 
change how it is implemented and applied. The law needs to be reformed, in light of a 
more nuanced concept of vulnerability. As Benedet and Grant argue the Canadian reforms 
have failed to ‘reflect the subtle ways in which power operates and how relationships of 
inequality can be exploited.’988 This theory offers us that opportunity. It acknowledges our 
inherent risk of harm, our dependency and need for resilience, our ever-fluctuating state of 
capacity and our need for protection. We should examine how sexual relations work in 
every situation, not just where the subjects meet the ideal autonomous independent criteria. 
We must examine how consent was obtained, in what environment and under what 
conditions- not just accept that it was given and ignore the pertinent potentially 
exploitative actions.   
From an in-depth evaluation of the Canadian sexual assault laws, it is argued that nothing 
substantial can be taken and adapted into the law of England and Wales. We might learn 
from their terminology by instead describing those with ‘mental disorders’ as having a 
‘mental disability’. We might also welcome the umbrella term of incapacity and commend 
their vitiation of consent where a relationship of power or authority existed; but a clear 
revision and expansion of these protections would be needed. The removal of the term rape 
and replacement with a three tiered ‘sexual assault’ offence might reignite the real rape 
myth. As Sideman & Vickers suggested, there is an ambivalence about placing sanctions 
on ‘non-violent’ sexual assault without any visible injuries, and has argued that prosecutors 
and police are now confused about the boundary line between sex and rape.989 In light of 
the above analysis, it is fair to state that the implementation of these apparently progressive 
laws has unfortunately fallen short, decisions continue to be distorted by stereotypes, hence 
victims of sexual assault are not afforded proper protection. Arguably this is because the 
roots of the legal response have retained a focus on autonomy. Perhaps the principal lesson 
 
986 Vandervort (n 792) 440. 
987 Benedet & Grant (n 951) 131. 
988 Ibid 132.  
989 Sideman & Vickers (n 982).  
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to be learned is that when reforms are made, the foundations upon which they lay must be 
changed too.  
From the analysis of the progressive reforms in Canada, and the legislative reforms in 
England and Wales as explored in the previous chapters, the ‘black letter law’ approach to 
reform is failing. Legislation alone is unlikely to significantly change the way in which we 
respond to sexual offences, particularly, when those reforms are based on the promotion of 
autonomy which is unachievable. Therefore, what we require is widespread systemic 
change, both to the law but also to our understanding of our ontological and social 
existence. We must therefore look in depth at the theory of vulnerability to determine what 
it can offer in terms of changing our perspectives and reforming the legal response to 
sexual offences. The following chapter will analyse what a legal response might look like 
through a theory of vulnerability.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Reforming the law- the creation of an ‘unjustified sexual relations’ offence. 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
As was argued in the previous chapter, the Canadian approach has inadequately challenged 
the underpinning issues within the legislative approach to criminalising sexual assault. The 
‘affirmative consent model’ fails to tackle the inherent biases contained within the law and 
continues to place undue focus upon the complainant and her behaviour. Similarly, the 
‘capacity umbrella’ approach, while progressive in principle, has failed in practice to 
effectively change the hierarchy of protections and attributions of blame because of the 
conceptual underpinnings of autonomy. 
The aim of this chapter is to consider how to reform the law using a vulnerability theory. 
To do this, it will examine Herring and Dempsey’s argument that sexual penetration 
requires justification. It will build on these foundations to develop a new offence, titled 
‘unjustified sexual relations’ that reflects the vulnerability of everyone and affords equal 
protections to all individuals.  
Section 1.1 of this chapter will succinctly summarise the key issues that an autonomy focus 
brings.  The focus of this section will be on whether it will be possible to remove 
autonomy from the core of sexual assault law considering its inextricable links with 
consent.  Section 1.2 will then consider the true importance and role consent currently has. 
Throughout this thesis it has been suggested that an autonomy focus carries individual 
responsibility, othering and the retrospective response from the law. As has been argued an 
autonomy focus carries the presumption of capacity and consent. Instead, as this thesis has 
contended, a vulnerability lens requires an active and responsive State that does not 
differentiate between individuals and shifts the focus from the complainant onto the actions 
of the defendant. In section 3 we must consider what a legal response might look like 
through a vulnerability lens. For this we will look to Jonathan Herring and Michelle 
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Madden Dempsey’s suggestions that attempts to reimagine how we perceive sexual 
relations.  
Sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 will explore how Madden and Herring’s arguments can be 
expanded and developed through a theory of vulnerability, rethinking how we understand 
harm. These sections will advance their arguments and build on their vision by suggesting 
how a legal response would be framed in legislation in section 3. These sections will 
explore the potential actus reus, mens rea and defences of a new offence through their 
suggestions and a theory of vulnerability.  
To conclude in section 4, it will be argued that to achieve systemic change and introduce 
progressive reforms, we must completely reconsider how we perceive sexual relations. The 
conclusion will summarise the legal reform suggested and address the likely challenges 
ahead.   
 
1.1 IF AUTONOMY IS A MYTH- WHAT DOES THAT MEAN FOR CONSENT 
IN SEXUAL RELATIONS? 
What this thesis argues is that the attempts to reform sexual assault legislation have been 
largely futile because they have all been based on the same legal theoretical underpinning, 
namely the autonomous liberal legal subject.  As explored fully in chapter 2, the 
autonomous legal subject is the self-determining capable individual, fully independent and 
free to make choices without any outside inferences. Basing the law on an unrealistic 
notion on freedom will may lead to victim blame and individual responsibilisation. Such a 
framework places excessive pressure on individuals to avoid harm, to avoid being raped 
and to self-protect. As we have seen in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 the current autonomy focus of 
the law, and indeed its uncertainty and therefore malleability lends us to scrutinize 
complainants and blame victims for failing to exercise their autonomy to avoid harm. 
What is therefore required is a complete uprooting of the current autonomous liberal legal 
foundations of the law. The pitfalls and promises for the decentring and potential unseating 
of autonomy will now be explored. Considering the inextricable links between consent and 
autonomy it must be asked whether vulnerability and autonomy can coexist, and indeed 
how the law might be reformed in this light. Attempts so far to achieve this balance have 
not been successful, and therefore we look to vulnerability to reform the law. Autonomy 
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has arguably become too tainted to play such a key role in sexual offences law. But it must 
be asked how might the law look without autonomy at its forefront? What shape might the 
legislation take if vulnerability were at the core? How might we perceive harm when 
protecting autonomy is no longer the aim of legislation? All of which will be explored 
below.  
 
1.2 THE TIES OF CONSENT AND AUTONOMY 
Consent was applied and understood in ‘its ordinary meaning’990 until the Sexual Offences 
Act 2003 introduced its statutory definition. The definition, which is still in use today, is 
based on liberal notions of capacity and free agreement.991 The concept and its definition 
are malleable and open to manipulation.992 Consequently, its application is inconsistent 
which leads to different results in like cases.993 One of the key issues with an autonomy 
and consent focus is the apparent presumption of capacity and consent, leading to the 
excessive focus on the complainant’s behaviour.  
For sexual offences, it is evident that the law has traditionally protected vulnerabilities.994 
As aptly noted by Marvel, the US laws in response to rape and other sexual offences 
appear to be framed in a way to protect defendants from false allegations and unwarranted 
prosecutions:995  
the legal system has emphasized not the actions of the accused, but the victim’s 
character, behavior, and words. Rather than examining the actions of the accused to 
establish the presence of a crime, as with other forms of assault, the focus shifts to 
determine whether or not the victim consented or led on the perpetrator on…996 
Marvel then states the effect is that the laws presume female sexual availability resulting in 
the legal presumption of what she calls ‘perpetual consent.’997 This analysis is applicable in 
England and Wales too. The entire offence of rape rests on the non-existence of consent. 
Indeed, as has been highlighted through an examination of case law, often when capacity is 
 
990 R v Olugboja [1982] 1 QB 332 
991 As discussed in chapter 3.  
992 Tadros (n 48). 
993 Bethany Simpson, ‘Why has the concept of consent proven so difficult to clarify?’ [2016] 80(2) The 
Journal of Criminal Law 97-123, 122 
994 A full exploration of the law can be found in chapter 3 
995 Marvel (n 18) 2042.  
996 Ibid 2043. 
997 Ibid 2043. 
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shown consent is often presumed.998 Adducing evidence to the contrary often resorts to a 
‘he said she said’ debate where the credibility of the complainant is often scrutinized 
through evidence adduced regarding her behaviour before during and after the assault that 
does not conform to society’s  perception of a credible and rational victim.999  However, 
with such a key transformative role in law in society, it must be asked whether we can 
envisage a legal response that does not solely rely on consent.  
 
1.3 THE ROLE OF CONSENT 
Considering the inextricable links between autonomy and consent, the role of consent 
through a vulnerability lens must be considered. First, we must determine the current role 
of consent to highlight its actual power as the central concept of sexual offences. This 
section will further highlight the problematic nature of a consent focus. 
Placing excessive focus upon a subjective internal concept such as consent is arguably an 
unreliable emphasis.  As Wertheimer suggests, consent must be both internal and external 
to become morally transformative and make A’s actions to B ‘permissible.’1000 The 
inherent flaw with consent is this disparate focus upon the actions of the victim whether a 
subjective or objective approach is used. As will be explored below, many academics 
disagree as to the ‘magic of consent.’1001 We must consider these arguments to determine 
whether consent is as powerful and adequate a concept as the law currently affords.  
As Munro rightly states, using consent to distinguish between what is right or wrong places 
a ‘disproportionate focus upon the will and behaviour of the complainant rather than upon 
the conduct and intentions of the perpetrator.’1002 The use of consent differs vastly from its 
original intentions of providing women with control over intercourse,1003 and other sexual 
relations. Instead, as Tadros contends, such a focus is problematic as it encourages an 
examination of the complainant’s conduct and sexual history rather than the actions of the 
defendant.1004 By questioning the state of the complainant’s mind, described as a 
 
998 As was discussed in detail in chapter 3 
999 Smith & Skinner (n 235) 458. 
1000 Wertheimer, A., Consent to Sexual Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 146 
1001 As Hurd explains, consent is ‘magical’ as it affords rights to others, delineating the boundaries of what is 
permissible through this ‘remarkable power of personhood’. Heidi M. Hurd, ‘The Moral Magic of Consent’ 
[1996] 2 Legal Theory 121-146, 121 
1002 Munro (n 107) 20.  
1003 MacKinnon (n 108) 174.  
1004 Tadros (n 48) 514.  
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‘subjective mental state’,1005 consent looks for internal evidence i.e. their consent; the 
exploitative actions of the defendant are distorted. This concentration upon the conduct of 
the complainant allows stereotypes and myths to distract jurors from the legal question.1006 
Therefore, complainants often meet many barriers when attempting to access justice. 1007  
Yet, some liberal academics argue that it is only through consent that sexual offending can 
be regulated properly.1008 The importance is on the free choice of the individual to consent 
to sexual activities rather than a paternalistic regulation of sexual conduct.1009 As Hurd 
states: ‘if autonomy resides in the ability to will the alteration of moral rights and duties, 
and if consent is normatively significant precisely because it constitutes an expression of 
autonomy, then it must be the case the consent is to exercise the will.’1010 Considering this 
close tie between consent and autonomy,1011 those who do not fit the criteria for either will 
fall outside the realm of protection. Arguably, the excessive focus on consent creates an all 
or nothing approach which fails to take into consideration alternative ‘outside 
pressures’1012 that may distort the true meaning of certain agreements.  
The concept of consent is indeed very powerful, playing a ‘legitimating role’1013 to 
transform the illegal to legal or the impermissible to permissible. Supporters of the consent 
model endorse the concept as an essential basis on which the laws regarding sexual 
offences are formulated regarding it as ‘morally transformative.’1014 Other academics 
support consent as a general concept for law making- for example Heidi Hurd’s 
perspective is evident in the very title of her article ‘The Moral Magic of consent.’1015 
 
1005 Hurd (n 1001) 121. 
1006 Temkin & Krahé (n 2); Loiuse Ellison & Vanessa E. Munro, ‘A stranger in the Bushes, or an Elephant in 
the Room? Critical reflections upon received rape myth wisdom in the context of a mock jury study’, Fall 
[2010] 13(4) New Criminal Law Review 781-801;  Ellison & Munro (n 295); Finch & Munro (n 274); Munro, 
V. & Finch E., ‘Juror Stereotypes and Blame attribution in rape cases involving intoxicants’ [2005] 45 
British Journal of Criminology 25-38; Ellison & Munro (n 340).  
1007 As discussed in Chapter 2 on rape myths. 
1008 Knight (n 72) 138.   
1009 Ibid. 
1010 Hurd (n 1001). 
1011 Wertheimer (n 1000) ch 6 
1012 MacKinnon (n 108) 174. 
1013 Robin West, ‘Sex, Law and Consent’ [2008] Gerogetown law faculty working papers 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1073&context=fwps_papers accessed 
online on 01.12.2016 
1014 Wertheimer (n 1000) 119. 
1015 Hurd (n 1001).  
178 
 
Within her discussion, the focus is on the so called ‘transformative nature’1016 of consent to 
make immoral acts accepted ones through the exercise of autonomous decision making.   
The actual power of consent to make ‘the painful pleasurable’,1017 and to ensure actions are 
justified, is however, doubtful. Such a delegation of power to this ‘internal 
phenomenon’1018 distorts the situational contexts in which consent might be given or 
indeed taken. In essence, consent carries a significant burden; the concept is simply asked 
too much. As Schulhofer similarly argues ‘consent is far from voluntary when given in 
response to extortionate threats or the persistent sexual demands of a woman’s doctor, 
lawyer, or psychiatrist.’1019 There may however be other reasons why consent is given or 
where it is given to a non-typically pleasurable act. But these reasons are not represented in 
the normative force of consent alone. Instead they act as background information 
informing that consent. What is instead suggested is that consent, together with other 
reasons for justification for an act, must be considered together. 
Hence, focusing solely on consent as the distinction between sex and rape may paint an 
unreliable picture. It suggests that sex is only criminal when it is non-consensual,1020 which 
does not identify the circumstances in which consent was apparently ignored. The law of 
rape presents ‘consent as free exercise of sexual choice under conditions of equality of 
power without exposing the underlying structure of constraint and disparity.’1021 
Unfortunately, its purpose is not realistic or achievable, we ask too much of the lone 
concept consent without providing stabilisers to support such a task.  
Herring and Dempsey have similarly questioned the power of the role of consent.1022 They 
distinguish between the effect of normative requests and consent or non- consent to 
penetration.1023 They suggest that a woman’s request not to be penetrated creates an 
additional reason for non-penetration carrying ‘normative force’. Whereas consent does 
not create additional reasons not to penetrate therefore carrying with ‘no normative force 
whatsoever.’1024 Non-consent therefore does not ‘add to or alter the reasons which already 
 
1016 Paul Roberts, ‘Philosophy, Feinberg, Codification and Consent’ [2001] 5 Buffalo Criminal law review 
173-25, 237 
1017 Knight (n 72) 138.  
1018 Jesse Wall, ‘Justifying and Excusing Sex’ [2019] 13 Criminal law and Philosophy 283-307, 284 
1019 Schulhofer (n 73). 
1020 Herring & Dempsey (n 99) 34 
1021 Herring (n 68) 54.  
1022 Herring & Dempsey (n 99) 30. 
1023 Ibid 33. 
1024 Ibid. 
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exist against sexual penetration.’1025 They go on to further explain the difficulties that non 
consent creates for evidential reasons. They state considering non-consent is the 
requirement for a conviction, and non-consent means a lack of something, evidential rules 
should not require a complainant to demonstrate anything.1026 This obviously creates 
difficulties in prosecuting an offence of rape where evidential rules require a complainant 
to prove she requested not to be penetrated within a legislative framework which merely 
requires lack of consent.1027 Moreover, the lack of a demonstration of non-consent may be 
used by defence barristers and jurors to deny the assault.  
Even at its strongest form, as Herring and Dempsey suggest, consent alone is still 
inadequate. In its ‘richest sense’ considering an individual who is ‘socially empowered’ 
giving voluntary free and fully informed consent, can only have the effect of ‘granting an 
exclusionary permission.’1028 Exclusionary permission is described as giving the penetrator 
the options not to conform to reasons against sexual penetration. Yet where an individual 
cannot give the most rich consent, which arguably is never achievable, Herring and 
Dempsey suggest that consent will not bear its ‘full normative force’, as the ‘reasons 
affected by the woman’s consent will be limited: it will not extend to all the reasons 
grounded in her self-interest’.1029 Arguably, the problems with consent may also be 
because it lays within an autonomy framework. If we accept the above problems with a 
consent-based approach, we must ask how we can progress without consent at the core of 
sexual relations. We must determine whether it is possible and practical and what role 
consent might play. The argument is not that consent need be eradicated, but the focus 
should be shifted onto our shared inherent vulnerability. Herring and Dempsey argue that 
consent to sexual penetration is not enough and instead requires further justification. The 
following sections will explore their argument to determine why penetration requires more 
than just mere consent and how that position can be justified through a vulnerability lens.  
 
 
 
 
1025 Ibid. 
1026 Ibid. 
1027 Herring & Dempsey (n 99) 34. 
1028 Ibid 35. 
1029 Ibid 36. 
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2. MOVING FORWARD, RETHINKING THE LEGAL RESPONSE.   
Having argued that consent is not enough on its own, the alternative must now be 
considered. To achieve our aims and to realise the key elements of a vulnerability theory, 
we must completely reimagine sexual relations. To do that, we look to Herring and 
Dempsey’s arguments that sexual penetration requires justification. Their position starts 
from a completely different point, where sex is not a presumed good for individuals. As 
will be explored below, starting from this point, using Herring and Dempsey’s arguments, 
can help address some of the issues that an autonomy and consent focus bring. From this 
standpoint there are many implications, many of which require a reimagination of our 
current legal response and how we conceptualise harm. Moreover, through a vulnerability 
theory, Herring and Dempsey’s arguments can be developed further and expanded on to 
explore what a legal response might look like when both lenses are combined.  
 
2.1 IS SEXUAL PENETRATION GOOD?   
Both Herring and Dempsey have advocated a reformulation of our understanding of sexual 
penetration. It is currently accepted that sexual penetration is good and not prima facie 
wrong. Most legal reforms have been based on the ‘orthodox view’1030 that generally sex is 
something that is desired, desirable and good, and it is only the lack of consent that makes 
sexual penetration wrong or potentially harmful. Dempsey and Herring list some of the 
many supporters of this orthodox view including Victor Tadros, John Gardner and Sharon 
Campbell.1031 These supporters suggest there is no reason not to have sex or against 
penetration,1032 in that we can presume sexual penetration is permissible.1033 There are 
significant moral and legal ramifications with this view. If we presume sexual penetration 
is good and generally permissible and welcomed as Wall suggests, a defendant is therefore 
‘engaged in a presumptively permissive activity.’1034 Therefore, ‘he or she has no need to 
seek permission to act, nor any need to act for any particular set of reasons.’1035 From this 
starting point, arguably, it makes it very difficult for a complainant to demonstrate that the 
 
1030 Dempsey & Herring (n 54) 468.  
1031 Ibid. 
1032 Ibid 468. 
1033 Wall (n 1018) 289. 
1034 Ibid 291. 
1035 Ibid. 
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penetration was wrong, and that the defendant’s actions were wrong. Arguably, starting 
from the point that penetration is good suggests the existence of perpetual consent. The 
presumption of this existence of perpetual consent then acts as a justification for the 
defendant’s actions or a reasonable belief that their actions were in fact consensual.   
It could be argued that this standpoint is because reforms have been based on this 
promotion of autonomy; suggesting adults are free to engage in sexual relations with 
whoever they choose, and indeed it is their right to sexual autonomy which the legislation 
seeks to protect. The rejection of the State in in the purported private realm to promote 
autonomy has acted to justify this position. Moreover, considering the current legal and 
moral positioning as to sexual penetration as good, the defendant ‘is engaged in a 
presumptively permissive activity, he or she has no need to seek permission to act, nor any 
need to act for any particular set of reasons.’1036 However, Herring and Dempsey have 
suggested convincing reasons for a departure from this norm understanding of sexual 
relations. If this position is accepted, the implications for such a starting point must now be 
considered. Moreover, as will now be explored, the potential of their suggestions can be 
realised even more so through lens of vulnerability. 
 
2.2 SEXUAL PENETRATION REQUIRES JUSTIFICATION 
In their article Herring and Dempsey list reasons why sexual penetration requires 
justification which are explored below. Together with a vulnerability lens, the potential for 
this standpoint for legal reforms will now be critically analysed to determine whether this 
starting point may be beneficial for addressing some of the concerns with the current legal 
response. 
A key element of the argument that penetration is a prima-facie wrong is because of the 
harm and or risk of harm that sexual penetration carries.1037 They suggest that penetration 
is force used against another,1038 and typically any force you use against another person 
must be justified. Their argument suggests that any touching of another person is an 
infringement of that person’s rights and must therefore be justified. 
 
1036 Ibid. 
1037 Herring & Dempsey (n 99) 31. 
1038 Dempsey & Herring (n 54) 474.  
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Moreover, they list many risk factors to justify this claim including physical harm, sexually 
transmitted diseases, psychological harm and pregnancy.1039 Although they accept that not 
every sexual encounter carries those risk of harm, it is enough that an individual be 
exposed to a risk of that harm materialising to require justification. Albeit it is agreed that 
instances where an individual is not exposed to such risks are ‘atypical’,1040 if we view the 
fact that penetration requires justification through a lens of vulnerability, we can further 
strengthen this argument. Moreover, another such criticism of the approach that sexual 
penetration requires justification is ‘somewhat reductivist.’1041 This argument is based on 
the fact that requiring justification for penetration lends to a focus on the physiological 
aspects of rape. Although addressed in Dempsey and Herrings argument,1042 if we were to 
view the need for justification of penetration through a lens of vulnerability, we would be 
including the qualitative nature of rape. To address both issues though would require us to 
reconceptualise our understanding of harm to the individual in sexual offences which is 
discussed in the following section. Before considering this, we must consider the other 
reason why both Herring and Dempsey suggest penetration is a prima facie wrong 
requiring justification.  
They suggest that the social meaning of sexual penetration can be construed as negative 
therefore requiring further justification.1043 They have suggested that the social meaning of 
penetration constitutes a violation of the woman. Herring and Dempsey have argued that ‘it 
is an act through which she is rendered less powerful, less human, whilst the male is 
rendered more powerful and more human.’1044 They refer to the derogatory nature of the 
language used to describe the act of penetration ‘fuck, bang, screw, rail, drill, smash, hit it, 
hump, let her have it, poke, shaft, slay, etc.’1045  
The reasons listed are used to support their argument that even where justified, sexual 
penetration is still a prima-facie wrong. They coin this a justified prima-facie wrong rather 
 
1039 Herring & Dempsey (n 99) 32. 
1040 Ibid. 
1041 They refer to John Gardener’s criticism of their approach as reductivist. Michelle Madden Dempsey and 
Jonathan Herring, ‘Why Sexual Penetration Requires Justification’ [2007] 27 (3) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 467-491, 470 
1042 They justify their ‘reductivist approach’ of focussing on the physiological aspects of penetration by 
referring to the opportunities that such a lens provides; it allows them to question the wrongfulness of forms 
of penetration that may have otherwise not been recognised. Moreover, they refer to the fact that the law 
criminalizes the physiological act of penetration and not ‘in terms of context’. Dempsey & Herring (n 54) 
471. 
1043 Ibid 482. 
1044 Ibid 471. 
1045 Ibid 485. 
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than an all things considered justified act.1046 They suggest that the act of penetration, even 
when it is justified ‘leaves a moral residue of regret.’1047 Unfortunately, this is the point of 
departure of this analysis, despite the authors’ repeated deterrence from this temptation.1048 
Although it is accepted that there may be negative social connotations with the act of 
penetration, many of which are listed in their article,1049 it is not accepted that these exist 
when justified. As identified by Herring and Demspey, the act of penetration can be a 
positive relationship confirming, love sharing and emotional experience where it is 
justified.1050 Therefore, it will instead be argued that here an act of penetration is justified 
in light of all the circumstances, it will be considered a justified act not a prima-facie 
wrong that is justified. Their argument is appreciated and understood, but this point of 
departure is necessary to acknowledge as it should be accepted that the act of penetration 
can be justified all things considered. Perhaps a middle ground can be accepted. As Wall 
explains perhaps where a defendant relies on his misguided understanding that the 
penetration was justified, we could accept that his conduct was excused rather than 
justified.1051  
Although this is somewhat of a departure from Herring and Dempsey’s argument, the key 
concepts and elements of their theoretical standpoint remains endorsed. Both Herring and 
Dempsey rely on this idea of the social meaning of penetration as a strong basis for the 
justification required for penetration. However, if we combine this argument with the 
theory of vulnerability, we no longer require this emphasis and hence the point of 
departure is acceptable. This will however require us to reconceptualise the meaning of 
harm through a theory of vulnerability.  
 
2.3 RETHINKING HARM THROUGH VULNERABILITY 
The above sections have addressed a potential starting point to reimagine sexual offences 
using Herring and Dempsey’s conceptualisation of sexual penetration. This starting point 
has many implications, and arguably its potential can be only be fully realised when it is 
coupled with a theory of vulnerability. This will therefore require us to continue to 
 
1046 Ibid 487. 
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challenge our traditional understandings. In this section, we look at what harm is, and 
begin to reimagine what it could be through a theory of vulnerability. There is not yet any 
substantial literature exploring the conceptualisation of harm through a theory of 
vulnerability. This section will therefore attempt to reimagine how harm might be 
perceived to be through a lens of vulnerability.  
As explored in chapter 1, it is quite difficult to conceptualise what the harm of sexual 
offences is to each individual. The law appears to conceptualise the harm of non-
consensual sexual activity as a violation of sexual autonomy. Some victims might 
conceptualise their experience of sexual assault as a denial of their autonomous right to say 
no, although there may be a varied response and experience of rape. Equally then it could 
be argued considering the inextricable links with consent that the infringement of 
autonomy cannot be accurately reflect the harm of rape. As Rubenfeld supports this and 
suggests: 
‘Autonomy is the sort of thing that’s “infringed.” Rape is not a mere “infringement.” We 
might as well explain torture as an infringement of the victim’s “bodily autonomy”—his 
right to do what he likes with his own body. Some evils go beyond the infringement of 
autonomy. Their wrongfulness and harm cannot be captured in terms of non-consent, even 
though consent will typically be lacking.’1052  
Moreover, if we are arguing to remove autonomy from the core of our response to sexual 
offences, we must consider how harm might be perceived. Considering the key concepts of 
the vulnerability theory as detailed in chapter 1 and throughout this thesis, we can accept 
that our vulnerability is inherent, universal and also particular. At different moments in our 
lifetime we may experience that vulnerability in a different light depending on our 
resilience at that time and the situational circumstances in which we are acting. Rather than 
being responsibilised to avoid harm, instead we could demand that individuals accept their 
moral duty not to exploit others vulnerability. It could be that we can conceptualise harm 
as an exploitation of our vulnerability. The knowledge and awareness that an individual 
was experiencing their vulnerability and knowingly exploiting that vulnerability. 
Moreover, this would create a responsibility on the State to provide resilience to avoid 
instances of the exploitation of vulnerability.  
The harm of sexual offences is also experienced on an individual level and the focus on 
this is therefore arguably justified. However, we also recognise that one of the aims of the 
 
1052 Rubenfeld (n 148) 1425. 
185 
 
vulnerability theory is to shift away from a focus on the individual onto the responsibility 
of the State and its institutions. Together with this understanding of the harm of the 
exploitation of vulnerability, we could consider the violation of someone’s vulnerability as 
it is experienced in society. As Brison notes, that all women’s lives are restricted by sexual 
violence is indisputable1053 societal harm. As Scholz explains, Brison argues that some of 
the harm experienced in the aftermath of rape and sexual assault is shaped by the social 
constructs in which we live.1054 She further explains that ‘as a result of their victimization, 
they often lose their jobs, their homes, their spouses— in addition to a great deal of money, 
time, sleep, self-esteem, and peace of mind.’1055  Like Herring and Dempsey note, sexual 
penetration is perceived to be a degrading devaluation of a woman through its social 
meaning.1056 We could then impose a collective responsibility as well as an individual 
responsibility not to exploit one another. Through this reconceptualization, we can demand 
that individuals owe each other, and society a duty not to exploit each-others’ 
vulnerability. In terms of sexual offences, if we suggest that sexual penetration carries with 
it the potential for exploitation of vulnerability, we can further strengthen Herring and 
Dempsey’s argument that sexual penetration requires justification. Moreover, as will be 
explored below, we could build on this argument and suggest that considering the risk of 
exploitation of vulnerability, any sexual touching, not just penetration, requires 
justification.  
 
3. THE LEGAL RESPONSE IF SEXUAL PENETRATION REQUIRES 
JUSTIFICATION THROUGH A VULNERABILITY LENS. 
Herring and Dempsey have suggested that a legal response to sexual offences would 
require reformulation if we start from a point where sexual penetration requires 
justification. This section will explore the strength of their argument where it is coupled 
with a vulnerability lens.  In the above sections we have detailed the key elements of 
Dempsey and Herring’s position. Although in their article, they state that their concern is 
not directly criminalisation.1057 They do, however, begin to suggest how a legal response 
 
1053 Brison, S.J., Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of self (Princeton: Princeton University Press:2001) 
chapter 1, 18 
1054 Sally J Scholz,’ Book Reviews’ [2004] 9(8) Violence Against Women, 1032–1036, 1034 
1055 Brison (n 1053) 11. 
1056 Dempsey & Herring (n 54) 488.  
1057 Ibid 467. 
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might be framed where sexual penetration requires justification. Building on these points, 
this section will now use the above-mentioned conceptualisation of harm with the aims of a 
theory of vulnerability to determine the potential legal response to sexual offences. 
 
3.1 THE ACTUS REUS 
The starting point for any criminal wrong deserving of sanction is determining the actus 
reus. We must look at an act and determine whether it is a wrong that is deserving of 
criminal sanction. It is that wrong act or the ‘actus reus’ that requires criminalisation. 
Presently, the actus reus of rape is composed of two elements, which is contained within s1 
of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The first element requires there to be penetration of the 
anus or vagina by a penis. Crucially, the second element is that penetration takes place 
without consent.  
Herring and Dempsey began to suggest reforms to the actus reus of rape which only 
requires  there to be penetration of the vagina or anus.1058  They have suggested that the 
actus reus of an offence could start from this point if we agree that it is not ‘justifiable… 
due to the restricted normative scope of consent’1059 or the considerations regarding the 
social meaning which consent is incompetent to affect.’1060 From a vulnerability 
perspective, it is agreed that consent is inadequate, and therefore this is a justified starting 
point. Moreover, considering our universal and particular vulnerability, the position that 
penetration requires justification fits neatly within our theoretical framework.  
If we start from a position where the act itself is deemed to require justification, 
immediately our focus is shifted away from the complainant and onto the defendant. As 
explained by Herring and Dempsey, this is true of many offences including common law 
assault and Actual Bodily harm for example. It is presumed that the touching of another or 
imposition of physical force on another is wrong, unless there are reasons to justify that 
act. Generally, if someone strikes another, we would consider their actions wrong, and we 
would scrutinize their behaviour and their reasoning behind the strike. Therefore, we 
would not examine the behaviour of the victim in that situation unless reliance was sought 
on self-defence.  
 
1058 Herring & Dempsey (n 99) 42. 
1059 Ibid. 
1060 Ibid. 
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The actus reus would therefore no longer contain ‘without consent’ and would instead 
focus on the physical act of penetration. This position would recognise universal and 
inherent vulnerability of all individuals. Moreover, as a prima-facie wrong carrying risk of 
disease, physical harm and exploitation, the legal framework would reflect the potential 
harm of the act. The wrongdoing would therefore no longer rest on the lack of consent and 
would instead rely merely on the proof of penetration. 
To build on this point, it might be possible to develop the actus reus of the offence to also 
include any sexual touching. Herring and Dempsey’s argument focuses on sexual 
penetration. This may be for a range of reasons, including the explanation that the force 
required for penetration is the same as any other force onto another that requires 
justification or because of their argument that there is a negative social meaning attached to 
penetration. However, through a lens of vulnerability, and therefore widening the scope of 
the potential harms and the potential exposure to the risk of harms, it could perhaps be 
suggested that sexual touching carries the risk of exploitation. This argument may 
therefore be justifiably extended to cover all forms of sexual interactions, arguing that any 
intimate touching is a prima facie wrong and therefore requires justification. This 
extension may be more difficult to support, as the requirements for justification are 
admittedly not as robust as that for penetration. Nonetheless, the risk of exploitation of 
vulnerability still exists, and therefore warrants this development of the actus reus to cover 
other incidents beyond penetration. The current definitions of sexual as contained within 
the sexual offences act would be sufficient to cover these circumstances.1061    
Therefore, through the lens of vulnerability and the requirement of justification for 
penetration, the actus reus of a new offence would be the penetration, by a penis or other 
object, or the sexual touching of another. It would be open to a defendant to deny that 
penetration or sexual touching took place and therefore deny the actus reus of the offence. 
Moreover, the prosecution would have to prove that the penetration or sexual touching 
took place together with the mens rea of the offence.  
 
 
 
 
1061 For the meaning of sexual see s78 Sexual Offences Act 2003 
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3.2 THE MENS REA AND THE POTENTIAL DEFENCES 
The current mens rea of the offence of rape is that the defendant did not reasonably believe 
that the complainant consented.1062 Considering the removal of consent from the actus reus 
of the offence this would also require reform. As Herring and Dempsey were not 
concerned with criminalisation, they have not detailed their perspective on the mens rea of 
a new offence. Perhaps, the mens rea of rape would refer to the facts that a defendant 
knowingly or recklessly exploited the vulnerability of another. If the prosecution could 
prove that penetration or touching took place, they would then need to show that a 
defendant did so with the intention of reckless to the fact, that their actions exploited the 
vulnerability of that individual.  If these elements of the offence are fulfilled, then the 
offence would be satisfied. Therefore, the offence would be fulfilled where a defendant 
was aware or reckless that the penetration or touching exploited the vulnerability of 
another. Arguably then, the actus reus and the mens rea might be more fulfilled with more 
ease. The prosecution would only need to show that the defendant was aware of their 
actions and the potential consequences of their actions. However, there would be a defence 
available to the defendant to suggest that ‘all things considered’ their actions were 
justified.  
 
3.3 EVIDENCE THAT THE COMPLAINANT WAS NOT EXPLOITED  
Departing from Herring and Dempsey’s argument, we can look to the defence as a way to 
suggest that what the defendants touching or penetration, was, all things considered, 
justified. It would be open to a defendant to rely on this defence to demonstrate that their 
actions did not amount to an exploitation of the individual’s vulnerability, and instead they 
were justified in their sexual relations.  As above explored, consent alone would not be 
enough to amount to a justification. As Dempsey and Herring suggest that a defendant 
could demonstrate his penetration was justified which would bear ‘greater normative force’ 
than consent alone.1063 Of course, consent of the complainant could still be considered as 
an element of justification, and therefore form part of a defence rather than the offence of 
 
1062 S1(1)(c) Sexual Offences Act 2003 
1063 Herring & Dempsey (n 99) 42. 
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rape. As earlier explored, consent is problematic because it bears no normative force. 
Herring has also referred to the fact that consent, is merely an exclusionary permission 
given to the defendant, to take consent as an assessment of their well-being.1064 Herring 
argues though, that such consent, given particularly in the heat of the moment, may not in 
fact reflect a true exercise of autonomy.1065 Where the defendant personally gains from 
such an assessment, ‘it is hard to resist the conclusion that D is acting for self-purposes 
rather than in the bests interests of V’.1066 He therefore argues that if a defendant is aware 
that the apparent consent of the victim-survivors ‘does not sit within their deeper values 
and decision’ then arguably, the defendant cannot accept that consent as a genuinely 
autonomous decision. The question must of course then follow, should the Defendant be 
criminally responsible where he is aware that the apparent consent given, is not in fact in 
the best interests of the victim? In an ideal world, both sexual partners should be in equal 
positions both exercising freedom and self-determination. However, where one party may 
be less resilient than another, and the parties start from a somewhat unequal standpoint, is 
it realistic, or even desirable, to have criminal intervention? Arguable it is not, instead the 
criminal law should place different responsibilities on defendants, such as a positive 
obligation not to exploit someone. Take strangers at a party for example, is appropriate for 
D to take stranger’s Vs current consent as being a sufficient assessment of their well-
being? Moreover, the defendant does not know the victim, should we place him in a 
position carrying criminal responsibility if he fails to properly assess the victim’s bests 
interests? Perhaps this leads us to consider the role of the criminal law.  
Can we criminalise a defendant where he might be aware that the consent given, albeit 
valid, is not in the Vs bests interests? We must differentiate between what the criminal law 
considers wrongful and deserving of punishment, to issues of morality. If we were to 
criminalise such behaviour, there is a chance that we would be removing every aspect of 
individual responsibility. So long as a defendant can demonstrate that they did not exploit 
the vulnerability of the V, and that they were justified in their actions, the criminal law 
should not be concerned with whether or not the victim had flourished. This is not and 
should not be the role of the law. Instead, we look to the issues of exploitation, consent and 
justification. That said, when a jury are considering, whether all things considered the 
 
1064  Herring, J., ‘Consent in criminal law: the importance of relationality and responsibility’ in Reed and 
Bohlander (eds) General Defences in Criminal Law 63 
1065 Ibid. 
1066 Ibid. 
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Defendant was justified in their sexual touching, they may look to the victim’s experience 
of the encounter. In doing so, the defendant’s knowledge and awareness of the victim’s 
experience, together with evidence of consent, may help inform their view as to whether a 
defendant’s actions were, all things considered, justified.  
As Wall made reference to Fletcher’s argument that consent ought to be a ‘justificatory 
offence.’1067 This position that justification is not an element of the offence fits well within 
the actus reus and mens rea as suggested above. Consent would act as an integral part of a 
justification for the defendant’s actions. To rely on this defence, consent would need to be 
evidenced. However, as aforementioned, consent alone is not enough to give normative 
force to the actions of the defendant and therefore some other reasons demonstrating 
justification would be required.  
Together with evidence of consent, as Herring and Dempsey argue, a defendant could 
show how his actions were justified and did not dehumanize or downgrade the 
complainant.1068 He could demonstrate how his touching or penetration was welcomed, 
reciprocated and done so where his actions brought about outcomes mutually desirable.  
This would be an optional evidence that could be adduced by a defendant to demonstrate 
justification for their actions.  
Building on this point, together with the requirement of consent, it would be fundamental 
for a defendant to demonstrate that he did not exploit the vulnerability of the complainant. 
This would form a core part of a defence that would need to be evidenced for a defendant’s 
actions to be determined as ‘all things considered, justified.’ Considering our universal and 
constant vulnerability, a defendant would need to be aware at all stages that there is 
potential for an individual’s vulnerability to be exploited at any stage or situation. 
Moreover, with the knowledge that everyone’s vulnerability is also fluid and particular, a 
defendant would need to be conscious of the particular situation in which penetration or 
touching would take place. The legislation might dictate certain circumstances in which it 
would be presumed that a defendant was aware that an individual would be experiencing 
their vulnerability, and therefore it would be for the defendant to disprove that that 
individual in those circumstances had enough resilience at the time, to not be exploited. 
 
1067  Wall (n 1018) 284 citing George P Fletcher Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston and Toronto: Little 
Brown, 1978) 707. 
1068 Herring & Dempsey (n 99) 42. 
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These circumstances could include where a defendant was in a particular position of 
power, trust or authority over the other individual. Moreover, these situations could also 
include circumstances where an individual’s vulnerability was realised where their mental 
functioning was so affected by some factor, whether that be through an intoxicant, 
disability or environmental factor. The defendant could not argue his actions were justified 
where a particular incident arose where it would be clear that the complainant was 
experiencing their particular vulnerability; therefore, it would be presumed that a defendant 
knowingly exploited their vulnerability and therefore cannot justify the penetration or 
sexual touching.  
The above defence suggestions are not intended to be exhaustive, but merely represent 
circumstances upon which a defendant may or may not be justified in their actions 
demonstrating that they did not exploit the vulnerability of the complainant. It is unlikely 
that a list of circumstances would be clearly detailed in legislation. One of the key 
elements of a vulnerability theory is to recognise our inherent, universal and particular 
vulnerabilities that are susceptible to change at any time. Therefore, we are moving away 
from a categorisation of people or groups as particularly vulnerable, and instead are 
encouraging a focus on the situational and a particular circumstances at a moment in time. 
This lens demands that a defendant examine the situational circumstances in which the 
complainant is apparently consenting to determine whether their actions would be justified. 
Moreover, this would require the defendant to be conscious of the potential exploitative 
nature of his actions. As the mens rea requires the defendant to knowingly or recklessly 
exploit another, his defence would have to demonstrate that he did not deliberately exploit 
another’s vulnerability. This approach could address many of the concerns that exist within 
the current legal response, but this must be coupled with widespread systemic change.1069  
 
4. THE LIKELY CHALLENGES AHEAD 
This chapter has suggested that in light of the previous chapters, the legal response to 
sexual offences is inadequate. Consent alone is inadequate to afford proper protections to 
individuals, and instead a complete overhaul to the approach to sexual relations is required. 
Herring and Dempsey’s position that sexual penetration requires justification has been 
 
1069 As detailed in the conclusion chapter 
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applied, extended and expanded to suggest a new offence and to include other forms of 
sexual assault. This argument has been strengthened through a vulnerability lens, by 
reimagining harm and using this position to encourage individuals to take responsibility to 
not harm each other.  
4.1 SEX NEUTRALITY 
Considering the historical significance of rape as a gendered crime perpetrated by a man 
against a woman, it is likely that the sex neutrality of the new offence of unjustified sexual 
relations might face some hesitancy. As outlined above, in contrast to the current 
heteronormative legal response to sexual offences, the law would not be framed in terms of 
gender. By including sexual touching, and removing the focus on penetration, both male 
and female perpetrators could be guilty of this offence. Moreover, like the current 
legislative response, both male and females could be victims of the offence too. The 
historical significance of the term ‘rape’ and keeping such an offence separate from female 
perpetrators has arguably lost its impact. As discussed in chapter 2, the term rape has 
become clouded in heteronormative assumptions and traditional expectations about 
gendered behaviour, which in turn carries responsibilisation and stereotypical attitudes. 
Although it is acknowledged, as the introduction outlined, the majority of perpetrators are 
male and the majority of victims of sexual assault are female, this would no longer serve as 
a justification for the segregation of protections. We should not make distinctions based on 
frequency. 
It has been argued throughout the failings of the legislative response largely relate to the 
focus on autonomy and the responisbilation of individual victims. To avoid creating 
similar issues, we must remove any boundaries and segregations. We must acknowledge 
and respond to the universality of vulnerability. Our experience of vulnerability, and the 
potential to have that vulnerability exploited does not solely rest with gender. Our 
experience of our vulnerability is dependent on our resilience. It is our embedded position 
in society that effects our experience of our particular vulnerabilities. Instead of focussing 
on gender, we need to ask more difficult questions about the source and experience of 
particular vulnerabilities. It is argued that the gender- neutral offence of unjustified sexual 
relations, framed through a theory of vulnerability, can help us to respond accordingly. 
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4.2 THE BROADNESS OF THE OFFENCE 
Flowing from the previous point on the gender neutrality of an unjustified sexual relations 
offence, it is likely that the broadness of this new offence might face criticism. As explored 
in earlier chapters, rape, sexual assault, causing another to engage in sexual activities, and 
assault by penetration are all contained within different sections of the Sexual Offences 
Act.1070 In particular, non- consensual sexual touching and penetration not by a penis, do 
not fall within the definition of rape, and instead sit as separate offences under section 2 
and section 3 of the act accordingly. Through this new offence, the actus reus of unjustified 
sexual relations covers any sexual touching or any penetration. Therefore, we must 
consider how the benefits of such an approach might outweigh any suggested shortfalls.  
Historically, rape has been noted as a particularly heinous crime. However, we must 
consider whether this label of rape, and its traditional significance, remain as powerful 
today. Gardner and Shute have discussed why penetration is ‘so special’, and why such 
violations are considered particularly horrifying? The thinking is that rape is (particularly) 
terrible, but as Shute and Garner argue, this alone is not enough to justify its distinction.1071 
Moreover, they discuss the development of the meaning of rape, where it used to be 
considered in terms of female virginity or as property of their fathers/husbands.1072 They 
argue its significance has ‘changed drastically it has changed for the worse, creating scripts 
and expectations that are unrealistic’.1073  Moreover, they go on to state  
‘The point is that the although the mere use of people is a timeless evil, the elevation of 
penetrative non-consensual violation to the status of a special paradigm is a longstanding 
but culturally conditioned application.’1074 
Instead, Shute and Gardner suggest rape to be widened to include all forms of sexual 
touching.1075 We take this point and agree that the elevation of rape as a particularly 
heinous crime retains is status merely symbolically. As explored in chapter 2, the term rape 
is problematic as it carries expectations of ‘real’ violent strange rapes, that in turns creates 
expectations and a hierarchy of protections. This also carries an expectation that 
penetration with a penis, indeed violent penetration as so often is expected with the term 
 
1070 S1-s4 Sexual Offences Act 2003. 
1071 Gardner, J., & Shute, S.,’ The wrongness of rape’ in Horder, J., Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford, OUP, 
2000) 209-210 
1072 Ibid. 
1073 Ibid. 
1074 Ibid. 
1075 Ibid 212. 
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rape, is particularly worse than other forms of sexual abuse. Of course, some might 
suggest, as Herring and Wall do,1076 that penetration is a forceful act that carries risks of 
physical harm. The Sexual Offences Act does acknowledge the significance of penetration 
as both assault by a penis and other penetration, carry maximum life sentences.1077 
Whereas sexual assault is categorised as an either way offence carrying a term of up to 10 
years on indictment.1078 The distinction and justification for penetration appears to be 
based on the potential for physical harm.  
Arguably, the experience of sexual assault and rape is wholly subjective and cannot be 
categorised or graded. The worst rapes do not necessarily mean the most violent ones. 
Arguably, it is the experience of the victim-survivor, and the particular exploitation of their 
vulnerability which should be the focus. Because of this subjective nature of sexual assault, 
we can and should differentiate it from other non-fatal offences against the person. For 
example, rape and sexual assault is not so clear cut as assault, actual bodily harm and 
grievous bodily harm. We cannot look to charging standards for guidance, or a particular 
wound to estimate the length of the healing process to reflect its severity. We cannot 
objectively determine its gravity, its healing time, or indeed the pain of suffering caused to 
the victim-survivor. Sexual violations go beyond just physiological harms, to differentiate 
based on the potential for physical harms is arguably reductivism. Moreover, as referred to 
in chapter 2,3 and 4, by differentiating between sexual violations, the law creates a 
hierarchy of protections, affording more protections to those we deem as most deserved, 
and thereby placing excessive responsibility on others to avoid harm. Therefore, it is 
argued, that the current legislative response is inadequate and unjustified. A more holistic, 
nuanced and broader offence of unjustified sexual relations should more accurately and 
fairly respond to sexual violations.  
 
4.3 THE PROBLEMS WITH ‘EXPLOITATION’ 
Another likely challenge lays within the meaning and understanding of the term 
exploitation. As a central concept to the above-mentioned offence of unjustified sexual 
relations, it is appropriate to consider what is meant by exploitation. In its simplest terms, 
 
1076 Ibid.  
1077 S1 & s2 Sexual Offences Act 2003 
1078 Sexual Offences Act 2003 s3 
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in our context, we take exploitation to mean the taking advantage of another’s 
vulnerability. Whether taking advantage has to be wrongful, benefit the user or be unfair 
are just some of the issues which have been explored in literature.   
 
There has been much discussion of exploitation as a concept with many academics 
struggling to agree a ‘general theory of exploitation’.1079 This may perhaps be due to the 
complex nature of what exploitation is, together with the different contexts in which 
exploitation might be applicable, eg financial versus intimate exploitation. There are many 
academics who have written widely on exploitation. Feinberg’s understanding of 
exploitation is often a starting point ‘how A uses B; what it is about B that A uses; and 
how the process redistributes gains and losses’.1080 However, as Collins notes, this formula 
tends to raise more questions than it answers.1081 It is not within the scope of this thesis to 
offer a definition or refined understanding of exploitation, but it is worth exploring the 
differing academic opinions on the concept to highlight the difficulties in conceptualising 
exploitation. Below is a brief exploration of the differing interpretations amongst some of 
the leading scholars.  
 
Tea Logar questions whether defining exploitation is in fact possible. Logar explains, in its 
most basic of terms, we can understand exploitation to mean ‘taking wrongful advantage of 
another’s vulnerability’.1082 Here, Logar suggests that the advantage taking be 
‘wrongful’.1083 Indeed, Logar uses exploitation and wrongful use interchangeably.1084 We 
must therefore explore what Logar means by ‘wrongful’ use, and under what 
circumstances is use acceptable. She designates wrongful use as a subset of wrongful 
treatment, distinguishing it from other forms of mistreatments such as ‘neglect, oppression, 
discrimination’.1085 She describes wrongful use as using a person as an object or an 
instrument.1086 She further explores when is use wrongful, given that there are a variety of 
 
1079 Tea Logar, Exploitation as Wrongful use: Beyond taking advantage of Vulnerabilities’ [2010] 25 Acta 
Analytica 329-346, 332 
1080 Joel Feinberg, ‘The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harmless Wrongdoing’ [1988] 176-210, 179. 
1081 Jennifer Collins, ‘Exploitation of Persons and the Limits of the Criminal Law’ [2017] 3 Criminal Law 
Review 167-184, 175 
1082 Tea Logar, Exploitation as Wrongful use: Beyond taking advantage of Vulnerabilities’ [2010] 25 Acta 
Analytica 329-346, 329.   
1083 Ibid.   
1084 Ibid at 331. 
1085 Ibid at 331. 
1086 Ibid at 331. 
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circumstances where people benefit from other’s needs, citing that ‘it is acceptable to trade 
food, medicine, and clothes for money’.1087 In citing Goodin’s understanding of 
exploitation, Logar states that context and circumstances will help determine when use is 
wrongful. Goodin relies on ‘social norms, as he explains exploitation in terms of a 
violation of the norms governing certain social interactions’.1088 Moreover, Goodin’s 
theory of exploitation would not be applicable in our context. Through his traditional 
understanding of vulnerability, he understands exploitation as a failure to protect the 
vulnerable.1089 He suggests someone is vulnerable when they are dependent on you and 
when they can be harmed by you.1090 Goodin’s basic understanding of exploitation is 
therefore grounded on a misunderstanding of vulnerability. Moreover, in the context of 
sexual offences, until our understanding of sexual relations reflects a more mutually 
beneficial experience, it is unlikely that we would take an approach where wrongful would 
be considered in light of social norms.  
 
Logar further suggests that wrongful use is different and broader than taking advantage, as 
the latter requires some sort of benefit be obtained by the user. She disagrees with this 
interpretation and argues that someone can use someone without per se gaining benefit for 
themselves. Moreover, Logar criticises what is meant by benefit, it may be that objectively 
they have not in fact gained.1091 Logar is particularly critical of the requirement of gain and 
or benefit for these reasons, ultimately stating it is not necessary to demonstrate 
exploitation.1092 In the context of sexual offences however, with particular attention to the 
requirement demonstrating that the did not exploit the complainant, it may be beneficial to 
demonstrate that a defendant acted in such a way so as to benefit themselves through the 
use of another. It is therefore unlikely that the understanding of wrongful use as 
exploitation would be helpful for the purposes of sexual offences.   
Ruth Semple understands exploitation differently. In her analysis she refers to exploitation 
as ‘degradation’.1093 She explains that seeing exploitation ‘in terms of respect for 
 
1087 Ibid at 336.  
1088 Ibid at 337. 
1089 Goodin, R., E., Protecting the Vulnerable (The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1985) 112 
1090 Ibid 
1091 Tea Logar, Exploitation as Wrongful use: Beyond taking advantage of Vulnerabilities’ [2010] 25 Acta 
Analytica 329-346,331. 
1092 Ibid at 332. 
1093 Sample, R., Exploitation: What it is and why it’s wrong (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003) 56 
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persons’1094 helps us to understand our ‘obligation not to exploit’.1095 Moreover, she 
suggests the use of a vulnerability is a prerequisite for exploitation.1096  Hence, she argues 
that making ‘use of one’s vulnerability for the sake of advantage is our basic way of 
understanding exploitation’.1097 She refers only to ‘genuine vulnerabilities’ as capable of 
being exploited. Although within this umbrella concept she refers to more than just basic 
material but also to ideals such as self-respect, rights and liberties.1098 Perhaps this 
conception of exploitation of vulnerability could be broadened through the vulnerability 
theory lens to incorporate a broader range of circumstances.  
 
She further argues that the basic ideals of exploitation involve ‘the interacting with another 
for the sake of advantage in a way that degrades or fails to respect the value in that 
being’.1099 Her focus is therefore on (dis)respect. She states that there are three broad 
divisions of failing to respect a person, which include ensuring a flourishing life, taking 
advantage of an injustice and treating a person as an object.1100 Arguably, Sample’s 
analysis takes a moral standpoint, focussing on duties owed to each other to ensure a 
flourishing life.1101 Logar criticises  Sample’s standpoint, suggesting that it is too narrow, 
as it focuses on needs and excludes the exploitation of desires.1102  
 
More recently Collins has explored this concept of exploitation. She distinguishes between 
the mere use of a person and the use of a person as mere means.1103 The former she 
describes as permissible, while the latter should be criminalised. She identifies the links 
between exploitation and criminalisation, whilst criticising the criminal law approach. She 
argues that the criminal law is limited in its abilities to in addressing ‘the root of the power 
dynamics which may lead to exploitation’.1104 Indeed, it is agreed that the criminal law is 
not necessarily the ultimate answer to address exploitation, however it is a necessary 
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Analytica 329-346, 329.   
1103 Jennifer Collins, ‘Exploitation of Persons and the Limits of the Criminal Law’ [2017] 3 Criminal Law 
Review 167-184, 170. 
1104 Ibid at 169.  
198 
 
element. Together with a change in societal attitudes of vulnerability, the responsibility of 
the State and an acceptance of our duties not to exploit one another, the criminal law play a 
key role in addressing exploitation.  
 
The above is merely a brief overview of some of the differing opinions on the theory of 
exploitation. It is clear that there is no consensus as to what exploitation means. Indeed, it 
may prove difficult to define exploitation within legislation. Perhaps legislation would not 
attempt to define this difficult concept but instead include guidance as to what amounts to 
exploitation perhaps referring to the use of a person as a means, for the defendant’s benefit 
with reference to elements of disrespect and using a person as an object. This may well be 
a challenge, coupled with the likely resistance of the requirement of justification for 
penetration.  
 
 
 
4.4 LIKELY RESISTANCE  
However, it is unlikely that these suggestions will be openly welcomed. Requiring the act 
of penetration to be justified on every occasion is likely to be perceived as onerous. In fact, 
Dempsey and Herring’s proposal has already been critiqued. For example, Nicholas J 
McBride analysed Herring and Dempsey’s suggestion regarding the wrongness of rape.1105 
He suggested that the courts should not adopt the standpoint that rape is unjustified sex.1106 
He rejects this argument because he suggests that the unjustified sex argument fails to 
account for the qualitative nature of the harm; as he cites Robin West,1107 it does not 
account for the ‘spiritual murder’ of rape. To address this concern, it can be argued that by 
requiring justification for penetration through a vulnerability lens, we can consider other 
non-physiological wrongs. By rethinking the harm of sexual offences, as potential 
exploitation of vulnerability, we can consider that the potential harm of unjustified 
penetration encapsulates the potential abuse a complainant might experience.  
It is unsurprising that liberal academics disagree with a legal stance requiring justification 
for penetration. Anthony Duff in particular, has argued that ‘we should not have to answer, 
 
1105 Nicholas J McBride, ‘Rape and Consent’ [2012] (online) available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2489819  
1106 Ibid. 
1107 Robin West, ‘Legitimating the illegitimate: a comment on “Beyond rape”’ [1993] 93 Columbia Law 
Review 1442, 1448 
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to our fellow citizens through the criminal courts, for every act of sexual penetration.’1108 
As explored by Dsouza, for Duff, sex is presumptively consensual, and that it would be 
‘anti-liberal to demand that all persons engaging in sexual penetration should answer to the 
polity.’1109 However, to engage with this argument we can suggest that the law currently 
does ask justification for penetration from individuals. The burden of such justification 
rests solely with consent, and as explored above and in chapter 3, consent alone is not 
powerful enough. Moreover, to demand a defendant to take more responsibility not to 
exploit others, is unlikely to be as burdensome as Duff maintains. Even through an 
autonomy lens, one could argue that autonomy might be more respected should we require 
justification for sexual penetration. We need to move away from a point of presumptive 
consent which arguably does not serve to protect the autonomy of individuals as it so 
claims. Instead we must start from a presumption of non-consent where penetration 
requires justification because of the potential exploitation of vulnerability.  
As Wall has cited, Dempsey and Herring’s view has been dubbed as ‘alternative and 
extreme.’1110 There will likely be much hesitation to accepting the view that both sexual 
penetration is a prima facie wrong and that sex requires more justification than consent 
alone. As Herring and Dempsey have cited, the orthodox view is that there is nothing 
wrong with sex.1111 Therefore this starting position may be difficult to implement. As Wall 
explains, labelling sexual penetration as wrong therefore means ‘there is prohibitory norm’ 
against it.1112 The law in labelling penetration as wrong would provide a protected reason 
not to do something. Having such a rule against sexual penetration would therefore remove 
the ‘weighing up of reasons’ for or against a scenario. As detailed by Wall ‘whilst the law 
may prohibit an activity, and pre-emptively exclude countervailing reasons for action from 
the equation, the law may also provide justificatory defences, which permit a certain set of 
countervailing reasons for action to re-enter the equation.’1113 Therefore, the wrongfulness 
of penetration can be, all things considered justified. Moreover, although categorising 
sexual penetration as initially wrong will no doubt cause controversy, we can arguably 
 
1108 R.A. Duff, Answering for Crime (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), 209 
1109 Mark Dsouza, ‘Undermining prima facie consent in the criminal law’ [2014] 33 Law and Philosophy 
489-524, 495 
1110 Wall (n 1018) 287 citing David Ormerod, Smith, Hogan, and Ormerod’s (eds.) Essentials of Criminal 
Law (2nd ed.,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) 279 
1111 Herring & Dempsey (n 99) 31 quoting Tadros, V. (2005) Criminal Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 106. 
1112 Wall (n 1018) 292. 
1113 Wall (n 1018) 292. 
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justify this standpoint by suggesting that the wrongness lays in the potential for harm and 
exploitation. Moreover, we do need to reconsider the act of penetration as initially a wrong 
in order to demand that a defendant’s actions be justified. This will help us to shift our 
focus from the complainant onto the actions of the defendant and help acknowledge, 
recognise and mitigate our vulnerabilities.  
It is a radical overhaul to our current legal response to sexual relations especially 
considering the current autonomy-based approach. However, the leap to a point where 
penetration requires justification will be minimised when we reimagine our existence 
through a vulnerability theory. This theoretical framework has shaped the above suggested 
legal response. Arguably, it is unlikely that the offence as detailed above would be as 
effective through an autonomy lens. Moreover, for this legal response to be effective we 
would require widespread and systemic change to reflect the key components of a 
vulnerability theory. Institutional and societal change play a key role in the State’s 
responsibility to address our universal and particular vulnerabilities. The law is a powerful 
tool and has a key position and in changing our approach to sexual offences. As Sabroe 
argues, ‘laws are not neutral- they promote produce and reproduce particular 
understandings of how to be human of society of family of equality and inequality’1114 and 
indeed it follows of capacities and incapacities. Equally, as Fineman states the ‘law defines 
the circumstances under which an entity and its actions will be considered entitled to the 
special protection of law.’1115 As a result, the law must be adapted around a complete, 
comprehensive understanding of the human experience if they are to work effectively for 
real-life subjects.1116  As she articulates, ‘law has agency, not just in its words but in its 
materiality and for the affect it has on human beings…1117 the law is also the people and 
institutions that realise law.’1118 Yet we must consider the implications of legal reform and 
how best to realise its potential. Therefore, the next chapter will conclude the overall thesis 
but will focus on how the vulnerability theory can be used to shape the societal response to 
sexual relations to bolster the potential of the suggested legal reform.  
 
 
1114 Jydbejerg (n 25).  
1115 Fineman (n 19) 6. 
1116 Ibid 10. 
1117 Jydbejerg (n 25). 
1118 Ibid. 
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Conclusion  
 
Beyond the law 
 
 
1. THE PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS IDENTIFIED 
This thesis has used a vulnerability theory to critique and unpick the legislation and its 
implementation in relation to sexual assault. It has been identified and argued that the 
current law is inadequate for many reasons. The following problems have been identified 
throughout this thesis.  
Chapter 1 and 2 argued that problematic response to sexual assault complainants exists 
because of the inextricable links with the autonomy approach and the connotations and 
implications that such a lens carries, including responsibilisation and othering. It was also 
argued that consent as a foundational principle is unsuitable because it is vague, malleable 
and too open to manipulation by defence counsel. Moreover, the ways in which consent is 
framed and interpreted in the law is too subjective. This therefore encourages an undue 
focus on the complainant’s behaviour. This arguably distracts jurors from considering the 
actions of the defendant.  
Chapter 3 argued that protections for incapacitated complainants are inadequate. The 
presumptions contained within section 75 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, focus 
primarily on the cause of the incapacitation rather than the individual’s potential for 
exploitation. The differing protections of incapacitated individuals creates a hierarchy. The 
less blameworthy you are perceived to be for your incapacity the more protection you are 
ultimately awarded. In particular, those with a mental disorder are afforded the greatest 
protection, whereas those who become voluntarily intoxicated have the least legislative 
protections. Moreover, the determination of capacity and the implementations of the 
presumptions is problematic. Through an analysis of the case law it has been argued that if 
a voluntarily intoxicated complainant retains consciousness, they are often determined to 
have retained capacity. The autonomous decision to become voluntarily intoxicated is 
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linked to an acceptance of responsibility to avoid harm. This approach reinforces 
responsibilisation, stereotypical attitudes and victim blame.  
Likewise, chapter 4 argued that the treatment of those with a mental disorder is also 
unsatisfactory. They are separated and othered by reason of the existence of a 
characteristic. The legal response fails to acknowledge the vulnerability of all individuals. 
Section 30 covers circumstances where a defendant has sexual intercourse with a person 
who has a mental disorder ‘impeding choice.’1119 This offence attempts to shift our 
perspective onto the defendant. It is a noteworthy attempt to balance sexual freedom and 
protection. Nonetheless, the constraints of an autonomy approach remain evident.  
To help address the aforementioned issues with the legal approach in England and Wales, 
chapter 5 looked to the Canadian perspective to determine whether any lessons could be 
learned. In particular, the affirmative consent model and its implementation were critically 
examined. It concluded that the affirmative consent model would not bring about sufficient 
changes to address the issues as outlined in the previous chapters. It was argued that it fails 
to adequately address stereotypes because of its autonomy foundation which still leads us 
to responsibilise and place undue focus on the complainant’s behaviour. Moreover, chapter 
5 also examined the Canadian approach to the treatment of incapacities. The interpretation 
and application of this capacity umbrella approach unfortunately did not address the 
hierarchy of protections. It was argued that this failure was due to the approach still being 
informed through an autonomy lens.  
Therefore, it was argued that the current legal response, as informed through an autonomy 
approach, is inadequate. Instead, what we need is a complete uprooting of the theoretical 
foundations of the law. It has been argued that a theory of vulnerability can take its place 
and alleviate the concerns addressed with the current legal and societal response to sexual 
assault complainants. Chapter 6 then considered what legislation might look like if it is 
based on a vulnerability foundation. 
Through an analysis and expansion of Herring and Dempsey’s arguments that sexual 
penetration is a prima facie wrong which requires justification, a new offence entitled 
‘unjustified sexual relations’ was proffered. Chapter 6 detailed the new offence that is 
informed through a vulnerability lens. It suggested that the actus reus of the offence would 
 
1119 S30 Sexual Offences Act 2003 
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be sexual touching or penetration. The mens rea of the offence would refer to the 
defendant’s knowledge or recklessness as to the exploitation of another’s vulnerability. A 
defence would be available to a defendant to show that his actions were, all things 
considered, justified. He would have to demonstrate the consent of the complainant as well 
as evidence that he did not exploit the vulnerability of the complainant. Other 
circumstances could be evidenced to demonstrate that a defendant was justified in their 
actions.   
It was argued that this offence may begin to alleviate the concerns identified in the 
previous chapters. Firstly, it would relocate consent from the heart of the offence to a 
contributing factor of a defence. Secondly, it would remove the hierarchy of protections 
through one single offence. There would no longer be different offences or protections 
available to certain individuals, instead the offence would include all individuals including 
incapacitated complainants howsoever caused. Having a single offence would therefore 
address the concerns of othering and responsibilisation and the hierarchy of protections. It 
would recognise our universal embodied and embedded vulnerability and not segregate or 
label individuals.  
Most importantly, this new offence would help to shift our focus from the complainant 
onto the defendant. From a starting position where penetration requires justification, the 
onus, and therefore the lens, shifts onto the defendant to justify his actions and to 
demonstrate he did not exploit the vulnerability of the complainant. Demanding 
justification for an act of penetration places responsibility on individuals not to exploit 
others, rather than to avoid harm. This response would reflect our universal and particular 
vulnerabilities. Instead of starting from a presumption of capacity promoting autonomy and 
thereby responsibilising individuals, we would be recognising the reality of our 
vulnerability and accepting our susceptibility to exploitation. This would create both a 
legal and a moral duty not to exploit each-other’s vulnerability. This shift means we could 
start to move from victim blaming and responsibilisation of complainants, away from 
reliance on stereotypical attitudes, expectations and myths.  
This change may help address the stereotypical attitudes that affect complainants, 
particularly those who are voluntarily intoxicated. By switching our starting point through 
a theory of vulnerability, this will inform our understanding of sexual relations and 
arguably address the expectations that are currently placed on complainants. 
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The law is only ever one step in addressing issues. Although powerful, the law alone is not 
enough to change the deep-rooted issues within our response to sexual offences. To 
achieve substantive and effective change, we look to use vulnerability to challenge the role 
of the State and our societal attitudes. The vulnerability theory asks us to think more 
critically about our existence, our relationships with each other and with society. It asks us 
to take a step back, and to rethink everything we ‘know’ to be true. It makes us question 
the ‘norms’ we have accepted for so many years about responsibility, about the State role 
and about being ‘autonomous’. Through vulnerability we can untangle these 
understandings, sourcing their root and questioning what if we were to start it all again? If 
we were to begin from a vulnerability perspective where would our focus lay, how would 
we perceive sexual relations? Where should our focus lay? In doing so, we can not only 
reimagine the law, but we can ask difficult questions of the State and society, to challenge 
how we perceive, understand and respond to sexual relations. 
 
2. MOVING FORWARD: THE NEED FOR SYSTEMIC CHANGE 
As previously discussed, we are vulnerable because of our embodiment as human beings. 
However, we must also recognise our vulnerability is embedded within our relationships 
with institutions and in society. As aforementioned, one of the aims of the vulnerability 
theory is to shift our perspective away from the individual onto the State. It asks us to look 
upward to determine the source of our vulnerability and question the distribution of 
resilience. Although the previous section has outlined the legal response to sexual offences 
through a vulnerability theory, we have still focussed on the individual. This is of course 
because sexual offences concern individuals; it is very difficult to imagine how you might 
create a legal response without considering individuals at the core. However, we still must 
address one of the aims of the vulnerability theory as a means of shifting our focus onto the 
State. It encourages us to move away from responsibilising individuals to demanding a 
State that is responsive to individuals’ needs. As has been outlined in chapter 6, by 
reimagining harm through a vulnerability lens we look at the potential exploitation of our 
vulnerability as a source of harm, but also, we look at harm as a harm to societal norms. 
Moreover, by addressing the State’s role in our experience of our vulnerability, we can 
demand a State that is proactive and responsible.  
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Through the aforementioned guise of the autonomy approach, the State has shifted its 
responsibilities onto its subjects. By recognising our vulnerability as constant, universal, 
fluctuating embedded and embodied in us, we need to demand a functioning and 
‘responsive’ State. Martha Fineman proposes this idea of a Responsive State, responsible 
for providing us with the assets and tools to be ‘resilient’ when we experience our 
vulnerabilities in different lights. The concept of a Responsive State is intriguing and 
indeed a crucial component of the vulnerability theory; it demands that the State give equal 
regard to the shared vulnerability of all individuals, abandoning the traditional identity-
based approach and recognising that the State must play an essential role in protecting 
against discrimination.1120 
However, the terminology of ‘responsive’ used to describe the demand for State 
intervention, carries with it many dubious connotations. It is argued that describing a State 
as ‘responsive’ suggests harm must occur before the State’s role and duties are activated. 
Moreover, it also suggests that the State plays some form of secondary part in our 
experience of vulnerability. It is in fact argued that the State currently has played a critical 
role in reinforcing and exacerbating our vulnerabilities through its failures to address our 
vulnerabilities and indeed in the creation of the hierarchies of protections and distributions 
of protections based on privilege. The State is always responding, but not necessarily in a 
proactive productive way. As Clough rightly contends, despite how the 
autonomy/paternalism binary currently works through the rejection of State interference, 
the State does already intrude in our lives through its various structures, institutions and 
norms.1121 Yet this interference is often normalised and ignored by being made 
‘invisible.’1122 We and indeed the State must recognise the State’s involvement in 
aggravating and exposing our vulnerabilities. As Byes astutely recognises, ‘disadvantage 
as well as privilege are not the product of individual choice but rather originate from unjust 
structural and institutional arrangements and therefore embody a failure of public 
responsibility.’1123 Therefore, considering the role the State already plays in our lives, we 
 
1120 Fineman (n 19) 20.  
1121 Clough (n 21) 477.  
1122 Ibid. 
1123 Emese Byes ‘imprisoned lives: expanding vulnerability to provoke sexual agency and inclusion in bodies 
labelled as intellectually disabled) Workshop on vulnerability and Social Justice, [2016] June 17-18 Leeds 
University.  
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should demand a State that monitors and adapts to our vulnerability to ensure institutions 
are structured justly.  
Although the concept of the responsive State is persuasive, it is alternatively suggested we 
should describe the active State as a Responsible State; this instead suggests both the 
State’s responsibility recognise the role it has played creating vulnerabilities and indeed its 
duty to be responsible to all its subjects equally. As Marvel argues ‘the State must shoulder 
responsibility in creating the laws and social institutions that will prevent conditions of 
exploitation from occurring.’1124 It is through access to these laws and institutions that we 
can as Martha Fineman coins ‘build resilience’ to confront our vulnerabilities. Although 
we cannot completely ‘mitigate our vulnerability’1125 resilience is what provides an 
individual with ‘the means to recover from harm, setbacks, and the misfortunes that affect 
our lives.’1126  
However, we are not born resilient,1127 resilience is cumulative,1128 and it also particular. 
Resilience is produced within institutions and relationships that confer power and 
privilege.1129 We gather the tools to live a fruitful life through a range of social institutions, 
and it is, through a theory of vulnerability, the State’s duty to provide us all with such 
resources. The State through its bodies should promote and foster resilience equally. 
Arguably individuals experience their vulnerability differently, this is often dependent on 
the quality and quantity of the resources they can access. This suggests that resilience 
depends on the how the State distributes access to resilience.1130 Those who cannot 
command access are more likely to have their vulnerabilities exposed more often; this has 
been revealed through our analysis of the hierarchical protections of incapacitated rape 
complainants. It is this inequality of resilience that is at the heart of vulnerability ‘because 
through unequal access to certain societal structures and or unequal allocations of 
powers’1131 some individuals are deemed more deserving of protection. By dividing groups 
into categories, we ignore larger structural issues and instead focus on issues of identity 
rather than on access to resilience. This pursuit of individualised treatment through a 
 
1124 Marvel (n 18) 2045.  
1125 Fineman (n 21) 146.  
1126 Ibid. 
1127 Fineman [2014-2015] (n 21) 623. 
1128 Fineman (n 21) 146.  
1129 http://web.gs.emory.edu/vulnerability/about/definitions.html 
1130 As explored in chapter 1 
1131 Marvel (n 18) 2046.  
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rights-based framework results in resources being rationed accordingly. Once we recognise 
and welcome the universality of our vulnerability, we can reduce the stigma assigned to 
accessing State services, thereby demanding equal access to all.   
Although imperative to the vulnerability theory the term ‘resilience’, it is argued, carries 
certain connotations. Arguably, ‘resilience’ in the ability to ‘spring back into shape’1132 
from hardship suggests something quite individualistic, something experienced in isolation 
and independently; which is what the vulnerability theory seeks to avoid. Instead perhaps 
we should demand access to resources rather than resilience from the State, such 
terminology suggests a more universal and mutual approach to recovering from 
misfortunes. One such way in which the State can offer resilience to individuals is through 
the law. As we have explored above, the legal response can be moulded through a 
vulnerability theory. This approach will address the inequality of the distribution of 
resources and acknowledge our universal but also particular vulnerabilities. However, the 
law alone is not enough to tackle the challenges that exist within our current response to 
sexual offences, the State, through its other institutions as a duty to address our 
vulnerability.  
The State has a duty to respond to our particular and universal vulnerabilities throughout 
all of its institutional frameworks. This would therefore require that current response to 
sexual offences in all areas would need to be reformed. Currently the State is failing by 
ignoring its responsibility and individually responsibilising its subjects. As we have seen 
through the analysis of the law, gaining a legal right does not necessarily allocate power 
but instead can burden and responsibilise. The State needs to use all measures available to 
rectify its failures and address its responsibility by promoting access to resources that 
promote a fruitful life for individuals. As Fineman argues ‘it is inescapable that we are all 
impacted upon and shaped by social structures, institutions and discourses.’1133 The 
challenge is, as Clough rightly recognises, to examine ‘how these structures are working, 
and how they are impacting upon particular experiences.’1134  
Once this is acknowledged through a theory of vulnerability, the State can make broad and 
wide-ranging institutional change. As aforementioned, the legal response could be shaped 
through a theory of vulnerability. As the law can help shape institutions and our societal 
 
1132 Oxford English dictionary definition 
1133 Fineman (n 19) 11.  
1134 Clough (n 21) 478.  
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response, we must look towards other measures to reimagine our ontological existence. 
One key issue of a lens of autonomy identified throughout this thesis is societal attitudes 
towards rape complainants. The expected behaviours, stereotypical attitudes and myths that 
many endorse creates significant barriers for complainants accessing justice. As discussed 
in detail in chapter 2, rape myths and attitudes affect complainants at every stage of the 
process. Therefore, we require a major shift in our attitudes towards sexual assault 
complainants. We need to reimagine sexual offences by reconceptualising our existence. 
Once we begin to think differently, we can start to do something differently. If we 
challenge our norms, we can challenge the expectations placed on victims of sexual 
assault. As alluded to in chapter 2, this is not achievable through a lens of autonomy 
because of the expectations that are interwoven within such a lens. Instead, the 
vulnerability theory can be used to tackle our understanding of our experience which could 
help to change our understandings and perceptions of sexual relations.  
We require educative measures to be implemented to challenge traditional understandings 
of gender roles, stereotypes and myths about complainant and defendant’s behaviour. This 
will require a shift from individual responsibility to State and relational responsibility. 
Such measures should reflect our universal and particular vulnerability. Campaigns on 
sexual assault should not be reinforcing ideas of women as vulnerable merely because of 
their gender and their being alone in public.1135 Instead we should acknowledge that 
susceptibility to sexual violence may stems from a lack of resources and the failure of the 
State and its institutions. As Marvel rightly suggests our focus should be on ‘an 
intersecting array of factors that include a lack of individual resources, legislative and 
judicial failures, and the limitations of institutional support.’ 1136 This would require a 
tremendous shift in the current understandings and response to sexual assaults. In the 
current ‘me too’ climate there is an opportunity to use the theory of vulnerability as a new 
lens of analysing sexual relations; it is acknowledged that such a task would not be without 
its difficulties, but it is plausible. Public educative measures are essential but should be 
coupled with broader structural change to the bodies that currently respond to sexual 
offences. If the State acknowledges its responsibility both for creating vulnerabilities and 
in mitigating our vulnerability, the entire criminal justice system and its attitudes towards 
sexual assault complainants would need to be changed. 
 
1135 See chapter 2 for discussion. 
1136 Marvel (n 18) 2049. 
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Moreover, the lack of policing, police training, victim-survivor support and the nature of 
the judicial system would require reconsideration through a vulnerability lens. Clough 
examines how substantive reforms could improve the current position. She uses the theory 
to advocate for training and education that could reform and improve the justice system. 
She states  
‘[f]ocusing through the lens of vulnerability emphasises the need for a range of 
responses. In the context of sexual vulnerability, this points to the need for 
education, training, access to justice, as well as services being augmented towards 
choice and control through positive risk taking.’1137  
The current failures have all contributed to the exacerbation of vulnerabilities to sexual 
assault, and once responsibility is accepted there will be an opportunity to address its role 
through substantial reform. By combining the aforementioned legal reforms with 
widespread systemic societal and institutional change, we may potentially transform our 
attitudes and treatment of sexual assault complainants.  
To conclude, a vulnerability analysis can assist us to reveal some of the many ways laws 
function to reproduce particular understandings of what it means to be human. When we 
reform the law through a vulnerability lens, it can have an impact on how we treat 
individuals who have experienced a sexual offence. We must use the vulnerability theory 
to reconceptualise our existence and societal understandings of sexual offences. To re-
educate, to train and to understand our vulnerability and how to respond. We need 
widespread systemic change both to the law but also to the State, its institutions and 
individuals. Once we accept and welcome our vulnerability, and therefore our duty not to 
exploit each other, we can challenge the norms and distribute resilience equally. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1137 Clough (n 174) 395. 
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